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Abstract: John Rawls has been criticised for wrongly specifying the relationship 
between persons' ongoing emotional and intellectual commitments and their capacity to 
reflect on and revise those commitments. While there are, arguably successful, responses 
to this critique, the difficulty shows up, I argue, in connection with his representation of 
the problem of stability. Stability, in an ongoing Rawlsian society, if it is to be realistic, 
requires an accommodation of competing, personal concerns, concerns grounded in 
"comprehensive" moral doctrines. However, when appeal to Rawls’ principles of justice 
is required in order to settle disputes, in an ongoing Rawlsian society, the disputants must 
adopt a neutral standpoint that mutes the practical salience of their personal concerns. 
Those concerns, then, will not be engaged in deliberation. This has the implication that a 
person must respond to a judgement that goes against her by rescinding what she sees, 
prima facie, as a legitimate concern. This represents the problem of stability as one of 
how to extinguish unsupported practical considerations. The problem ought to be 
represented, rather, as one of how to accommodate competing concerns while keeping 
their practical salience, for the individuals whose concerns they are, intact. Ways to 
attempt to remedy this can be drawn on from outside of Rawlsian theory. In this thesis, 
however, I attempt to show how one can address the issue from within a Rawlsian 
account. Centrally, I note that Rawlsian citizens are, by assumption, market participants, 
at least insofar as they are involved in a system of discretionary exchange, and that, in 
order to be adequately specified as market participants, they must possess certain 
characteristics. An exploration of these characteristics offers, or so I argue, a conception 
of the relationship between ongoing personal commitments and the capacity for radical 
critique that promises to address the deficiency in Rawls’ representation of the problem of 
social stability.
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Introduction
John Rawls’ A Theory o f Justice (Rawls, 1999/1971, henceforth, Theory) presents 
a contractarian justification for liberal egalitarian institutions. A just society is, on 
this account, one whose legal, social, and economic policies are informed by 
principles that would be chosen, by its citizens, under conditions that are fair. The 
fairness o f the hypothetical choice scenario (what Rawls calls the “original 
position” 1) is secured by denying information to the contractees that would tend to 
induce them to argue for principles that reflect personal bias. This “veil o f 
ignorance” is designed to model impartial reasoning, then, by removing 
information about persons’ talents, social status, wealth, and the substance o f their 
personal moral, philosophical, and religious beliefs. Social stability is o f central 
importance in Theory, being one o f a number o f criteria with which to select 
principles o f justice. It takes on even greater importance in Rawls’ work when he 
comes to realise the incompatibility o f the way he argues for the principles o f 
justice and a presumption o f radical disagreement across different cultural and 
ideologically differentiated social groups, about what constitutes the good.
Rawls’ contractualist approach, as he presents it in Theory requires that 
principles for a just society be supported for reasons all can share as part o f their 
conceptions o f the good. This presumes a common evaluative basis for principles 
o f justice that any group, given the radical nature o f their disagreement with other
1 Rawls, 1999/1971, §4.
2 Rawls, 1999/1971, §24.
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groups in the same society, ought to be able to reject, without thereby 
disqualifying themselves as Rawlsian citizens. Realising this, Rawls reworked his 
accommodation o f stability and the fact o f radical disagreement, the “fact o f 
pluralism” , culminating in Political Liberalism  (1996/1993)4. In essence, 
whereas in Theory support for public institutions was to be understood as 
emanating from persons’ conceptions o f the good, in Political Liberalism  support 
for public institutions is made possible through the capacity people have for a 
mode o f thinking that takes the political as its special domain, leaving conceptions 
o f the good to inform evaluative thinking in personal contexts, and group-specific 
discussions. A further distinction between Rawls’ thesis in Theory and that o f 
Political Liberalism  is his emphasis, in the latter, on the artificiality o f the 
conception o f the person employed there. In this Rawls was responding to a style 
o f criticism that objected to the way in which he characterised the moral point o f 
view. According to this type o f critic Rawls fails to embed the moral reasoning he 
requires for evaluation o f existing institutions in the ongoing moral context o f the 
people whose institutions they are. Stripped o f the information associated with 
their own conceptions o f the good people will derive normative principles that are 
arbitrary from the personal point o f view, having no foothold in their everyday 
way o f seeing things. There are a number o f ways in which this type o f criticism 
can be made but most useful, for my purposes here, is the following. The 
principles o f justice Rawls derives are intended, in the first instance, for what he
3 That is, importantly, the fact of “reasonable” pluralism. A just, liberal society need not 
accommodate all conceptions of the good, but can reject those that, for example, threaten 
its viability (see Rawls, 1996/1993, 36).
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calls a “well-ordered society”4, a society characterised by ideal conditions, 
concerning, for example, the extent o f agents’ compliance. While this is an 
idealisation it is Rawls’ intention that the well-ordered society not be a distortion 
o f reality, but be sufficiently realistic to present the bases for a realisable liberal 
egalitarian polity. He fails in this objective because in order for people to 
moderate their everyday conduct so as to act in accordance with normative 
principles o f justice, such as those Rawls recommends, they must recognise the 
practical significance o f those principles from within their everyday point o f view. 
Because Rawls requires an impersonal evaluative stance that neutralises the 
practical role o f personal beliefs, affections, and convictions, in the justification 
for the principles o f justice, agents must bypass those factors in order to 
appropriately modify their behaviour. This misconstrues ethical reasoning as it 
fails to recognise the embeddedness o f moral evaluation, and so fails to 
adequately model the ethical thinking, and, therefore, the moral possibilities, o f 
real world agents. Rawls’ response to this critique is to point up a distinction 
between the everyday, evaluative stance of the agents in the well-ordered society, 
an evaluative stance that is informed by what he calls agents’ “comprehensive 
doctrines”, and the artificiality o f the neutral stance agents adopt when evaluating 
their society’s institutions. The normative stance o f real world agents is informed 
by their comprehensive doctrines, being constituted by their philosophical, moral, 
and religious convictions, and this is reflected in the conception o f the evaluative 
thinking o f well-ordered citizens in their everyday lives. The impersonal 
perspective they are presumed to adopt in an assessment o f their society’s basic
4 Relevant references for this notion in Rawls can be found in chapter one of this essay.
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institutions is not intended to reflect real world evaluative capacities but to 
function merely as a theoretical device intended to portray a form o f moral 
thinking that does not presuppose a comprehensive doctrine. While we (real world 
agents) are capable o f moral reasoning that does not call into play the convictions 
that underpin our comprehensive doctrines, representing this requires an artificial 
division o f modes of evaluative thinking that, Rawls suggests, those who criticise 
him on this score mistake for an attempt to describe the actual evaluation o f real 
world people. Rawls offers here an effective rebuttal. The realism o f the well- 
ordered society need not be seen to be challenged by the use o f a bipartite account 
o f reflective thinking, once we recognise that the impersonality o f the behind-the- 
veil point o f view is merely artificial. Rawls’ defence will not work, however, or 
so I want to argue, once we recognise the implications o f the bipartite conception 
for his representation o f the problem of social stability.
A stable liberal democratic society, in which stability is associated with 
non-violent, incremental institutional change, is marked by an ever-present 
tension between compliance and dissent. Non-violent critique requires that 
dissenters comply with existing institutions even while the latter are under review, 
and, where dissenters’ claims are unsuccessful, that they, albeit reluctantly, 
comply with what prevailing institutions require. The problem o f social stability, 
then, for the type o f society that is Rawls’ target, ought to be understood as 
accommodating an ongoing tension between what persons agree to do, with 
regard to institutional requirements, and what they would do were institutions 
structured in the way they desire. Dissent must be a live possibility for those who 
reluctantly comply with existing institutions. Rawls’ conception o f reflective
criticism will not allow for the ongoing possibility o f a manifestation o f dissent 
among those who reluctantly agree to abide by institutional requirements. Those 
who comply with existing rules do so by extinguishing, or obliterating the 
personal concerns that motivate their dissent, so as to remove the practical 
significance they would otherwise possess, in their everyday lives. This is 
because, in order to adjudicate between competing claims in the well-ordered 
society, the society regulated by Rawlsian principles o f justice, it will be 
necessary, at least for certain hard cases, for agents to attempt to establish the 
standing o f their claims by imaginatively adopting the stance o f contractee in the 
original position. This requires that the agent adopt Rawls’ bipartite conception o f 
reflective criticism as a model for their own thinking. They then understand 
themselves to be evaluating the basis for their claims from a behind-the-veil 
position that puts out o f mind the bases o f the motive force of the personal 
concern that motivates their claim. This has them adopt a neutral stance to their 
personal concern that mutes its practical significance, this being unavailable from 
behind the veil. Stripped of their comprehensive doctrine in the neutral 
perspective o f reflective evaluation, agents have no means to feed the results o f 
such evaluation back into their everyday reasoning. They cannot moderate the 
motive power o f their personal concern from within the point o f view that is 
informed by their comprehensive doctrine because the mode o f reasoning they 
have used to arrive at a normative assessment o f their claim is alien to that point 
o f view. In order to override personal concern, where that is required, a person 
must obliterate it from outside o f his or her comprehensive doctrine, rather than 
moderate its motive power from within the doctrinal standpoint. Thus the
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artificiality o f Rawls’ bipartite conception o f reflective criticism no longer seems 
innocuous, once we recognise its implications for the understanding, in Rawls, of 
the problem o f stability. The problem is understood to be one o f how to root out, 
or eradicate, dissent rather than the problem o f how to motivate agents to 
moderate the motive purchase o f their personal concerns, in their everyday lives.
In this essay I do not attempt to solve the problem o f social stability. Indeed 
the Rawlsian solution may be correct. What I attempt to do is to provide a 
conception o f critical evaluation that allows for a representation o f the problem of 
social stability that recognises the ongoing tension between compliance and 
dissent. I attempt to provide such a conception by drawing on, what I argue are, 
the characteristic marks o f market participation. Everyday, personal, market-based 
choice is informed by comprehensive doctrine. This must be the case in a 
Rawlsian, well-ordered society, if  Rawls is to preserve the distinction between the 
doctrinal basis o f everyday choice and the neutral perspective associated with 
institutional evaluation. Dissent in the marketplace, associated with, for example, 
policy intended to root out unwarranted discrimination in employee selection, will 
involve a comparison, at the personal level, o f competing considerations. The 
dissenter will, on one hand, be faced with a requirement that he or she choose in 
accordance with the institutional rule designed to effect Government policy, and 
will, on the other hand, possess personal criteria she would apply in the absence o f 
the institutional rule. In order to arrive at a settled opinion as to which o f these 
two, alternative evaluative criteria to apply, the market participant must bring the 
criteria into view. This perspective is one from which the presuppositions 
supporting the two types o f criteria must not be presupposed. Were they to be
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presupposed we would fail to distinguish between the neutral and doctrinal points 
o f view that support the competing types o f evaluation. The way is opened, then, 
to defend a conception o f presuppositionless criticality that dissolves the divide 
between neutral and doctrinally committed points o f view. This conception allows 
us to embed criticality because the neutrality required for impartial evaluation is 
possible without requiring the agent to stand outside o f his or her comprehensive 
doctrine. Being so positioned, criticality need not entail the neutralisation of 
personal concern, leaving the latter’s motivational pull open to moderation. This 
conception o f embedded criticality does not solve the problem of how to achieve 
social stability, but it does offer a conceptualisation o f the problem that can 
accommodate the ongoing tension between compliance and dissent that ought, I 
have suggested, to be thought to exist in Rawls’ well-ordered society.
Market-oriented choice, though a central aspect o f everyday life in a 
modem economy, covers only a limited domain o f personal choice. It leaves out 
choice, and, more broadly, conduct, in family and other social contexts, and so the 
picture o f embedded critique I have outlined here might be thought, for that 
reason, to be o f limited interest to Rawlsian criticism. The conception of 
embedded critique associated with market participation has, however, 
implications for how we view the critical faculties o f the Rawlsian citizen as such, 
and not only in his or her role as market participant. First, it might be thought that 
a presuppositionless conception o f criticality, such as this, cannot to be associated 
with groups whose market conduct is exclusively informed by their group-specific 
norms. Such groups are market participants without being at all responsive to 
institutional requirements, it might be said. However, such groups are ruled out of
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the Rawlsian well-ordered society because they lack the sensitivity to constraints 
on personal choice support for which comes from outside o f their own norms. 
Moreover, restrictions on conduct intended to harmonise conceptions o f the good 
will inform institutional design, and so being sensitive to institutional 
requirements, and not only their own group-based norms, will be required o f all 
agents in a Rawlsian society. This being so, the market-oriented choice o f all 
persons in a Rawlsian society must be informed not only by personal doctrine but 
also by what is prescribed (and proscribed) at an institutional level. Having 
established, then, that all (Rawlsian) agents possess the characteristic mark of 
market participation, a degree o f criticality that transcends the division between 
neutral and non-neutral thinking, as that division is specified in Rawls, it is 
possible to view this as a mark o f the critical capacities o f the Rawlsian agent as 
such. It would be implausible to associate with the Rawlsian agent qua family 
member, for example, the bipartite conception o f reflective critique many think 
constitutes a weakness in Rawls' thesis, while being convinced by the conception 
that, I am suggesting, ought to be associated with the agent qua market actor. It is 
possible, then, to argue for a more adequate picture o f the place o f dissent, in the 
conception o f the problem o f stability, by focusing first on the market context. 
The thesis can then be extended to the Rawlsian society at large.
In chapter one I lay out the problem with Rawls' representation o f social 
stability, as I see it, relating it to a familiar style o f Rawlsian criticism associated 
with a "neo-Hegelian" disapproval o f the way he conceives reflective evaluation. 
Here the problem is framed in terms of a distinction between “oversocialised” and 
“undersocialised” conceptions o f human agency. In chapter two I emphasise the
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contrast between institutional constraints and personal doctrine as they influence 
choice in the market context. I do this via a response to G. A. Cohen's recent 
critique o f Rawls. According to Cohen, Rawls cannot, as he would wish, restrict 
his principles o f justice to background institutions, but must, necessarily, extend 
them to personal contexts, such as the market. I argue that Cohen fails to attach 
adequate weight to the role o f comprehensive doctrine in everyday, market-based 
choice. Chapter three is an attempt to resolve the problem identified in chapter 
one. I attempt to show how a sound conception o f embedded critique flows from a 
defensible understanding o f certain characteristics o f market participation. The 
central argument draws on the notion o f “metapreference”. In chapter four the 
work o f John McDowell is brought into play. This is in order to support the view 
that it is appropriate to view the critical capacities o f the market participant, and, 
more generally, the person, in a way that dissolves the divide between neutral and 
non-neutral points o f view. I suggest ways, drawing on McDowell, in which the 
argument o f chapter three might be extended to non-market contexts. A final 
section contains concluding remarks.
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Chapter 1
A Problem with the Problem of Stability in Rawls
Introduction
John Rawls has been criticised for wrongly specifying the relationship between 
persons' ongoing emotional and intellectual commitments and their capacity to 
reflect on and revise those commitments. In this chapter I consider the way in 
which this (neo-Hegelian) style o f critique shows up in Rawls' representation of 
the problem of social stability. I argue that, while there are, arguably, successful 
responses to the neo-Hegelian reproach, they do not succeed in the context o f 
Rawls' representation o f social stability. To put some preliminary flesh on the 
remarks I want to make, I note that the problem o f stability ought to be 
represented as one o f how to accommodate competing concerns and interests, on 
the understanding that the practical bearing o f those concerns on personal conduct 
is a live, or ongoing, issue for the people whose concerns they are. A stable (or, at 
least, a stable democratic) society is one in which the possibility o f dissent is an 
ever-present phenomenon. While individuals whose interests run contrary to 
prevailing institutions, and the restrictions on personal conduct they entail, will, if  
they are not actively subversive, restrain themselves, this does not mean that they 
will, nor that they are prepared to, radically overhaul their personal convictions, 
so as to remove their practical force. They will, rather, exercise personal restraint
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in the respect they show for the existing institutional set-up, even though they 
would rather see alternative institutions prevail. Rawls, or so I will argue, fails to 
represent this tension, the tension between persons' commitment to existing 
policies, rules and procedures, and their wish that their society's institutions were 
constituted otherwise. While stability ought to be represented as involving 
ongoing temperance on the part o f those who reluctantly accept existing 
institutional constraints, the way Rawls represents the problem has dissenters 
exorcise their personal commitments, commitments that do not sit well with 
existing institutions, and has them extirpate their normative significance.
In the sections that follow I state first (in section one) a response to the neo- 
Hegelian charge that Rawls' conception o f reflective critique is faulty. In section 
two I note the role and character o f stability in Rawls’ theory, and argue that his 
conception of, what he calls, "quasi-stability" entails a particular conception o f 
reflective critique: one that combines a capacity for critical reflection on 
prevailing institutions with ongoing obedience to their practical requirements. 
While this conception is represented differently in his earlier and later work - is 
improved upon, Rawls would say, in his later writing -  neither successfully 
captures what is necessary for a realistic representation o f social stability. As is 
argued in section three, the type o f impersonal reasoning a Rawlsian person must 
engage in, in order to evaluate and defend the strength o f his or her public claims, 
mutes the practical significance o f the concerns that motivate her case. So 
subdued, the normative and practical weight o f those personal concerns is lost in 
deliberation. So, where a person accepts, reluctantly, that her claim ought not, all 
things considered, to result in institutional adjustment, and so ought not to inform
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her personal conduct, she will be unable to moderate (from within her everyday 
standpoint) the normative pull her concerns have for her in her everyday life. In 
order to suppress the sources o f dissent the person will have to root them out, so 
as to be a person for whom such concerns simply do not figure in everyday life. 
Section four explores the roots o f the problem, while in section five I address the 
point that Rawls might be immune to criticism in this regard because o f his 
explicit intention to offer an artificial account o f personal reflection, one that is 
not intended to mirror real world evaluative capacities. My argument, here, is that 
his misconstrual o f the problem o f stability runs counter to his "realistic 
utopianism". Section six concludes.
§1. A Response to the Neo-Hegelian Critique of Rawls
John Rawls' theory o f justice, as stated, principally, in A Theory o f  Justice 
(1999/1971), Political Liberalism  (1996/1993), and Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement (2001), has come under attack from a number of, what have been 
called, neo-Hegelian critics. Prominent among these are Michael Sandel (1996, 
1998/1982), Alisdair MacIntyre (1987/1981, 1984, 1988, 1999), Bernard 
Williams (1981a, 1985), Michael Walzer (1983, 1994, 2004), and Charles Taylor 
(1979, 1989).5 One strand in the neo-Hegelian critique o f liberal political theory
5 Discussions can be found in, for example, Sen (1999b), Buchanan (1989), O'Neill 
(1988), and Kymlicka (1991). Feminist critics of liberal theory present similar objections. 
See, for example, Heckman (1992, 1995, Ch. 2). I choose the term neo-Hegelian rather 
than the more common “communitarian” in order to separate what it has to say about the 
liberal conception of the person from the associated communitarian political agenda. This 
allows me, inter alia, to include Bernard Williams in the list. As support for the view that 
there is a distinction to be had between the communitarian thesis and its political
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draws attention to the role and character o f personal autonomy in liberal thinking. 
A staple liberal view claims that personal and social interests are best served 
where individuals are allowed personal space to explore their ideas, inclinations, 
and talents. Thus the self is emphasised as a source o f innovation and social 
renewal over the community and its collective energies. Supporting this emphasis 
on the individual is the liberal picture o f the ideal agent: one capable of, and 
prepared to take up, a critical stance that doubts the validity o f even the most 
deep-rooted o f his society's norms and considered convictions.6 This, the neo- 
Hegelian argues, is a wrong-headed account o f the critical distance a person is 
capable o f when assessing her society's underlying principles, practices and 
routines. A person cannot simply shrug off her culture, its norms, its ready-made 
modes of evaluation, in order to think things through anew. The point is put 
vividly by Alisdair MacIntyre, who talks about the embeddedness o f the Homeric 
character alongside the illegitimacy o f supposing there to be a standpoint outside 
o f the Homeric setting from which a self so situated could view his milieu:
implications, I note that Sandel’s communitarianism supports his “republicanism” 
(Sandel, 1996) but, according to Larmore (1992/1987, 112), the one need not entail the 
other.
6 For other strands see, for example, Buchanan (1989) who identifies five currents 
running through neo-Hegelian views. The view I focus on in this essay is most akin to his 
point iv (p. 853); the view that "Liberalism presupposes a defective conception of the self, 
failing to recognize that the self is "embedded" in and partly constituted by communal 
commitments and values which are not objects of choice."
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The self of the heroic age lacks..that characteristic which...some modem moral 
philosophers take to be an essential characteristic of human selfhood: the capacity to 
detach oneself from any particular standpoint or point of view, to step backwards, as it 
were, and view and judge that standpoint or point of view from the outside. In heroic 
society there is no 'outside' except that of the stranger. A man who tried to withdraw 
himself from his given position in heroic society would be engaged in the enterprise of 
trying to make himself disappear. (MacIntyre, 1987/1981, 126).
In similar vein, Michael Walzer argues that the social meaning o f goods varies 
across distinct political communities, and that their social meaning forms the basis 
o f a judgement about their appropriate distribution (Walzer, 1983). Hence an 
approach to justice that has goods ju s t as such as its subject matter is bound to be 
mistaken by Walzer's lights. Indeed, a self specified in an acultural way so that all
n
it can have in view are goods just as such would be similarly mistaken. And this 
is not solely a theoretical worry. A society that has such a (mistaken) self-
o
understanding may have a severely morally impoverished public space , or 
alienate its people because o f a failure on the part o f its government to endorse its 
citizen's beliefs.
A good way to characterise Rawls' project is as an attempt to combine 
radical moral, philosophical and religious plurality with a society-wide 
commitment to public institutions, sufficient to secure political stability over time.
7 (Cf. Walzer, 1994, x-xi: “There is a picture of the self, nothing so grand as a theory, that 
is consistent with "complex equality"” -  a conception he explores in chapter five of that 
text).
8 Michael Sandel complains that the value-neutrality of public debate Rawls recommends 
creates a vacuum into which come the gossip columnist and the talk-show host (Sandel, 
1998,217).
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And his recommended way o f achieving this is to require agents to blind-side 
their personal normative commitments when assessing their society's institutions. 
In order to achieve this, Rawls attempts to provide a basis for the justification of 
principles o f justice that can convince all o f a society's members, irrespective of 
their standing, personal moral outlooks, or, what he calls, their "comprehensive 
doctrines".9 Such a basis is provided, in his thesis, through the construction o f a 
fictional, contractual scenario, the "original position", in which the moral point of 
view is represented by placing carefully chosen limitations on the knowledge 
individuals have about their personal characteristics and social circumstance.10 In 
doing this, the neo-Hegelian charges, Rawls neutralises the emotional and 
motivational factors, the sensitivities and presuppositions that inform evaluative 
discussion within a living morality. An assessment o f principles so derived, by the 
people whose lives they are intended to regulate, will require them to censor what, 
for them, are fundamental givens in moral discussion. Further, if, as the neo- 
Hegelian believes, such reflective neutrality engenders disenchantment then 
instability will be an inherent feature o f a Rawlsian society. Stability requires 
civic virtue, fraternity and altruistic commitment, the argument goes, but these
9 Rawls, 1996/1993, 13: "A moral conception is...comprehensive when it includes 
conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as 
ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is 
to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole. A conception is fully 
comprehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely 
articulated system.. .Many religious and philosophical doctrines aspire to be both general 
and comprehensive."
10 Eg. Rawls, 1973/1971, Chapter I, section 4.
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depend on a "thick"11 form of moral conviction that Rawls' account of personal 
reflection disallows. This, were it to be true, would substantially undermine his 
project. Further, and more fundamentally, if  Rawls' specification of the 
possibilities o f reflective thinking call for an impossible radical perspective then 
any conclusions that rely on it will require a different sort o f support.
One response to this, offered by Rawls, is to emphasise the artificiality of 
the representation o f the person in his theory o f justice. The division in the person 
between the neutral stance she adopts in her assessment o f public institutions, and 
the thick point o f view she adopts in her daily life, models but does not attempt to 
depict how things actually are with real world evaluative psychologies. I return to 
this response in section five. A second way to respond is to redescribe the social 
world and persons’ relationship to it in a way that responds to the neo-Hegelian 
critique but maintains the evaluative autonomy required for traditional, and 
Rawlsian, liberal positions. This approach acknowledges that group attachments, 
while not indissoluble, play a constitutive role in any correct characterisation o f a 
person’s normative outlook. According to this response we can accept the cultural 
embeddedness o f persons, in a correctly specified liberal society, while arguing 
also that this ought not to lead us to give inadequate weight to the possibility each 
has o f exiting his or her given social or cultural grouping. And associated with
11 Walzer (1994, xi, n.l) uses the term “thick” to denote “a kind of argument that 
is...richly referential, culturally resonant, locked into a locally established symbolic 
system or network of meanings. He borrowed the term from “Clifford Geertz's defence of 
"thick description" in his much-cited The Interpretation o f Cultures ( New York: Basic 
Books, 1973).” In this essay I take “thick” to refer to the normativity-laden perspective a 
person adopts when her comprehensive vision is what is informing her thinking.
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this possibility is the capacity for a critical distance that brings social and group-
1 9specific norms, and their philosophical basis, into view. The neo-Hegelian 
ought, on this view, to accept this as a correct description o f modem (liberal) 
societies unless she wants to disallow, implausibly, changes in normative stances, 
the possibility o f movement among social groups, or reflective loyalty. And this 
degree o f critical distance is all the liberal needs in order to derive principles for 
society as a whole, even given the fact o f radical plurality.
It is commonly accepted that these responses are adequate to silence the 
neo-Hegelian critic. Rawls himself, while emphasising the artificiality o f his 
conception, applauds Kymlicka’s view that the liberal has anyway the resources to 
accommodate cultural embeddedness. And it seems right that we need not think of 
there being a radical gap, in fact, between personal and impersonal normative 
stances in order to theorise the scrutiny o f shared institutions. It seems right, 
further, that modelling this form of reasoning will require a separation, somehow, 
o f thick and thin commitments that need not be taken as depicting how things are 
with the evaluative reasoning o f actual people.
12 This type of response is found quite explicitly in Kymlicka (1991) and, can be 
borrowed also from Walzer (2004), even though, as is well known, Walzer is not in the 
habit of defending Rawls. In this recent work Walzer emphasises, among others things, 
the reluctance many people have to abandon their social roots even though an opportunity 
may have arisen to climb the social ladder. Conceptualising this requires that we 
characterise such a person as capable of reflective distance and emotional attachment, 
simultaneously. This picture can be imported, in principle, into Rawls' account without 
the rest of Walzer's methodological baggage. For a brief but illuminating account of the 
difference in method between Rawls and Walzer, see Carens (2000, 22-23).
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However, when applied to the problem of stability in Rawls the neo- 
Hegelian critic is not so easily silenced, or so I want to suggest. There are two 
aspects to this critique and I prepare the way for them by looking, next, at the 
meaning o f stability in Rawls. It will be seen that there is a relationship between 
the way he characterises stability and a conception o f the reflective capacities of 
the Rawlsian agent. His theory incorporates this character to some extent, but not 
sufficiently, I will argue, to represent the problem o f stability in a fully satisfying 
way.
§2. Stability, Quasi-Stability, and Characteristic C
Underlining the importance o f the notion o f social stability to Rawls' thesis is his 
early effort, in A Theory o f  Justice (henceforth, Theory) to define stability, and to 
express its significance:
Some measure of agreement in conceptions of justice is..not the only prerequisite for a 
viable human community. There are other fundamental social problems, in particular 
those of coordination, efficiency, and stability... (T)he scheme of social cooperation must 
be stable: it must be more or less complied with and its basic rules willingly acted upon; 
and when infractions occur, stabilizing forces should exist that prevent further violations 
and tend to restore the arrangement. (Rawls, 1999/1971, 5-6).
We cannot, in general, assess a conception of justice by its distributive role alone... We 
must take into account its wider connections...other things equal, one conception of 
justice is preferable to another when its broader consequences are more desirable. (Rawls, 
1999/1971, 6).13
13 Cf. (Rawls, 1999/1971, 49, 119, 153-155; 1996, xix,).
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Indeed, as is well known, Rawls did not come to think that he had down-played 
the issue o f stability in Theory. Rather, he came to see that his account o f the 
bases o f social stability, in section III o f that text, was inadequate once the 
implications o f radical (though "reasonable") disagreements about social and 
human goods, among members o f the same society, were fully recognised. In 
Theory Rawls sees the task o f demonstrating the stability o f a society regulated by 
the two principles o f justice as one o f showing the "congruence" (eg. Rawls, 
1999/1971, 496) o f justice and goodness. That is, he thought it was necessary to 
show that the just society, the one endorsed by "justice as fairness", would (or 
could) also be endorsed by its citizens from the perspective o f their own 
conception o f the good. Indeed, he says,
Best of all, a theory should present a description of an ideally just state of affairs... such 
that the aspiration to realize this state of affairs, and to maintain it in being, answers to 
our good and is continuous with our natural sentiments. (Rawls, 1999/1971, 417).
But this point o f view he rejects as he comes to appreciate how "unrealistic"14 it is 
for societies marked by what he calls "the fact o f reasonable pluralism"15, 
societies marked by a diversity o f beliefs about the nature o f the good. It cannot 
be presumed, that is, that all o f such a society's members will endorse institutions 
as just from the perspective of their otherwise radically disparate conceptions o f
14 Rawls, 1996, xvii, xviii.
15 Eg. Rawls, 1996, 24, n.27, 144.
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the good.16 Stability in Political Liberalism , then, is founded not on a 
correspondence o f conceptions o f the good and the rational basis o f just 
institutions, but is based rather on a capacity persons have to apply a separate 
mode of evaluation when assessing the justness of their society's basic institutions. 
This conception is presented perhaps most clearly in the following (Cf. Rawls, 
1996, 12):
(J)ustice as fairness is to be understood at the first stage of its exposition as a free­
standing view that expresses a political conception of justice... (T)he political conception 
is a module, an essential constituent part, that in different ways fits into and can be
16 "Conception of the good" is a rather vague notion. Rawls puts some flesh on it when he 
says that a conception of the good, "must not be understood narrowly but rather as 
including a conception of what is valuable in human life. Thus, a conception of the good 
normally consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends we 
want to realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to 
various groups and associations... We also connect with such a conception a view of our 
relation to the world -  religious, philosophical, and moral -  by reference to which the 
value and significance of our ends and attachments are understood." (Rawls, 1996, 19- 
20). In what follows I often use Rawls' term "comprehensive doctrine" in place of 
conception of the good, though their relationship is confusing (see Rawls, 1996, 13). It 
seems that, a conception of the good should be identified with a "fully comprehensive 
doctrine", where the latter can be partial or full depending on the range of subjects to 
which it is applied. Also, a conception of the good takes for its subject matter all areas of 
political and personal life, including background institutions. A capacity on the part of 
citizens of a democratic society for the neutral thinking that is appropriate to the 
evaluation of public institutions that enables them to bracket their conceptions of the good 
for this domain. Rawls notes, in his discussion of public reason: "different procedures and 
methods are appropriate to different conceptions of themselves held by 
individuals...given the different conditions under which their reasoing is carried out, as 
well as the different constraints to which their reasoning is subject." Rawls, 1996, 220- 
221).
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supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society 
regulated by it.
It is not suggested here that a justification for a commitment to just institutions 
should be viewed as grounded in the mode o f evaluation associated with a 
person's religious, moral, and/or philosophical convictions. And that is, o f course, 
a central point o f departure from the point o f view Rawls put forward in Theory 
(Cf. Rawls, 1996,388, n.21).
There are a number of difficulties with Rawls' approach to stability in both 
earlier and later work. One concerns the reconciliation o f his ideal-theoretic 
assumption o f "strict compliance" (Rawls, 1999/1971, 8) with the possibility of 
non-compliance that underpins the need to secure stable institutions. An attempt at 
reconciliation here is instructive. While the problem of stability, as Rawls defines 
it (Rawls, 1999/1971, 12, cited above) is a problem for real world societies it 
seems as if  Rawls' ideal-theoretic approach to its resolution precludes stability, so 
defined, as a problem. The principles of justice he derives are intended, in the first 
instance, to apply to the basic institutions o f a “well-ordered” society (Rawls, 
1999/1971, 4 (also, p.397)). A well-ordered society is one in which,
everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and..the 
basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these 
principles.
(A) well-ordered society is also regulated by its public conception of justice. This fact 
implies that its members have a strong and normally effective desire to act as the
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principles of justice require. Since a well-ordered society endures over time, its 
conception is presumably stable. (Rawls, 1999/1971, 398. My emphases).
However, this seeming tension, between a presumption o f stability and its use as a 
criterion for a successful account o f justice, can be dissolved once we notice two 
important (though little advertised) qualifications of the notion o f stability Rawls 
employs in his theory. First, he describes the type o f social stability he intends as 
"quasi-stability":
A well-ordered society is quasi-stable with respect to the justice of its institutions and the 
sense of justice needed to maintain this condition. While a shift in social circumstances 
may render its institutions no longer just, in due course they are reformed as the situation 
requires, and justice is restored.” (Rawls, 1999/1971, 400, n.3).
We are not, then to picture social stability as an equilibrium in the sense o f an 
ongoing harmonisation o f interests against a background of unchanging legal 
procedures and social and economic policies. Well-orderedness is compatible with 
gradual alteration to, or evolution in the structure of, background institutions. 
What is assumed away, in ideal-theoretic reasoning, is not a capacity to criticise 
what is considered, say, unjustifiably burdensome. What is assumed away is a 
preparedness on the part o f society's members to consider the practical restrictions 
associated with existing institutions ineffective while they are subject to reflective 
critique. Quasi-stability, in the context of ideal theory, allows for internal criticism 
but requires non-radical shifts between institutional set-ups. This is compatible 
with a well-orderedness that presumes commitment to existing institutions (in 
terms o f their practical import).
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Second, Rawls does not desire stability simpliciter, but "As 
always...stability for the right reasons." (Rawls, 1996, xlii). Individuals in a well- 
ordered society must volunteer their assent to just institutions because o f  the 
rational appeal o f their justification. Were this not the case, the society, "would 
not be liberal." (Rawls, 1996, 143):
(T)he problem of stability is not that of bringing others who reject a conception to share 
it, or to act in accordance with it, by workable sanctions.. .Rather justice as fairness is not 
reasonable in the first place unless in a suitable way it can win its support by addressing 
each citizen's reason.." (Rawls, 1996, 143).17
17 Rawls justifies his decision to approach things via “strict compliance theory”, (Rawls, 
1999/1971, 8) by claiming that it provides “the only basis for the systematic grasp 
of. .more pressing problems,” (ibid.) -  those associated with, for example, civil 
disobedience. This suggests that we can safely distinguish between the possibility of 
critique (possible in a well-ordered society) and subversive conduct (precluded by well- 
orderedness). The contrasts here between what is and is not possible in a well-ordered 
society support a response to Wingenbach's complaints about Rawls' acount of social 
stability (Wingenbach, 1999). He suggests, among other things, that Rawls’ notion of 
stability fails to accommodate conflict over conceptions of justice (Wingenbach, 1999, 
14), and this seems correct. Evaluation of existing institutions does not entail evaluation 
of the background conception that informs the principles of justice in the first stage of 
reflection on existing public rules. However, Rawls distinguishes early in Theory (p.5) 
between disagreement over conceptions of justice in actual societies and its presumed 
absence in the well-ordered society. It is not an implication of his theory, then, that he 
does not accommodate disagreement of this sort, it is an assumption. Wingenbach also 
says that Rawls' account, “fails to distinguish between justice and legal order” 
(Wingenbach, 1999, 14). While this appears to be true, given Rawls’ definition of 
stability (Rawls 1999/1971, 12), once we make his notion of stability compatible with his 
ideal assumptions, an adequate distinction appears between legal bounds on behaviour 
and stability as ongoing, voluntary, and conditional, assent. In addition, the distinction 
Rawls sees between quasi-stability and stability per se appears in a more general context, 
in Ake (1974, 584-585): “(W)ritings on modernisation.. .conceptualize political instability
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The voluntariness associated with quasi-stability, entails non-violent transition 
between institutional frameworks, and this conception o f stability entails a 
particular characterisation o f the relationship between a person's standing 
commitment to existing practices and her capacity for a critical response to them. 
Indeed, it is in the way this characterisation changes between Theory and Political 
Liberalism  that a contrast between those works can be formulated. It also helps to 
identify a weakness in Rawls' conception o f stability that transcends the issue, 
addressed in Political Liberalism , o f the legitimate grounding o f persons' 
commitment to just institutions.
Note, first, that there are different ways in which a person (in a well-ordered 
society) might criticise her society's existing institutions. Specific policies might 
be criticised because, while in intention they satisfy agreed upon principles of 
justice, they fail, in fact, to achieve their objective. A particular tax schedule, for 
example, might be thought a weak attempt to achieve equality according to the 
difference principle, though that that is its intention is not in dispute. A second 
possibility is that a policy might be thought to conflict with, or fail to adequately 
reflect, the background, regulative principles o f justice themselves. A policy 
concerning the provision o f faith-based education, that gives privileged funding
as, implicitly or explicitly, as violence, conflict, civil disorder, short duration of 
governments, lack of institutionalisation, and so forth.. .These conceptions do not fully 
reflect the fact that, properly speaking, only relations or a system of relations can be said 
to be stable.. .The application of the term (to a relation) always suggests the possibility of 
change in that relation, a certain possibility of centrifugence among the elements which 
constitute the system.” Wingenbach appears to work with Rawls' basic definition
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status to particular faiths might, for example, be argued to be inconsistent with the 
principle that a society ought to secure equality o f opportunity. Third, in the 
manner o f an exercise in reflective equilibrium, a person might want to evaluate 
the justice o f her society's institutional backdrop in toto. Rawls (1996, 28) appears 
to deny that agents in a well-ordered society can engage in a process o f reflective 
equilibrium. This is only open, he says, to "you and me" (i.e., us and Rawls) 
(ibid.), but I don’t see how this can be sustained, as the justness o f a well-ordered 
society's institutions are primarily a matter for the agents in that ideal world. This 
is not, however, o f central importance for what follows. It is the second type o f 
possibility that is instructive here: criticism o f a specific, existing policy that 
questions whether it is justified by the reasoning that informs the principles o f 
justice. It will, as Rawls says (1996/1993, 229) be difficult on occasion to 
determine whether actual policy is so justified:
(W)hether the aims of the principles covering social and economic inequalities are 
realized is...difficult to ascertain. These matters are nearly always open to wide 
differences of reasonable opinion; they rest on complicated inferences and intuitive 
judgements that require us to assess complex social and economic information about 
topics poorly understood.
This does not, however, preclude an attempt to settle disputes (in the well-ordered 
society, regulated by Rawlsian principles) by invoking the justification for the 
regulative principles o f justice themselves, those that, it is agreed, ought to inform 
policy design. Now, a person who engages in such criticism, criticism of existing
(199/1971, 12) which is more akin to the definition Ake ascribes to "writings on 
modernisation".
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economic and social policy, must, in order for her criticism to be compatible with 
quasi-stability, and voluntariness o f commitment, have the following core 
characteristic, (C):
(C) She must be able to engage in counterfactual critique o f  existing institutions 
while respecting the practical requirements associated with those institutions as 
they stand.
To be clear, stability in the well-ordered society that Rawls describes does not 
require a once-for-all commitment to a particular set o f basic institutions. While 
he assumes “strict compliance”, universal, ongoing obedience to the institutions 
that the Rawlsian principles o f justice support, he recognises it may be difficult to 
achieve universal agreement on the way actual institutions are designed. 
Moreover, a flaw might be identified in existing institutions that, all agree, 
suggests a need for institutional redesign. So, while agents comply with 
institutions and the constraints on personal conduct they entail they, nonetheless, 
appreciate the contingency o f those constraints, and recognise that the arguments 
in favour o f existing institutions, and the constraints they entail, are questionable. 
Obedience to the constraints associated with existing institutions does not 
preclude a counterfactual stance that considers what society would be like were 
existing institutions otherwise constituted. Characteristic C is intended to capture 
what must be true o f an agent if  he or she is to be, at once, both non-subversive 
and reflective in her obedience.
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The existing, personal, practical implications o f institutions inform the
individual's personal conduct as someone engaged in everyday life in the well-
ordered, up-and-running, Rawlsian society. Critical reflection that takes into
account the soundness o f the justificatory ground for existing policy, on the other
hand, requires a standpoint that transcends the everyday point of view. It must be
the case, however, that while the transcendent (behind-the-veil) point o f view is
adopted the practical import o f existing institutions is, nonetheless, in place, and
in Theory this core characteristic is achieved by weaving together persons' "sense
o f justice" and their personal good. It is mainly in chapter eight o f Theory that
Rawls presents a sketch o f the moral development o f the person from infancy to 
1 8adult maturity , culminating (p.415) in an account o f a mature “sense of justice”. 
There he says that,
a sense of justice shows itself in at least two ways. First, it leads us to accept the just 
institutions that apply to us and from which we and our associates have benefited. We 
want to do our part in maintaining these arrangements.. (...).. Secondly, a sense of justice 
gives rise to a willingness to work for. ..the setting up of just institutions, and for the 
reform of existing ones when justice requires it.
Furthermore, we are not to suppose that a person, who on reflection, sees the 
justness o f the institutions that shape his action, takes on board the entailed 
personal requirements as external constraints on his behaviour. A person with a 
developed sense o f justice embraces the requirements on personal conduct,
18 Distilled into three “psychological laws” at page 429.
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entailed by institutional rules, as part o f the fabric o f his personal moral vision. 
The adult citizen in a well-ordered society is one for whom,
Ethical norms are no longer (as in childhood) experienced merely as constraints, but are 
tied together into one coherent conception.” (Rawls, 1999/1971, 434).
Hence, a preparedness to work for the reform of existing institutions “when 
justice requires it” (ibid., p.415) is combined with an internalisation o f existing 
constraints that embeds them in existing normative commitments. Being woven 
into the fabric o f persons’ conceptions o f the good, institutional constraints will be 
respected even while they are subject to critical review, while their justness is 
under suspicion. Rawls comes to see this way o f harmonising compliance and 
critique as incompatible with a recognition o f radical plurality. That is, given that 
the universal sense o f justice emanates from disparate conceptions o f the good, 
and Rawls comes to see that this pays insufficient respect to the fact o f pluralism, 
he adjusts the way he incorporates core characteristic C in Political Liberalism. 
There a commitment to criticise institutions while respecting their practical 
authority derives from a capacity for, and preparedness to engage in, neutral 
thinking as regards basic institutions, from a capacity, that is, to engage in a mode 
o f reasoning appropriate to political issues, that does not invoke “comprehensive” 
points o f view (recall n.12, above).
It appears, then, that Rawls, were he to recognise characteristic C as a fair 
implication o f quasi-stability, would see his conceptions o f reflective critique, in 
both Theory and Political Liberalism , as accommodating it. In Theory existing 
institutions are wedded to existing conceptions o f the good and so are supported
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even while they are subject to criticism. In Political Liberalism  a mode of 
appraisal appropriate to political discussion allows for ongoing commitment to 
existing institutions while they are under review. However, there is a problem 
here. Characteristic C, as stated above, does not capture all o f the implications of 
the combination o f quasi-stability and voluntariness o f commitment for the 
conception o f personal reflective critique. I try to state the nature o f this difficulty 
in section three, before, in section four, exploring its roots.
§3. Stating the Problem
Consider an unhappy Rawlsian. He is a citizen o f a well-ordered society, 
regulated by the two principles of justice, who will only make reasonable claims, 
regarding what he views as unfair burdens, or unfair distributive shares. He is 
unhappy because he thinks he perceives an injustice to him, and to his 
community. I will put some hypothetical flesh on why he is disgruntled in a 
moment. Note for now the following characteristics that a person so disgruntled 
must display, if  he is to possess characteristic C. He is committed to existing 
institutions, only insofar as they reflect the principles o f justice. While he is 
obedient, then, to institutional constraints, his commitment to them is inherently 
critical. Were it not then he would not be alive to occasions on which “justice 
requires” (Rawls, 1999/1971, 415) institutional reform. This critical acceptance of 
institutions is part o f what makes a person’s commitment voluntary, and his 
institutions liberal institutions. Furthermore, acceptance o f existing institutions 
will be critical acceptance because, while he accepts what they entail for his 
personal conduct, or, if  he is public spirited, what they entail for society as a
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whole, existing institutions run counter to, or only partially fulfil, his own 
aspirations. Quasi-stability and voluntariness entail a criticality, then, in the 
acceptance o f existing institutions that places a tension between compliance and 
critique that Rawls, I want to argue, does not accommodate. While his theory, in 
both its earlier and later forms, appears well-placed to capture characteristic C, as 
I suggested towards the end o f section three, above, it is not, I will argue, well 
placed to capture the mentioned tension.
Consider the following scenario. In a post-contract (up-and-running) 
Rawlsian society there is a minority cultural grouping (group 1) that has secured, 
through intelligent financial investment, say, greater resources with which to 
expand the number o f opportunities it has to publicly celebrate its beliefs and 
traditions. Another minority group (group 2), with different beliefs and traditions, 
worries that the first group’s raised profile may reduce social and economic 
opportunities for its (group 2 ’s) members. The argument group that two puts 
forward in support o f its claim is that an enhanced position for members o f group 
1, in the public imagination, a greater understanding o f its traditions and rituals, 
will give it (group 1) an unfair advantage in the labour market, stifling group 2 ’s 
efforts to advance itself. This will then, the argument might proceed, reduce group 
2 ’s ability to influence public debate because o f its inability to support and gamer 
general support for candidates to represent its interests.19 Both groups, we can 
assume, are small relative to other groups and a resource expansion for either 
would have to be very large for it to have a significant impact on the opportunities
19 Cf. Rawls, 1999/1971, 197-198: This would seem to be a claim that a Rawlsian 
government ought not to be deaf to. Resource inequalities, Rawls says, ought not to be 
such as to be the cause of inequality of political voice.
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facing other cultural groupings in the post-contract society. So, significantly, 
group 2 is the only one making a claim for extra resources to combat what it sees 
as the threat from group 1. This is an important fact because, while the size of 
group 2, the number o f its members, is relevant to the question why it and not 
other (larger) groups are concerned about group 1 ’s economic progress, the reason 
why group 2 is making a claim, and not other groups, is that group 2 has what 
might be called a heart-felt concern. To share their concern, not in a detached, but
9 0in a heart-felt way, one would have to be a member o f group 2 . First, consider 
the way in which a typical member o f group 2 must air his concern if  he is to 
challenge the permissibility o f group 2 ’s economic advance.
Suppose group 2 ’s claim finds no support in the existing constitution or the 
details o f social and economic policy. Then the group will want to show that their 
claim would be accepted were the government’s decisions informed by a correct 
understanding o f the implications o f the two principles o f justice. They will want 
to show, that is, that a decision in their favour would follow from a general rule 
itself informed by the, more general, two principles. This, the second kind of 
critique mentioned on pages 23-24 above, is, it should be noted, consistent with 
the procedural nature o f Rawls’ theory o f justice. The group are not claiming that 
a direct judgement can be made about their specific case by appeal to the two 
principles, only that a policy favourable to them, in its regulative character, can be
20 According to the O.E.D. “heart-felt” can be defined as that which proceeds from “the 
innermost self’. I use the term in something close to this strong sense in order to make 
vivid the connection between the claim made and the person’s outlook. I refer, more 
generally, in the essay to persons’ “personal” concerns. A concern does not have to be 
heart-felt, in the O.E.D sense, in order to be motivating.
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so supported. But note the reason their claim will be successful here, if  it is. If it is 
successful it will be because their claim is supported by a policy that in turn is 
supported by the more general two principles, that are in turn supported by 
behind-the-veil reasoning. Moreover, in order to argue that their claim is so 
supported the typical, or representative, member o f group 2, who wants to make 
this argument, must adopt the perspective Rawls requires for impartial thinking: 
the behind-the-veil point o f view that puts out o f sight personal facts, such as, 
relevantly here, cultural identity. Along with cultural identity goes also, of course, 
the personal concerns whose basis is the cultural identity that is fully bracketed in 
the behind-the-veil point o f view. There is a schism here. The reason for which 
group 2 is making the claim emanates from within their culture. It is not a reason 
available to all from an acultural standpoint, that is the point of calling their 
concern heartfelt, but operates as a reason only for those so culturally endowed as 
to see it as such. It is not a claim to additional resources just as such, and so a 
claim any might make irrespective of their cultural membership. Indeed, the group 
claiming disadvantage may accept that the resource inequality is due to good 
“option luck”, and so, arguably, fair by Rawlsian lights, yet still press their claim. 
So, on the one hand, in order to adequately ground their claim the group that feels 
the disadvantage must engage in argumentation that puts out o f sight its cultural 
convictions in order to argue for public support for more resources. On the other 
hand, the reason for their claim is based not in considerations accessible to all 
from an acultural perspective. The considerations that give rise to the reason for 
their claim are intimately related to their cultural convictions.
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At play here, inter alia, is the familiar neo-Hegelian criticism that the liberal 
reduction o f the person to an individual as such puts a distance between her and 
the reasons she has for her more heartfelt claims. But more fundamental is the fact 
that the group cannot construct their argument, for a claim to public resources, in 
a way that has it retain the practical salience o f the reasons that are internal to 
their way o f seeing things. They must adopt a normatively neutral conception of 
themselves that mutes the motive power o f their heartfelt concerns. A group can, 
o f course, argue for a claim from behind the veil that refers to the importance to 
them of the relative social standing o f their culture. But in order to do this, in the 
way that Rawls’ original position device requires, they must speak o f themselves 
not as the culturally loaded persons they are, with their cultural perspective intact, 
but as a cultural group as seen from the outside. They can, when they have 
adopted that point o f view, refer to the reasons that initiate their claim, but they 
cannot give those reasons their practical, initiating role, that is they cannot keep in 
play the practical, motive status o f the concerns, distinguished here by being 
called heartfelt. To give them this role they would have to be embraced from the 
standpoint of, in this case, group 2 ’s cultural outlook.
And the point is a general one. Where the basic reasons for a dispute are 
culture-bound it is those reasons that are the motor for the dispute. But Rawlsian 
citizens are agents for whom such reasons are denied their initiating role, in an 
argument intended to settle disagreement among cultural groups. This does not 
put at an appropriate distance but entirely mutes the reasons that emanate from 
that source, so denying them their role as the practical ignition (so to speak) in a 
dispute. What is faulty here is not an implausible metaphysical split between a
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situated self and its rational direction, nor the unreasonable expectation that
people extinguish culture-based reasons in the formulation o f their claims. The
problem is that the requirement to begin with neutral considerations does not
begin to engage personal reasons in disputation. It merely blind-sides them. It
doesn’t recognise and manage their force it merely extinguishes them, and in this
way fails to give them their proper status, as the momentum in disagreement
across cultural boundaries. What this entails is that when a person accepts a
negative judgement, a judgement that goes against her, she has no way back in her
thoughts to the practical reasons that were the basis o f her claim. This is because
the basis o f those reasons, her heartfelt concerns, are put out o f view in an
impartial assessment that is constructed in the way Rawls constructs it in his
model. Now, as an obedient, but disgruntled Rawlsian citizen, she must, having
accepted the judgement, restrain herself so as to mute the practical purchase o f her
heartfelt concerns. But this she cannot do (cannot do, that is, in a way that
addresses them with their motive status intact) because those concerns have not
been engaged in deliberation. They must be extinguished or allowed free reign,
but cannot, given that they have not been incorporated in evaluative thinking, be
21restrained as a matter o f reluctant acceptance.
Summarising this section, I note again that the problem o f stability plays 
a pivotal role in Rawls’ theory o f justice. It can’t be expected that groups with
21 I note that Sandel presents a similar thesis in one of his criticisms of Rawls: “The 
priority of the right over the good precludes members of different moral communities 
from bringing into play arguments based on their peculiar convictions in public 
discussion of "constitutional essentials and basic justice" (Sandel, 1998, 211. My 
emphasis).
38
differing doctrinal persuasions will commit to policies and procedures whose 
justification relies on normative presuppositions they do not share. For political 
stability there must be ongoing commitment to public institutions, and Rawls’ 
objective is, in order to provide a model for actual polities, to show how in his 
“well-ordered” society such commitment can be sustained across doctrinally 
divided groups. It must be the case, then, that public procedures for dispute 
settlement, in a Rawlsian society, enable citizens to air their concerns and to work 
towards agreement. This is, in one sense, unproblematic. The constitutional phase 
o f Rawls’ theory o f justice involves the implementation o f legal principles and 
procedures, that, one might argue, must be adequate to dispute settlement, because 
they reflect the principles o f justice Rawlsian citizens accept. This is not enough, 
however, to ensure that Rawls has successfully captured, or represented, the 
problem of stability in his conception of the well-ordered society. The importance 
disputants attach to their claims reflects their belief in the strength o f those claims, 
even if it is accepted, also, that the claims they make may be faulty. That is, even 
where a critical stance is taken towards a conviction, and the typical Rawlsian 
citizen, being reasonable, can be expected to take such a critical view, the claim 
made will be heartfelt. It will stem, that is, from a world view, the commitments 
that constitute that view being the basis for the claim that is made. The basis of 
the claim must differ, then, from the basis o f the Rawlsian person’s support for the 
principles o f justice. Were this not the case, the two would coincide, so 
undermining the gap between neutral and non-neutral stances so important in 
Rawls’ theory. Yet, in order to press a claim so contentious that the principles of
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justice must be brought into play - in order to work towards agreement - the 
discussants, in the well-ordered society, must adopt, forthwith, a stance that puts 
out o f view, that negates the influence of, the heartfelt concerns that motivate the 
dispute. Part o f the problem with this is that, detached from what they in fact care 
about, disputants clash not as citizens but as disengaged selves on whom personal 
concerns make no impression. But this is only part o f the problem.
The problem o f stability is a practical problem. It is the problem of how to 
deal in a single polity with the often competing and heartfelt claims o f doctrinally 
divided, social groups; but the problem is represented, in the Rawlsian society, as 
one o f how to arrive at agreement given a neutral standpoint all can share. On this 
basis, Rawls contends that we can overcome the problem of stability for a well- 
ordered society. However, he misdescribes the problem of stability by requiring 
agents to deal with disagreements by entering into a common, neutral standpoint 
that extinguishes rather than engages the heartfelt reasons o f the parties to a 
dispute. If agreement is reached by means o f such impersonal reasoning then what 
we have is a picture o f a society from which sources o f potential conflict have 
been expunged, rather than one in which those sources are tempered, in an 
ongoing accommodation o f potentially disruptive interests. This undermines 
Rawls' intentions to present what he calls, in later work, a “realistic utopia” 
(Rawls, 2001, 4, 5-6, 11-12), a theory in which the properties o f the ideal (well- 
ordered) society reflect what can be realistically achieved, given limitations on 
what can be expected, in terms of attachment and motivation, from real world 
agents. I return to this point in section five. In the following section I attempt to
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further uncover the roots o f the problem, and in so doing, to specify it more 
completely.
§4. Stability and the “Oversocialised” Conception of the Person
It will be helpful to attempt to uncover the root cause o f the misrepresentation of 
the problem of stability in Rawls. A deeper understanding o f the nature o f the 
problem can be brought out by looking at the influential work of Mark 
Granovetter (1985). Granovetter’s general argument relates to the sociologist’s 
search for a more socially embedded, norm-laden alternative to the economist’s 
isolated, rational actor. Applied to the marketplace Granovetter’s concern is to 
emphasise the importance o f ongoing social influences in market action. In 
arguing for his thesis Granovetter remarks on, what he calls, Rawls’ 
"undersocialised" conception o f the human agent (Granovetter, 1985, 483). In a 
way that is familiar from neo-Hegelian stances on Rawls’ approach, Granovetter 
contends that Rawls pays too little attention to the role o f socio-cultural norms in 
situating a person’s moral outlook:
Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context...Their attempts at 
purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations. 
(Granovetter, 1985, 487).
Granovetter recognises the power o f the liberal rejoinder to this critique, a 
rejoinder that points out the theoretical and real dangers o f social determinism. If 
the defender o f situated ethics is not careful to provide space for reflective 
critique, at the personal level, then personal freedom and autonomy are
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threatened; and Granovetter shares this opposing concern. Drawing on Dennis 
Wrong (1961), Granovetter says he is also concerned about the converse 
consequences o f an "oversocialised" rendition o f the agent in terms o f the limited 
space it might leave for social criticism at a personal level. What is interesting 
here is the way in which Granovetter thinks we ought to try to avoid the opposing 
pitfalls. I attempt next to bring this out. First, note that the "oversocialised" 
conception is, according to Granovetter,
A conception of people as overwhelmingly sensitive to the opinions of others and hence 
obedient to the dictates of consensually developed systems of norms and values, 
internalized through socialization, so that obedience is not perceived as a burden. 
(Granovetter, 1985, 483. My italics).
The italicised phrase in the quote helps to identify what makes Granovetter’s 
thoughts distinctive. For him (p. 485) the central weakness in both undersocialised 
and oversocialised conceptions o f Man is that neither captures the role o f ongoing 
social relations and associated pressures in shaping personal conduct. Moreover, 
while some norms are associated with habitual behaviour, we ought to recognise 
that much social conduct, whilst it respects the pressures o f social expectation, 
duty, and so on, involves an exercise of self-restraint on the part o f the agent. The 
oversocialised conception, as Granovetter describes it, fails to make room for the 
possibility o f  self-direction that goes against expectation. Norms, moreover, are 
malleable things, and a responsiveness to, often subtle, changes in social norms 
needs to be built into the conception o f the socially embedded person to reflect 
this. But the problem is not only that the person tends to be either undersocialised
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or oversocialised, there is a relationship between the two (a relationship 
Granovetter doesn’t, in fact, bring out explicitly).
Where a theory assumes, as does Rawls’, according to Granovetter, an 
undersocialised conception of the person, for purposes o f deriving normative 
requirements for the social context, it has difficulty representing agents, in their 
social context, as responsive to, and accepting o f those requirements, rather than 
fully governed by them - “so that obedience is not perceived as a burden” (ibid.). 
Socialisation, on what Granovetter sees as a faulty account, is a matter of 
embracing norms that once embraced play an exclusive role in shaping choice. 
Once adopted they remove the need for an ongoing responsiveness on the part of 
the individual to her living, social context, because the once-for-all nature o f the 
adoption of social norms has removed the possibility o f acting in a way that is in 
tension with them. That is, they act on the individual as if  from the outside, 
necessitating compliance, in a way that does not require any active social 
participation on the part o f the individual agent:
Social influence is..an external force that, like the Deist's God, sets things in motion and 
has no further effects.. .Once we know in just what way an individual has been affected, 
ongoing social relations and structures are irrelevant. Social influences are all contained 
inside an individual's head, so, in actual decision situations, he or she can be atomized as 
any Homo Economicus... (Granovetter, 1985, 486).22
22 This perspective has wide-ranging implications, according to Granovetter, for the 
analysis of economic activity. He argues, for example, that the "markets and hierarchies" 
literature associated prominently with Oliver Williamson relies on an artificial conception 
of the organisation as a place in which conformity is automatically forthcoming given 
hierarchical control. Against this one can point out that Williamson's theory allows for the
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The point is made, perhaps more clearly, in Wrong:
What has happened is that internalization has imperceptibly been equated with "learning", 
or even with "habit formation" in the simplest sense. Thus when a norm is said to have 
been "internalized" by an individual, what is frequently meant is that he habitually both 
affirms it and conforms to it in his conduct. The whole stress on inner conflict, on the 
tension between powerful impulses and superego controls, the behavioural outcome of 
which cannot be prejudged, drops out of the picture. (Wrong, 1961, 187).
On this sort o f account Rawls’ agents are, in fact, at once both 
undersocialised and oversocialised. They are undersocialised because they are 
capable o f imaginatively removing themselves from their social milieu and 
looking at things from the outside, as if  everything, including the modes of 
evaluation that ordinarily inform their everyday conduct, is available for 
inspection. On the other hand, when the principles they accept are in play in their 
society they accept these in a way that has them override rather than engage their 
everyday commitments and beliefs. This makes them oversocialised in the lack of 
room it makes for the fact that new commitments ought to be characterised in 
such a way that they integrate with standing commitments, and, where 
appropriate, suppress, though do not extinguish, them. Moreover, the 
characterisation o f the agents should be such as to keep in play the sensitivities
possibility of workers "shirking" in a hierarchy, though Williamson does seem to miss 
Granovetter's point when he refers (Williamson, 1998, 75) to "societal embeddedness" as 
a "background condition".
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that enable them to commit but nonetheless take a critical stance towards their 
commitments. Without this there is no room for the tension between a 
commitment and the desires, dispositions, and reasoned intentions that push 
against it in everyday life.
For further clarification of the point, it will be helpful to consider what 
Granovetter (following Wrong) views as problematic in Thomas Hobbes' attempt 
to provide a model of social order (Hobbes, 1651/1985). Hobbes presents a 
contractualist account of a transition from a pre-social state, marked by the ever­
present threat o f violent disorder, to a peaceable, stable society, in which at the 
root o f social order is compliance enforced by a central agent, the Sovereign. 
According to Granovetter, Hobbes' conception suffers the same weakness as 
Rawls' account. Rather than resolving the problem of the ever-present possibility 
o f conflict that confronts Hobbes’ pre-social agents, his proposed solution 
transports them immediately into a social scenario in which social conflict simply 
will not arise due to persons’ unreflective obedience to normative requirements. In 
this way the problem of social order is not worked through, but merely removed, 
because as a norm-governed agent the potential in the person for following desires 
at odds with those consistent with existing social norms has been erased. So, when 
a person accepts the constraints imposed by sovereign authority in Hobbes’ 
society he does so, on the Granovetter-Wrong thesis, on a model o f internalisation 
o f constraint that removes the possibility o f him doing otherwise. And this, as 
with Rawls, is not an incidental problem for Hobbes. It is a result o f the 
undersocialised conception o f the person Hobbes works with. The only possible 
way in which internalisation can take place is through a radical transformation o f
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the way the individual thinks about his choices and what is permissibly open to 
him. The person that needed restraining is no longer in view. What is in view is a 
new person from whom the problematic characteristics -  importantly, in the 
Hobbesian case, a readiness (supported by natural law) to resort to violence -  
have been removed as an ongoing concern. Thus the individual is transformed 
into an oversocialised personality incapable o f having his inclinations vie with his 
impulse to obedience.
As an antidote for these perceived failings, Wrong (p. 186) recommends 
Emile Durkheim's conception o f the way in which social rules constrain 
individual behaviour, drawing attention to Talcott Parson's treatment of Durkheim
23 The point is made also in connection with the conception of the person the (orthodox) 
economist adopts. Having a rational concern for what affects the self, the person can only 
be made sensitive to moral demands by appealing to her rational self-regard by showing 
her that moral boundaries are somehow better for her. This shows up in attempts to derive 
moral restraint in a game-theoretic, prisoner's dilemma framework - David Gauthier's 
"Morals by Agreement" (Gauthier (1987)) being one such, well known, attempt. The 
problem is, as Wrong sees it, not that moral restraint cannot be derived. The problem is 
that in showing moral restraint to be something that was anyway in the interest of the 
person they make the case for moral conduct completely compelling. For a person to see 
the possibility of immoral action as a live possibility for him makes him irrational and so 
disqualified from being an agent at all, on the definition of agency in play at the outset. 
Removing the possibility of immoral behaviour from the scope of a rational person's 
decision removes the problem the moral theory was intended to give an account of. 
Rather than retaining immoral conduct as a live possibility it removes it as a possibility 
for the rational person. Interestingly, Phillipa Foot's argument in "Morality as a System of 
Hypothetical Imperatives" (Foot, 1972) can be seen as an attempt to find a way out of the 
approach to moral theorising that sees moral demands as rationally compelling. The 
analogy she draws between morality and etiquette can be viewed as an attempt to 
introduce ongoing optionality (in a way that chimes with Granovetter's intentions) into a 
conception of moral agency.
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in his The Structure o f  Social Action (Parsons, 1937, pp. 378-390). Durkheim 
came to think, Wrong tells us, o f constraint arising from social rules not as an 
obstacle exerting pressure from outside o f a person's psychology, but as 
permeating his personal reasoning, being, in fact, "constitutive" o f the actor's 
ends. As Wrong notes,
Durkheim.. .recognised that the very existence of a social norm implies and even creates 
the possibility of its violation. (Wrong, 1961, 191).24
In light o f this discussion the problem with the representation o f the problem of
9 <stability in Rawls can be viewed in the following way. In order to enter into
24 Wrong's primary concern, I should note, is with the conception of the person he felt 
was prevalent in sociology. A central task for the modem sociologist has been, he says, to 
provide an alternative to the motivational picture of the individual contained, for 
example, in utilitarianism, orthodox economics, and "the power-seeker of the 
Machiavellian tradition in political science." (Wrong, 1961, 190). It would be "ironical" 
he says (ibid.) if the sociologist's response, that Man has an overarching interest in group 
approval, should be merely "the creation of yet another reified abstraction in socialized 
man, the status-seeker of our contemporary sociologists." (ibid.).
25 Vanberg (1994) identifies a central disagreement between economists and sociologists 
to be the sociologist’s emphasis on rule-following and the economist’s emphasis on 
choice in individual behaviour. He supports Wrong’s reading of Parson’s on Durkheim 
seeing the latter’s intention to be a way of resolving the tension between a self-effacingly, 
norm-obedient conception of the person and one that sees her as continually opting to 
follow rules. For Parsons, Durkheim achieves this by integrating the constraints 
associated with rules and a person’s extant interests: “the constraining factors actually 
enter into..concrete ends and values, in part determining them...” (Parsons 1960, 143,
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dispute concerning hard cases, in the well-ordered society (where an issue's being 
a hard case entails that reference must be made to the principles o f justice, and not 
just the procedures that interpret them), a person must adopt a stance that 
neutralises the motive power o f the reasons he has for pressing the claim he 
makes. Suppose that his claim is unsuccessful because the principles o f justice do 
not, on reflection, support his case. Then he will, if  he is compliant, have to adjust 
his behaviour in order to abide by the judgement. But, because he has been 
required to adopt a neutral stance, and argue on that basis, there is no route from 
the judgement he accepts to a fine-tuning of his everyday way o f seeing things. 
What he must do, if  he is to abide by the judgement, is to transform himself, from 
the outside, in a way that does not engage, but bypasses, his comprehensive 
outlook.
The problem o f stability, I have said, is a practical problem, a problem of 
how to accommodate, in an ongoing compromise, heartfelt claims, rather than of 
how to arrive at consensus given a shared neutrality. What is heartfelt is not 
tempered, or repressed, in an acceptance of an argument that draws on behind-the- 
veil reasoning. What is heartfelt is pushed aside, its vital force lost, in a radical 
transformation o f the individual enlightened by what the principles o f justice, he 
can now see, entail. To resolve this difficulty, neutral thinking, required o f one 
who is reasonable enough to recognise the need to justify his claims to others, 
must be characterised in such a way that the practical salience, to him, o f his 
concerns is somehow accommodated in deliberation. If those concerns can retain,
cited in Vanberg, 1994, 238). (Not all would agree that Parson’s has captured Durkheim’s 
meaning: the issue is discussed in Pope (1973, 1975), Cohen (1975), Parson’s (1975)).
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somehow, their vital status, then their motive force will, once deliberation is 
ended, be something that must, if  required, be contained. What is blocked in such 
a conception is a presumption that personal concerns that have their basis in 
comprehensive doctrine have been rendered harmless in a person who accepts his 
claim is not justified. In chapters two and three I attempt to work up a response to 
this critique that draws on Rawls’ presumption that his agents are market 
participants. It is important, however, to emphasise that the criticism I am making 
is not easily rebuffed by Rawls' stress, in his later work, on the artificiality of his
9 f \conception o f the person, and the associated model o f reflective critique.
26 In Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas (1995) (reprinted as Lecture IX in Political 
Liberalism, 2nd edition) Rawls presents an account of his theory that suggests the divide, 
as I draw it, between comprehensive and neutral thinking does not well represent Rawls’ 
view. In his reply to Habermas Rawls states that the principles of justice are pro tanto: 
“(S)ince political justification is pro tanto, it may be overridden by citizens’ 
comprehensive doctrines once all values are tallied up.” (Rawls, 1995, 143). In addition 
he says that, “We assume that each citizen affirms both a political conception and a 
comprehensive doctrine..In this case, the citizen accepts a political conception and fills 
out its justification by embedding in it some way to the citizen’s comprehensive doctrine 
as either true or reasonable, depending on what that doctrine allows.” (ibid.). Taken 
together these two statements imply that agents in a well-ordered society are to be 
understood to be capable of grasping at once both arguments with a neutral basis, and 
those that are associated with comprehensive doctrine. And, in order for agents to 
harmonise public reasons, those associated with arguments for regulative principles of 
justice, with comprehensive doctrine it must be the case that a standpoint is afforded them 
that allows a single evaluative perspective, one that dissolves the divide between 
comprehensive and neutral thinking. Such an all-embracing perspective would permit 
agents to raise personal concerns without annulling their motive force. On this reading, 
Rawls has an answer to both the neo-Hegelian charge that his conception of critical 
reflection relies on a metaphysically suspect level of rational detachment, and the 
objection that his agents are, as a result, oversocialised. It could be argued, then, that the
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interpretation of Rawls I am working with is one that ought not to be maintained once we 
take into account the comments on his own theory Rawls makes in his reply to Habermas. 
I want to cast some doubt on that contention, while recognising that the point deserves 
more detailed discussion.
The pro tanto status of the principles of justice permits discussion of their rationale 
and allows that they are open to modification. However, when Rawls points this out, in 
his reply to Habermas, he notes also that the principles are to be discussed from the point 
o f view o f agents in a well-ordered society, “from the point of view of citizens in the 
culture of civil society” (Rawls, 1995, 140). And this is quite a dramatic change from 
Rawls’ earlier statement that the proper perspective for theoretical consideration of 
principles of justice is that of the theorist and his audience (Rawls, 1996/1993, 28). I 
think that this change is one that Rawls must, arguably, find hard to support.
Recall that according to Rawls the conception of the person employed in his theory 
is artificial. Are we to suppose, on this new account, that this is no longer the case and 
that the agents in the well-ordered society really do stand behind the veil of ignorance, 
from a higher-order perspective that embraces both that view and that associated with 
comprehensive doctrine? If so, the conception is no longer artificial and lets in the neo- 
Hegelian who wants to remark that this gets the metaphysics of normative reasoning 
wrong. Are we then to suppose that the model of reflective critique represented by the 
original position is an artificial device and knowingly thought to be so by the agents who 
employ it? If so, then it will be associated with the misrepresentation of a stable society in 
the way I have suggested in chapter one. That is, while the interpretation the agents have 
of their behind-the-veil reasoning sees it as merely artificial, they will represent their own 
thinking to themselves in a way that misconstrues what is required for a realistic 
representation of a stable society. While this response suggests that it might be possible to 
avoid the implications, for my thesis, of what Rawls says in his reply to Habermas it is 
unlikely that it can be so summarily dismissed.
For example, Rawls says elsewhere that, “citizens will of course differ as to which 
conceptions of political justice they think the most reasonable,” (Rawls, 1997, 770) and 
that “criticism of political liberalism as not allowing new and changing political 
conceptions of justice is incorrect” (ibid., 775, n.30). These quotes reinforce the view that 
Rawls envisages citizens in a well-ordered society as being capable of a perspective that 
embraces political and moral points of view, and their associated neutral and doctrinal 
perspectives. However, if this is what Rawls intends, his position is weakened by his
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§5. The Artificial Defence
It might be thought that whatever the problem is said to be with Rawls' conception 
o f the problem of stability it cannot be a genuine worry for Rawls. At the heart of 
the complaint is the view that Rawls defends a mistaken conception o f reflective 
criticism. What needs to be tempered in a person who is obedient to institutions he 
or she would rather reject is the motive power o f heartfelt concern. The way 
Rawls conceives reflective evaluation, however, makes obliteration o f the
insistence, in the same paper, on the fundamental division between comprehensive and 
political outlooks. On this he says, for example,
Since the idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic political values and 
specifies how the political relation is to be understood, those who believe that 
fundamental political questions should be decided by what they regard as the best reasons 
according to their own idea of the whole truth -  including their religious or secular 
comprehensive doctrine -  and not by reasons that might be shared by all citizens as free 
and equal, will of course reject the idea of public reason. (Rawls, 1997, 771).
It is imperative to realize that the idea of public reason does not apply to all political 
discussions of fundamental questions, but only to discussions of those questions in what I 
refer to as the public political forum, (ibid., 767).
These quotes suggest that in order to consider basic institutions from a neutral perspective 
agents must step outside of and in so doing detach themselves from the point of view 
associated with their doctrinal commitments. Indeed, Rawls refers to “what Political 
Liberalism calls the background culture of civil society in which the ideal of public 
reason does not apply.” (ibid., 775, n.28). The accusations I make in the text are, then, 
arguably supportable, I think, even in the face of evidence that Rawls wants to defend a 
conception of the agent that permits an ongoing critical stance towards the principles of 
justice and their rationale.
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heartfelt the only option for one who, having engaged in reflective critique, 
accepts the judgement that goes against him. The motive power o f the heartfelt 
can only be tempered from within a way of seeing that is informed by the 
commitments, convictions, affections, and so on that generate heartfelt concerns. 
A piece o f rational reflection that does not engage those commitments, those 
affections, and so on, can result in a person overriding the motive power o f 
heartfelt concern only by radically removing it. This fails to accommodate the 
tension between rational commitment to less than desirable institutions and the 
pull o f personal preference, and this tension, I have argued, is required in an 
adequate representation o f the problem of social stability. But Rawls has argued 
that the conception o f the person in political liberalism ought to be viewed as 
artificial, as a theoretical construct, or heuristic device, intended to model but not 
to mirror actual evaluative capacities. Can't this same defence be made against the 
argument that he misconstrues the problem of stability? I want, in this section, to 
argue that this is not the case.
The defence that the conception of the person he employs is artificial 
arguably protects Rawls against the charge that he misrepresents personal 
evaluative capacities. The criticism I am making, however, does not point to 
Rawls' conception o f the person per se, but to its implications for the 
representation o f stability, and that representation, I will suggest, ought, by Rawls' 
own lights, to reflect something o f the real world.
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§5.1 Sandel and the Artificial Conception of the Person in Rawls 
I begin by considering the way in which Rawls' appeal to the artificiality o f his 
conception of the person in his theory seems an effective counter to the neo- 
Hegelian critique. I focus on the way it works as a response to Michael Sandel’s 
objections in this regard. According to Sandel, Rawls' conception o f the person 
has us,
stand to our circumstance always at a certain distance, conditioned to be sure, but part of 
us always antecedent to any conditions...Deontological liberalism supposes that we can, 
indeed must, understand ourselves as independent in this sense. (Sandel, 1998/1982, 11).
That is, we must understand the self as having an ontological priority that is the 
basis for our authority over the convictions we have, what permits us to view 
things from the value-neutral stance required by the theory. Sandel (1998/1982, 
16) goes on to say why he thinks Rawls sees reflective, evaluative neutrality as a 
desirable characteristic. What he desires, says Sandel, is an "Archimedean point", 
a perspective from which societal arrangements can be assessed that does not 
locate the assessment within the existing modes o f justification the society would 
use to defend its political arrangements. What is needed is a reflective space 
between the object of evaluation (the society's legal, politico-economic and social 
structure) and the means by which evaluation o f the object proceeds (Sandel, 
1998/1982, 16-17). What Rawls fails to do, on Sandel's account, is to provide a 
distance between the means o f evaluation, and its object, that avoids an alternative 
pitfall. In placing the Archimedean point outside o f existing modes of 
argumentation, Rawls asks the individuals in the society under inspection to adopt
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a detached perspective. The methods o f reasoning associated with this point of 
view must be arbitrarily selected, having no grounding in the evaluative 
commitments and ways o f reasoning they regularly apply and see as, in fact, 
adequately grounded. Sandel says:
If the principles of justice are derived from the values or conceptions of the good current 
in the society, there is no assurance that the critical standpoint they provide is any more 
valid than the conceptions they would regulate, since, as a product of those values, justice 
would be subject to the same contingencies. The alternative would seem a standard 
somehow external to the values and interests prevailing in society. But...where the first 
would be arbitrary because contingent, the second would be arbitrary because groundless. 
Where justice derives from existing values, the standards of appraisal blur with the 
objects of appraisal and there is no sure way of picking out one from the other. Where 
justice is given by a priori principles, there is no sure way of connecting them up. 
(Sandel, 1998/1982, 17).
The way that Rawls squares this circle is, Sandel tells us, through his belief that 
the self is a distinct item that can reflectively regulate its ends. The individual has 
the capacity, on this view, to rise above context and to bring into critical view her 
convictions, beliefs, modes o f evaluation, and the like, and subject them to 
rational scrutiny. While this conception does not require the noumenal, extra­
natural, self of Kant's moral philosophy, and the difficulties that entails, it does, 
nonetheless, defend a similar role for reason in practical deliberation. The 
individual has a capacity for self-command that enables her to bypass extant 
desires, affections, and beliefs. Hence, Rawls, on Sandel's reading, is alive to and 
addresses the difficulty posed by the potential gap between a person's moral 
context and a reflective stance, and is convinced that his conception of the person,
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as fundamentally under the command of a detachable self, is both correct, and 
serves to link what is worked out in reflection with everyday convictions. 
However, says Sandel, Rawls' conception is faulty in that it has the individual 
appeal to a normative basis for evaluative judgements that lie outside o f her 
ordinary way o f thinking. This alien basis can only be grafted onto and not 
integrated with an individual's ways o f thinking and so be, for him, groundless. 
Sandel recognises that in Political Liberalism  Rawls abandons the notion that his 
theory o f justice depends upon a voluntaristic conception o f the person - where 
"voluntaristic" captures the idea that a person is in command o f her desires, 
beliefs, and so on.
It is in response to this that Rawls adjusts the interpretation he offers o f his 
theory by having it float free o f any particular, substantive, understanding o f the 
relationship between the self and choice. His arguments are, he says, in this 
revised version, political; innocent of any view about the metaphysical status of 
the self. Hence, the nature o f the self as such is not at issue. And so, as Sandel 
himself acknowledges, in Rawls' later work, "(t)he priority o f the right over the 
good is not the application to politics o f Kantian moral philosophy, but a practical 
response to the familiar fact that people in modem democratic societies typically 
disagree about the good." (Sandel, 1998, 189). A grounding for right that is 
neutral among conceptions o f the good is a necessity given the fact o f radical 
disagreement among people within a "constitutional democracy". Rawls 
recognises his earlier work to have been a project in "comprehensive liberalism", 
a liberalism founded on arguments intended to convince all irrespective of what 
they see as being o f value in life. This comprehensive doctrine, associated in
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intention with, as Rawls sees it, Kant and Mill, is replaced in Political Liberalism 
by a "political conception of justice" that does not expect to root in common soil 
an agreement about the basis for the just society. The source o f agreement and the 
basis for cooperation is sought instead in an "overlapping consensus" (Sandel, 
1998, 190). This does not, however, Sandel thinks, remove the need for a 
conception of the person. For the results churned out o f the original position 
device to have any purchase on actual people the theory must presuppose 
something about them, to secure the possibility of their being responsive.
(I)n order for this way of thinking about justice to carry weight, the design of the original 
position must reflect something about the sort of persons we actually are, or would be in a 
just society." (Sandel, 1998, 191).
But Rawls insists that the parties to the original position are,
merely the artificial creatures inhabiting our device of representation. Justice as fairness is 
badly misunderstood if the deliberations of the parties, and the motives we attribute to 
them, are mistaken for an account of the moral psychology, either of actual persons or of 
citizens in a well-ordered society. (Rawls, 1996/1993, 28).
And this is a powerful rebuttal. Sandel has argued convincingly that Rawls 
cannot, without inviting a charge of arbitrariness, construct a reflective stance that 
fully severs the associated mode o f evaluation from the person's ethical outlook. 
Nor can he embed rational critique in standing modes of thought. However, 
Rawls, equally convincingly, side-steps the issue by adopting, or emphasising, the 
non-metaphysical character o f his theoretical avatars. The conception of the
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person need not represent either real people or the, within-theory, citizens o f a just 
society. In justice  as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical (1985), Rawls says,
As a device of representation the original position is likely to seem somewhat abstract 
and hence open to misunderstanding. The description of the parties may seem to 
presuppose some metaphysical conception of the person, for example, that the essential 
nature of persons is independent of and prior to their contingent attributes, including their 
final ends and attachments, and indeed, their character as a whole. But this is an illusion 
caused by not seeing the original position as a device of representation.. .when we 
simulate being in this position, our reasoning no more commits us to a metaphysical 
doctrine about the nature of the self than our playing a game like Monopoly commits us 
to thinking that we are landlords engaged in a desperate rivalry, winner take all. (1999, 
402-3).
For Sandel, this does not get Rawls off the hook. Sandel's comeback, however, (in 
the second edition o f his Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice) does not rely 
centrally on his original metaphysical charge (see also Sandel (1996, 17-20)). The 
difficulty now, as Sandel sees it, is that there is nothing to prevent someone, some 
group or representative, adopting a reflective stance that keeps their value-related 
characteristics intact. That is, the non-metaphysical construction does not carry 
with it a reason for an individual to adopt the neutral stance Rawls requires to 
make his argument work. Sandel asks (1998, 191) "Why must we ‘bracket’, or set 
aside, our moral and religious convictions, our conceptions o f the good life?" 
While Rawls distinguishes between moral choice in general and political choice in 
particular, and insists that "for political purposes.. .we should think o f ourselves as 
free and independent citizens, unclaimed by prior duties or obligations." (Sandel,
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1998, 192) this does not o f itself supply a reason to be "unclaimed by prior duties"
97in our reasoning about political institutions.
Rawls' political conception, however, puts Sandel on the back foot. No 
longer able to press a metaphysical charge he objects to the disparity between the 
artificial construction and the agents it, he thinks, is supposed to represent. But 
when Rawls point out that the model agents are not intended to be 
representational Sandel's point seems to have little purchase. We can, with little 
difficulty, imagine an artificial representation of ourselves for purposes of 
argument without supposing that the model captures something true about our 
actual psychology. The economist's representation of the individual as a rational 
utility maximiser, for example, does not require us to think that it tracks our actual 
practical thinking for it to be o f use. (Friedman, 1966, is the classic statement of 
this in economics). Sandel has other objections. He remarks, for example, that 
"the political life that (political liberalism) describes leaves little room for the kind 
o f public deliberation necessary to test the plausibility o f contending 
comprehensive moralities" (Sandel, 1998, 211); and that not taking into account 
one’s own and others’ moral and religious convictions in public discussion is only 
one way to establish mutual respect. Another way to show respect is to engage as 
far as possible with the perspectives of others, attempting to arrive at an 
understanding o f their point of view by exploring patches o f shared meaning, to
27 Sandel (1996) traces an oft noted modem malaise in modem American life, a lack of 
connection between people and public institutions, to precisely the liberal neutrality 
Rawls recommends for the political point of view. Sandel’s suggested fix is a revival of a 
republican conception of democracy, and the generation of civic virtue, grounded in an 
understanding of the common good.
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grasp not only the strength o f their beliefs but the qualitative aspects of their view 
of the good (This is often referred to as "Evenhandedness", see Carens (2000)). 
These may well be sound arguments, but they do not challenge, as Sandel’s 
original critique did, the status of the conception o f the person Rawls employs in 
his argument. A response that is favourable to but not mentioned by Sandel is as 
follows. In connection with the division o f points o f view referred to above Rawls 
says:
The third point of view -  that of you and me -  is that from which justice as fairness.. .is 
to be assessed. Here the test is of reflective equilibrium: how well the view as a whole 
articulates our more firm considered convictions of political justice, at all levels of 
generality, after due examination, once all adjustments have been made. (1993, 28).
Sandel could claim, I think, that the process of reflective equilibrium cannot 
plausibly come to rest unless a more realistic, situated, conception o f the person is
9 Qadopted. Excluding a facet o f our moral characters from the artificial conception 
-  our situatedness -  removes the possibility o f a harmony between actual fact and 
theoretical device. A key ingredient, Sandel might argue, would always be 
missing. But I doubt that this argument can be made to work. A reflective 
equilibrium, a harmony o f intuition and theoretical account can contain,
28 (1996, 385) "Reflective equilibrium...is a point at infinity we can never reach, though 
we may get closer to it.." Given this specification of the method of reflective equilibrium, 
perhaps the way to put the point in the text is to say that, without an adequate 
denotational representation of the person, reflective equilibrium will be asymptotic due to 
a misspecification (of the person) rather than because of its character as a method.
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unproblematically, a representation o f the person designed to theorise but not 
represent actual psychologies.
§5.2 Stability in a "Realistic Utopia"
Rawls' rejection o f Sandel's remarks about his reliance on the unencumbered self 
is, arguably, successful. While Kymlicka (1991) and Barry (1995), it seems, think 
that Rawls ought not to have seen Sandel's criticisms as so pressing as to require a 
re-examination o f his theory, the emphasis on the artificiality o f the conception of 
the person, at the centre o f his work, serves Rawls well as a defensive strategy 
against Sandel and his like. Does it likewise serve to defend Rawls against an 
attack on his conception of stability? I would argue not. Consider the following 
quote from Samuel Freeman:
To appreciate the development of Rawls's views it is essential to understand that all along 
he has sought to work out a realistic ideal of justice (a “realistic utopia”). His conception 
is ideal insofar as it is designed for the ideal conditions of a “well-ordered society”, where 
reasonable persons who are free and equal all accept the same conception of justice. 
Rawls's account of justice is realistic since it is designed to apply neither to moral saints 
or perfect altruists on the one hand, nor to natural sinners or rational egoists on the other, 
but to what humans at their best are capable of, given their nature, under normal 
conditions of social life.” (Freeman 2003, 2).
Rawls formulates his project as one that aims to establish principles for a "realistic 
utopia" in his Law o f  Peoples (Rawls, 2001, 4, 5-6, 11-12). There he says that he 
is echoing Rousseau in his intention to take people as they are and “laws as they 
might be” (Rousseau (1950/1762, 3). But Rawls makes comments on the intended 
realism o f his project elsewhere as well. He says in Political Liberalism (p.39),
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when commenting on Theory's mistaken reliance on a common doctrinal 
commitment to public institutions, that his corrections, "do not impose the 
unrealistic -  indeed, the utopian -  requirement that all citizens affirm the same 
comprehensive doctrine.." (Cf. Rawls, 1996, 86-87).
So, the principles that regulate the well-ordered society could regulate real 
world polities, in the sense that the requirements they impose are within the range 
o f those that actual people could live under, taking into account facts about how 
we respond to incentives, our, typically, limited altruism, and so on. Hence, we 
can distinguish between the conception of the person, or her reflective 
capabilities, and the contribution these make to the character o f the well-ordered 
society. While Rawls might argue that the conception o f the reflective person 
thought to be at the root o f the weakness in the representation o f stability is 
merely artificial, he cannot say the same about the representation o f stability that 
the artificial conception supports. Hence, even if  we accept the artificial character 
o f personal reflection we can accuse Rawls o f failing to respect his own standards 
o f realism by failing to accommodate heartfelt concern in his conception o f social 
stability. There is a criticality in real world democratic societies, a tension 
between compliance and critique that is absent from Rawls' well-ordered society. 
The well-ordered society is intended to be realistic in that it is attainable, but in 
the absence o f criticality the well-ordered society is a long way from being a 
world that could be lived in.
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§6. Conclusion
The neo-Hegelian critique o f Rawls’ theory o f justice doubts its ability to 
accommodate the influence o f culture on a person’s evaluative reasoning. Two 
responses, one that describes the social world in such a way as to credibly 
combine cultural embeddedness and autonomous critique, and a second that 
emphasises the artificiality of the concept of the person in Rawls’ theory, can be 
seen to fail when confronted with a criticism of Rawls' representation of the 
problem of stability. Neither overcomes the privileged position Rawls gives to the 
impersonal point o f view and the difficulty this creates for the incorporation o f the 
critical tension that is the mark of real world, stable but potentially unstable, 
democratic societies. This is significant for Rawls, I think, because stability is not 
a side-issue for him, but is a central motif throughout his work. In the chapters 
that follow I try to work out a response that draws on his abiding presumption that 
the well-ordered society is a market economy. In the next chapter I introduce 
some concepts, that will be drawn on in chapter three, through a consideration of 
an approach to Rawlsian theory associated with G. A. Cohen.
62
Chapter 2
The Embeddedness of Market-Oriented Choice:
A Response to Cohen on Rawls
Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to prepare the way for the discussion o f chapter 
three by formulating some important distinctions. Primarily, I want to emphasise 
the distinction, as it appears in Rawls, between the role o f comprehensive doctrine 
in everyday, market choice, and the role o f institutional restrictions, which 
perform a more regulatory function. That is, while, comprehensive doctrine 
informs personal choice, on each occasion o f choice, institutional regulations 
place limits on what can be legitimate objects o f choice. Institutional rules place 
prior limits on choice with regard to what a person is permitted to choose, but, 
unlike personal doctrine, do not inform deliberation regarding what, on each 
occasion of choice, what to choose. In order to bring out these distinctions I draw 
on a prominent strand in recent criticism of Rawls' theory o f justice, one that 
contends that his theory is vitiated by a limitation he places on the reach of the 
principles o f justice he defends. They ought, according to Rawls, to apply 
primarily to a society's basic institutions, it being a further question what 
principles ought to be taken to apply to personal conduct. According to those who 
oppose this gulf between institutional and personal principles, if  principles are
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proposed for institutions then they ought also to regulate personal choice in
9Qeveryday social and economic contexts . The two main advocates o f this 
"monist"30 critique are G. A. Cohen (1992, 1995, 1997, 2000) and Liam Murphy 
(1998), for whom, "all fundamental normative principles that apply to the design 
of institutions apply also to the conduct o f people." (Murphy, 1998, 252). So, in 
this chapter I discuss this area o f Rawlsian criticism in order to establish some 
background understanding, essentially o f the relationship between institutional 
and everyday choice in a market context, in Rawls, as preparation for the 
argument of chapter three.
Defenders of the view that Rawls is right to give principles o f justice an 
institutional focus, are offered by Andrew Williams (1998) and, more recently, 
Thomas Pogge (2000, 2002a). For Cohen, on Pogge's reading, the objective,
29 Cohen's claims apply to social as well as the type of economic conduct that is mediated 
through markets. Giving a lower priority to the educational needs of female members of 
the household damages their expectations and reduces their actual and potential holdings 
of "primary goods" in a way that violates the difference principle. My discussion applies 
only to conduct that can be straightforwardly categorised as market-based activity.
30 Pogge (2000) suggests the "monist" tag is misplaced. We might argue, for instance, that 
principles for institutions entail principles for economic conduct while leaving the social 
sphere, for example internal family relations, untouched. That is, there may be more than 
two "sites" of distributive justice, and the term "monist" doesn't pick this up. Also, though 
not mentioned by Pogge, Rawlsian dualism commonly refers to the distinction between 
political commitments and the "thick" conceptions of the good life associated with 
personal doctrines. Adopting "monism" for a Cohen-Murphy position will not be a 
suitable opposition to dualism in this latter sense; as it need not pay explicit attention to 
the neutral/thick distinction. Nonetheless, I find it convenient to use the term "monist" to 
refer to the type of position defended by Murphy and Cohen.
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embodied in principles o f justice, that inspires institutional design should also 
inspire everyday personal decisions. On Pogge's reading, then, Cohen is claiming 
that Rawlsian citizens ought to modify their actions so as to directly promote the
o  i
aims favoured by the difference principle. And Pogge offers criticisms that 
Cohen, read this way, would certainly find awkward to deal with. For example, if  
individual decisions are to be informed by the difference principle, in the form of 
a moral requirement, then,
(j)ust as people can erase socioeconomic inequality while raising the lowest 
socioeconomic position by giving some of their money to the poor, they can promote the 
same goal by expropriating others' money. And why should they not feel morally 
compelled to do so? (Pogge, 2000, 162).
However, Pogge works with an interpretation of Cohen that emphasises the need 
to look to personal actions and the possible outcomes o f those actions when 
assessing their permissibility, a reading that is, I want to argue, not compulsory.
An alternative take on Cohen is available, one that provides a way to avoid 
Pogge's criticisms, while retaining his core claim against Rawls: that he ought not 
to see determining the details o f a personal morality as a secondary task for a 
theory of justice. On the interpretation o f Cohen I propose, Rawlsian citizens must 
look not to actions per se, nor to their consequences, but to the reasons for the 
choices they make. It is certain reasons for choice that are impermissible, not, 
primarily, certain acts.
31 This is not to say that they must direct their attention in particular choice scenarios to 
the least well off in that scenario (Pogge, 2000, 161, n.43).
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In section one I give a more detailed account o f Cohen’s view, and go on to 
develop the reasons-based account by looking first at Williams’ paper (section 
two), and then Pogge's critique (section 3). A retreat to a reasons-based account of 
Cohen’s argument does not, however, make Cohen safe from criticism. I argue 
first (section four), that Cohen, along with Murphy, pays insufficient attention to 
the importance o f the distinction between the neutral and non-neutral standpoints 
associated with, respectively, political and everyday concerns in Rawls’ later 
work. Once this distinction is properly respected we see, I argue, that Cohen must 
(and will find it hard to) characterise personal principles simultaneously as 
principles that inform everyday personal deliberation and principles supported by 
the neutral reasoning appropriate to institution-level concerns. To properly respect 
the distinction in Rawls between neutral and non-neutral standpoints is to 
recognise that principles that inform institutional choice cannot, except perhaps 
unusually, have for their basis the convictions that constitute a comprehensive 
doctrine. If principles that influence institutional design and principles that inform 
everyday personal choice do, in the usual case, share a common basis in personal 
ethical outlooks, then the division Rawls sees as so important in his later theory 
between political commitments and commitments shaped by comprehensive 
doctrine is threatened. Applying this to market activity (section five) the question 
arises how Cohen can characterise principles for personal market-based choice as 
at once part o f everyday practical reasoning and entailed by reasoning associated 
with a neutral stance. We might in response to this want to wipe out the role of 
comprehensive doctrines in personal market choice, but there is, as I try to show 
in section five, good reason to think that this cannot be done without damaging
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(an important) part o f Rawls' thesis. Finally (section six), I consider a response 
that is available to Cohen. He can claim that the personal principles he sees as 
entailed by the difference principle are, what I call, delimitative. That is, he can 
claim that we need not see such principles as operative in personal deliberation, 
but as delimiting, a priori, what a person can permissibly take into account in 
personal choice. In this way they will not interfere with the bases o f 
comprehensive doctrines but will, Cohen might claim, nonetheless inform 
personal choice. This, I suggest, will not work. A delimitative principle that places 
parameters on choice but does not play a role in practical deliberation is not a 
personal principle, a principle that informs everyday choice. It doesn't feature in 
first-personal, in situ practical reasoning, and so fails to place requirements on 
choice in the way Cohen needs in order to make his thesis compelling. Section 
seven concludes.
§1. Cohen’s thesis
In the central economic aspect o f his argument, Cohen criticises Rawls for not 
applying his difference principle "in censure of the self-seeking choices o f high­
flying marketeers, which induce an inequality that...is harmful to the badly o ff ' 
(Cohen, 1997, 5). They ought, Cohen thinks, to eschew material rewards as an 
incentive for taking up more demanding economic and social roles. In general, 
according to Cohen,
principles of distributive justice, principles, that is, about the just distribution of benefits 
and burdens in society, apply wherever else they do, to people's legally unconstrained 
choices. Those principles.. .apply to choices that people make within the legally coercive
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structures to which, so everyone would agree, principles of justice (also) apply.' (Cohen, 
1997, 3).
And, as applied to Rawls, in particular, the claim is (in its economic aspect) that 
the difference principle, Rawls’ principle o f distributive justice, ought to inform 
everyday market-based deliberations as well as institutional arrangements. 
Cohen’s central argument for his position as it applies to Rawls can be put as 
follows.
Rawls defends two theses:
Thesis A: A society whose members accept the difference principle can take it to 
regulate background institutions while not taking it to inform their personal 
choices. Rawls says,
The difference principle holds, for example, for income and property taxation, for fiscal 
and economic policy. It applies to the announced system of public law and statutes and 
not to particular transactions or distributions, nor to the decisions of individuals and 
associations, but rather to the institutional background against which these transactions 
and decisions take place. (Rawls, 1993, 283).
Thesis B: A commitment to the difference principle on the part o f the agents 
within a Rawlsian society is compatible with their unrestrained pursuit o f material 
rewards intended to foster higher productivity. As Cohen puts it:
It is commonly thought, for example by Rawls, that the difference principle licences an 
argument for inequality which centres on the device of material incentives. The idea is 
that talented people will produce more than they otherwise would if, and only if, they are
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paid more than an ordinary wage, and some of the extra that they will then produce can 
be recruited on behalf of the worst off. (Cohen, 1997, 6).
Thesis B is, argues Cohen, indefensible, for the following reason. It cannot be 
maintained that extra reward is necessary to entice additional work effort from the 
talented in any but a casual (non-logical, non-causal) sense o f the term 
"necessary". Indeed, extra reward is necessary only because the talented will not 
agree to work harder (or more efficiently) without it. Their not agreeing is not for 
them a matter of, say, invincible psychological fact, but a reluctance on their part 
that they could with effort overcome (For example, Cohen, 1997, 6-10; 2000, 121- 
122).32 Hence, expansion o f social output through enhanced productivity could be 
forthcoming without additional productivity incentive. This inequality, then, is 
unjustified by the difference principle the Rawlsian individuals avowedly accept. 
This implies that the difference principle entails a restriction on personal choice - 
and this entailment dissolves the divide Rawls thinks he can defend in thesis A.
32 It is interesting to note here one of the senses Aristotle attaches to the term “necessary”. 
The quote is from Wiggins (1998/1987, 25): “Aristotle is not usually credited with having 
any view of what a need is; but in his philosophical lexicon at Metaphysics V he has the 
following entry for 'necessary': 1015a20: We call NECESSARY...(b) anything without 
which it is not possible for good to exist or come to be, or for bad to be discarded or got 
rid of, as for instance drinking medicine is necessary so as not to be ill, and sailing to 
Aegina so as to get money..” Cohen would argue, I think, that incentive payments for 
greater productivity, on the part of the talented, are not necessary in Aristotle’s sense b.
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§2. Questioning Williams’ ethos-based reading of Cohen
Williams (1998) presents an account of Cohen that, in its essentials, chimes with 
that presented above. In the context o f market choice, advantaged, talented people 
ought to forego material rewards intended to provide incentives for extra effort. 
Such effort could be made in the absence o f such incentives and so the inequality 
they occasion cannot be classed as necessary in the sense required for them to be 
justified by the difference principle (see Williams, 1998, 226-227). However, 
Williams’ response to Cohen relies upon a reading o f him that emphasises the 
role of ethos in his argument. That is (according to Cohen on Williams’ reading) 
Rawls ought also to recognise the need for a social ethos, that embodies moral 
requirements on personal conduct, in order to promote compliance with the 
personal principles Cohen argues for. There is, as one might expect, ample 
evidence that Cohen does think that “the difference principle requires an 
egalitarian ethos.” (Williams, 1998, 227)), for there to be widespread compliance. 
On the one hand, Cohen does not envisage a community o f moral saints:
..in estimating what it would be like for a person to accept a salary that is much lower that 
what full exercise of market power would provide, the strain to think about is the one he 
would feel if, ex hypothesis people like him are accepting similarly modest salaries. We 
are talking about an egalitarian society, not about a population of talented people each of 
whom is a unique moral hero. (Cohen, 1991, 293).
On the other hand, government cannot be relied upon to ensure compliance with 
personal moral principles in the marketplace (Cohen, 1991, 315). Hence, given a 
recognition on the part o f Rawlsian agents that they cannot defend their “need” 
for productivity payments, an egalitarian ethos is required to foster (what need not
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be self-conscious (p. 316)) personal compliance. Williams’ response to Cohen 
makes the latter’s remarks on the necessity of an egalitarian ethos a prominent 
feature in his argument, and, on the basis o f this interpretation, Williams’ 
argument is a powerful one.
The rules that constitute institutions satisfy, Williams points out, a 
"publicity" requirement Rawls imposes on principles of justice, a requirement, 
centrally, that violations o f them be transparent (Williams, 1998, 233). The basis 
o f a decision made in the marketplace, including a decision concerning career 
choice, or remunerative package is not so transparent, and this lack o f 
transparency - or inherent asymmetry o f information between a market actor and 
those who would judge him - makes market choice a private and not a public 
affair for the purposes of Rawlsian justice.
To be more precise, Williams offers a strengthened version o f  the basic 
structure objection to Cohen’s argument. According to this objection the 
difference principle is “inherently restricted” (Williams, 1998, 228) having 
application only to the basic structure and not to personal conduct. Williams notes 
examples o f the textual support for such a restriction in Rawls and considers 
Cohen’s main response. Cohen argues that market conduct ought not be seen as 
“occurring within, rather than comprising part of, a society’s basic structure.” 
(Williams, 1998, 229). If, on the one hand, Cohen argues, basic institutions are 
restricted to being those that are “legally coercive” (Williams, 1998, 230) then it 
is hard to see how this restriction can be defended. Principles that govern 
institutions in this sense will be silent about morally repugnant conduct merely 
because it lies outside the range o f conduct that is subject to legal coercion. If, on
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the other hand, basic institutions are understood to be those that “produce 
profound effects” (Williams, 1998, 231) then, argues Cohen, the behaviour of 
market participants in their pursuit o f material rewards ought to be seen as part 
(though an informal part (ibid.)) o f the basic structure, and this because of its 
profound effect on the opportunities facing others.
Given the strength o f Cohen’s response to the basic structure objection 
Williams restates it in order to strengthen its appeal. To do this he notes that “the 
basic structure can be defined either by reference to what it does (its dispositional 
properties), or how it does whatever it does (its intrinsic properties)” (Williams, 
1998, 231. Phrases in parentheses not in original). Williams then observes an 
intrinsic property overlooked by Cohen that secures a restriction on the reach o f 
Rawls’ principles o f justice that excludes the decision to be a market-maximiser. 
The intrinsic property of basic insitutions Williams describes is the public nature 
o f their constitutive rules (Williams, 1995, 233):
Rawls appears to regard institutions’ constitutive rules as public in three respects. Thus 
individuals are able to attain common knowledge of the rules’ (i) general applicability, 
(ii) their particular requirements, and (iii) the extent to which individuals conform with 
those requirements.
The decision whether to be a market-maximiser is not public in the sense 
Williams associates with the basic structure. We can see here that the non-public 
character o f market conduct is most evident in connection with point iii. The lack 
o f transparency o f motives and rationales for wage offers would undermine any 
attempt to publicise the extent to which individuals were conforming with a 
principle such as that which Cohen recommends.
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Williams recognises that it is important in order for his argument to work 
that the ethos Cohen argues for “cannot be regarded as realizing public rules.” 
(Williams, 1998, 235) and goes on to show that it would be difficult for Cohen to 
maintain such a position.
I want to argue, however, that there is an alternative reading o f Cohen that 
retains the force o f his criticism against Rawls while making the role o f an 
egalitarian ethos, and its status, a secondary rather than a central issue. If this can 
be sustained then Williams' defence o f Rawls may not be quite so compelling. The 
insistence that Williams points to in Cohen on the necessity o f an egalitarian ethos 
suggests that we ought to picture the Rawlsian agent as responsive to the personal 
principle he (Cohen) recommends, only to the extent that it is a principle 
embodied in the requisite ethos. In order to argue for an alternative construal of 
Cohen’s opinion, I want, first, to try to show, against this, that the personal 
obligation Cohen points up can be seen as pressing for a Rawlsian agent 
irrespective o f the existence o f an egalitarian ethos. That is, the (talented) 
Rawlsian can, indeed ought, to see that he has reason to accept what Cohen says 
by assessing the compatibility o f his commitment to the difference principle with 
his willingness to accept, or determination to push for, productivity incentives. 
There is much in Cohen to prevent this sort o f reading. First, Cohen appears to 
argue that pure productivity payments33 are not, as such, morally indefensible, 
even where they are accepted by a supporter o f the difference principle. Though a 
person would, in Cohen's opinion, be taking an implausible, mechanistic view of
33 I call them "pure" to distinguish them from (by Cohen's lights legitimate) payments 
made, for example, to compensate for arduous or risky jobs.
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the behaviour of the talented, a person could argue that material incentives just are 
necessary to get the talented to exert themselves. He would not then be making a 
moral mistake. His mistake would be a factual one. His (mistaken) belief in the 
will-independence o f talented persons' need for pure incentive payments would be 
compatible with his commitment to an egalitarian principle that sanctions only 
inequalities that are necessary to enhance the position o f the less well off. That a 
person who defends differentials due to pure productivity payments is morally at 
fault becomes apparent only when we imagine her (a talented person) articulating 
a first-personal defence o f pure productivity payments (Cohen, 1991, esp. 271- 
304). It is apparent in this voicing o f her view that the necessity she ascribes to the 
talented she is ascribing to herself, and there is no room here for factual error - no 
distance between speaker and subject matter that might justify a misunderstanding 
of the relationship between possible effort levels and the rewards necessary to 
entice them. In making the argument, first personally, the speaker reveals her 
“inegalitarian attitude” (Cohen, 1991, 269). The argument that incentives are 
required to expand the social product, and so enhance the position o f the least well 
off, is successful only if  she thinks it justified, for her and people similarly 
talented, to refuse to put in extra effort without additional reward. But such refusal 
is incompatible with a commitment to the difference principle, a principle that 
sanctions only inequalities that are necessary for the betterment o f the less well 
off. It is not merely a first-personal account, however, that reveals the injustice 
here. It also has to be the case, Cohen argues, that the speaker recognises herself 
to be part o f a “justificatory community”, for her acceptance o f productivity
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differentials to be morally criticised; and a justificatory community, Cohen tells us 
(1991,282) is,
..a set of people among whom there prevails a norm of comprehensive justification. If
what certain people are disposed to do when a policy is in force is part of the justification 
of that policy, it is considered appropriate to ask them to justify the relevant behaviour, 
and it detracts from justificatory community when they cannot do so.
Indeed (Cohen, 1991, 307) the,
incentive argument is not problematic when it is thought acceptable to view the rich
as outside the (justificatory) community to which the poor belong.
Making his point depend upon the assumption that Rawlsian society forms a 
justificatory community is surely innocuous, but it does imply that his argument, 
for him, only has force if  we picture the talented actually justifying their action 
with regards to productivity payments to the less well off. This seems to cut off 
the option o f presenting a monological alternative to Williams' ethos-based 
reading. The talented must address their commitments and behaviour post­
contract not merely because they are enlightened by Cohen’s argument, but 
because, it seems, they are also, and they recognise themselves to be, members of 
a justificatory community: “a set o f people among whom there prevails a 
norm ...of comprehensive justification.” (Cohen, 1991, 282). But this need not 
prevent the reading I want to offer, one that avoids the emphasis on egalitarian 
ethos found in Williams’ work.
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It is possible for the talented person to reason that were she to be confronted 
with a less well off person, then, given that they are (by her own account) 
members of a justificatory community, in Cohen’s sense, she would reveal her 
“inegalitarian attitude” in requiring, what are in fact, unnecessary incentives for 
additional personal effort. The revelation here is to the talented individual herself, 
rather than a public shaming. This monological alternative lays emphasis on a 
talented person’s beliefs about what is permissible personal conduct, given a 
commitment to the difference principle. This account opens up the possibility of 
retaining the important claim against Rawls, that a commitment the difference 
principle entails a moral constraint on personal conduct, while making the 
question o f how that recognition might be registered in actual personal decision a 
further question. It seems correct to think, with Cohen, that an ethos would be 
necessary, but this is, once we emphasise the monological character o f the 
argument against the Rawlsian marketeer, a secondary consideration; one that 
takes into account the prevalence o f weakness o f will and the limits to effective 
government regulation.
Williams’ argument depends for its cogency on the fundamental importance 
to Cohen of an egalitarian ethos. However, Cohen need not, I have so far argued, 
make his argument the way he does. He can make the primary target the Rawlsian 
agent himself, requiring him to amend his beliefs about what is permissible 
personal conduct, given a commitment to the difference principle. That an ethos, 
rather than iron will or governmental intervention is the only feasible way to have 
agents successfully exercise self-restraint is then a secondary point. The primary
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point is that each has a personal moral principle thrust upon him by a commitment 
to the difference principle.
§3. Pogge’s outcome-oriented reading and a reasons-based alternative
Pogge's argument draws on a distinction between what he calls mastergoal and 
supergoal monism. The latter is, Pogge says (2000, 156), Cohen's favoured 
conception while the jury is out as regards which one Murphy would say he 
prefers. Pogge defends Rawls against both. Offering definitions, Pogge says that 
mastergoal monism,
postulates that there is one goal (or system of goals) of ultimate moral importance and 
that all social institutions and personal dispositions, ethos, and conventions, ought to be 
shaped so that they together optimally promote this common mastergoal. Persons, in 
particular, ought to have whatever conduct principles and dispositions in fact cause them 
best to promote this goal. (Pogge, 2000, 155).
The supergoal variant, alternatively,
postulates that there is one goal (or system of goals), which ought to be all-pervasive: 
exalted and prescribed in conventions and institutional rules, permeating the ethos, 
inspiring individuals. Persons, in particular, ought consciously to pursue (aim at, strive 
for) this goal. (Pogge, 2000, 155).
The difference, it appears, between these two variants o f monism is that a 
mastergoal thesis is compatible with individuals not aiming in their practical 
decisions to achieve the mastergoal directly or consciously. Thus, a polity based 
on Richard Hare's indirect, two-level utilitarianism would be mastergoal monistic.
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A single principle, that preference satisfaction ought to be maximised, permeates 
both institutional design and individual practice, however, individuals in Hare's 
theory can, indeed will typically, have aims that are not explicitly preference 
maximising. (Hare (1952, 1962, esp. 1981)). For an account to be supergoal 
monist individual decision must take for one of its guiding principles, the (or a) 
principle that informs institutional choice. For example, in Kant's theory (Kant 
(1998/1785)) no moral standing is given to the instrumental value o f acting from 
motives other than duty. If one wants, then, action in the personal domain to have 
moral standing, actions at this level must be ‘from duty’. They cannot, that is, as 
in the mastergoal thesis, be o f moral worth simply because o f their contribution to 
the master goal. Supergoal monism as its name and Pogge's definition suggest is 
goal-oriented. Where it differs from a mastergoal version (with respect to 
individual conduct) is in its requirement that individuals act, consciously, in a way 
that they think promotes the type o f outcome that their institutional arrangements 
are intended to promote. In what follows I refer to this goal-oriented reading as 
“outcome-oriented”. This works, as we will see, as a better description of Pogge’s 
interpretation o f Cohen, given what he says in the objections he raises. 
Additionally, I should say that the term “outcome-oriented” relates to what Pogge 
calls supergoal monism in that it is the consistency of the possible outcomes of 
personal action with society’s goals that influences, according to supergoal 
monism, personal choice. Supergoal monism, then, requires that the individual 
behave in a way that reflects the social goals embodied in the principles that 
influence institutional design. The principles that shape, for example, economic 
policy ought also to be brought to bear in personal attitudes and everyday
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decisions. Moreover, in order to reflect, in the personal domain, their society’s 
goals, individuals must assess their behaviour, and the choices they make for their 
contribution to those overarching goals.
That this is the outcome-oriented understanding o f Cohen that Pogge works 
with shows up in a number o f places in his discussion. Pogge says of talented 
Cohenists (Pogge, 2000, 142)34 that they, "should be ready to do managerial work 
at a lower reward multiple so as to increase the laboring net pay" (emphasis 
added). The phrase "so as to", here, betrays an emphasis on the outcome o f a 
person's behaviour as a way to incorporate the difference principle in everyday 
life.35 But, drawing on the remarks I made in connection with W illiams’ 
argument, a requirement to have an outcome-orientation in one’s thinking, is a 
secondary consideration. A general requirement on the talented to take on work 
that calls for their special talents follows, in the argument I have offered, from a 
recognition of the incompatibility of a commitment to the difference principle and 
unnecessary demands for extra pay. Where it is only an enticement to greater 
productivity that is the source of the high pay for managerial work, then the 
enlightened Rawlsian, enlightened by Cohen’s reasoning, will see reason to refuse 
the extra pay, and do the work anyway. But the reason is related to the
34 In the example he is using here managerial work is the more productive job that only 
the "talented" are capable of. A “talented Cohenist” is, here, a Rawlsian agent who is 
convinced by Cohen’s argument and wants to adjusts his behaviour accordingly.
35 For further evidence that Pogge's is a goal-oriented interpretation of Cohen consider 
Pogge's view that, according to Cohen, Rawlsian individuals "should want neither the 
basic structure nor their own personal conduct to produce inequalities that are not to the 
greatest benefit of the lowest socioeconomic position." (Pogge, 2000,141).
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incompatibility o f the difference principle and the reasoning behind certain 
personal choices. There is no requirement to “do managerial work at a lower 
reward multiple so as to”, or in order to effect more equal rewards. Note also that 
Cohen says,
one function of the egalitarian ethos is to make conscious focus on the worst off 
unnecessary. What rather happens is that people internalize, and -  in the normal case -  
they unreflectively live by, principles which restrain the pursuit of self-interest and whose 
point is that the less fortunate gain when conduct is directed by them. (Cohen, 1992, 384, 
as cited in Murphy -  note omitted -  (1998)).
A reading, such as Pogge’s, that sees his core thesis as involving the self- 
conscious application o f the difference principle does not sit well with this 
comment on one o f the purposes of an egalitarian ethos. It is, Cohen thinks, 
perfectly compatible with his thesis to have a self-effacing ethos in place that 
achieves the conduct he sees as required for consistency in Rawls' theory. There 
might be no room, in such a society, for the "so as to" o f intentional action Pogge 
envisions.
One way to support the self-effacing ethos Cohen appears to have in mind, 
is to envisage the parties to an agreement about how to design the institutions of 
their society recognising that they ought, for consistency, to have the difference 
principle inform their everyday lives. They might then go on to agree that a self- 
effacing ethos would be the best way to achieve universal compliance. (There are 
reasons, o f course, to reject the idea that Rawlsian citizens could be self-effacing 
in this way. Williams (1998) has one connected with publicity at page 234). What 
they could not do is decide, in line with Pogge’s interpretation o f Cohen, that the
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difference principle will inform their personal lives as a reflective endorsement of 
their commitment to the worst off, and then suppose an ethos that precludes 
reflective endorsement. A view, then, that sees Cohen’s primary point as being 
about a requirement on personal conduct, and only secondarily about how 
compliance is to be achieved, accommodates, in a way Pogge's emphasis does 
not, the role Cohen countenances for ethos.
Further, Pogge says (2000, 149), that,
If managing and laboring are objectively equally burdensome, then managers should be 
asked to redirect all special rewards attached to their work toward raising the lowest net 
pay rate. This is what, Cohen holds, a true commitment to the difference principle 
requires.
But suppose that a person, on the reading I am recommending, believes what 
Cohen wants him to believe, then he will think that requesting, or demanding, 
more pay in order to call forth extra productive energies is impermissible. He will 
also think that a society in which "special rewards" paid for extra effort are the 
norm is not a just society. However, he may find him self in a society in which 
extra pay is offered on the understanding that it is required in order to entice 
people into occupations that require the exercise o f rare talents. What then is a 
person to do with any extra reward that accrues? He can refuse it or redistribute it, 
but nothing in the realignment of beliefs that Cohen's core argument calls for 
requires him to do these things with extra reward so gained. For one thing, this 
would involve a fruitless exercise on the part o f an individual to change society 
through individual acts o f giving. If, on the other hand, such an understanding 
does not permeate the market economy - an understanding that premiums for
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effort on the part o f the talented are needed -  then a supposed requirement to 
refuse or donate extra reward, received for additional effort, is otiose. Such an 
economy might be the result o f an ideal theoretic behind-the-veil decision to have 
all market actors (including producers) conduct themselves on the understanding 
that pecuniary motives of the relevant type will not operate.
The foregoing appears to suggest that accepting, and keeping, productivity 
premiums offered in the marketplace is consistent with a commitment to the 
impermissibility o f requiring non-necessary rewards. And I think this is a 
plausible corollary to the reading of Cohen I am recommending. However, there is 
a relationship between, on the one hand, a belief about the incompatibility o f the 
difference principle and personally requiring incentives for effort, and, on the 
other hand, actual action. Were a person to take a premium for effort because it 
offered personal gain for additional effort then the reason she is prepared to (and, 
indeed, does) act from would be incompatible with her professed beliefs. This 
does put a block on action -  action done for a particular reason -  but this 
restriction antecedes any consideration of the outcome of the action, in terms of 
the actual or possible resultant distribution. It is a restriction on action, that is, that 
makes no room for Pogge’s outcome-oriented reading. On this “reasons-based” 
account of Cohen’s thesis, then, a redirection o f "special rewards", just because 
they are rewards designed to promote greater productivity, is not required. It is 
enough for an individual to address his or her beliefs and to act only from reasons 
compatible with them in order to answer Cohen's call. That extra pay is 
forthcoming might be a fact about a market economy, a fact that follows from
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employers’ assumption that individuals respond in a predictable way to pecuniary 
motives; a fact not easily, directly addressed by the individual in the marketplace. 
If extra pay is given (because, for example, accepting Pogge's account, 
individuals with a lower "respio" benefit from the higher pay paid to attract 
people with higher respios) we can take it to be the individual's prerogative what 
he does with it. Cohen's extension of principles for institutions to everyday life 
does not impose requirements on what individuals do with their wage packets. 
Pogge's critique o f Cohen relies on this outcome-oriented interpretation and what 
it implies for individual action. If the interpretation is non-compulsory, however, 
then Pogge's charges are similarly open to rejection.
The following points reinforce the view that Pogge’s remarks are misplaced 
on an alternative, reasons-based reading of Cohen:
(1) Included on the list o f Pogge's suggested specifications o f Cohen's thesis is the 
following:
One might specify the moral duty Cohen seeks to inject into Rawls' theory as a duty to 
redirect the economic-rent portion of any special rewards one receives toward raising the 
lowest pay rate. (Pogge, 2000, 147).
36 A person’s respio is her “reservation net pay rate ratio...defined as the lowest reward 
multiple that would (barely) suffice to induce her to work as a manager.” (Pogge, 2000, 
145). The respio differs from the economist’s more standard reservation wage. The latter 
is the lowest amount of pay a person is prepared to work for, while the respio takes into 
account the ratio of this amount to the pay available in another job. The difference 
between the two becomes important, for example, when there are a number of jobs 
against which a respio for a particular job is calculated (as on p. 146). The difference is 
also in play in point 2 of section 3d below.
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This, connected to the notion that more reluctant individuals receive less 
economic rent37, entails that the less reluctant (i. e. less reluctant to take 
productive employment that engages their talents) have more o f a distributive 
burden than the more reluctant. In fact the more reluctant an individual is the less 
she must transfer o f her income, as less will be accounted for by economic rent. 
But this rewards the very reluctance Cohen finds objectionable.
But restricting Cohen to comments about personal consistency and the sort of 
reason a Rawlsian can with consistency act from makes Pogge's suggested 
specification inapplicable.
(2) Consider also an objection Pogge (pp. 149-150) takes to be related to one 
offered by Williams (1998, 235-37). Suppose (in order to represent Pogge's 
argument) a two individual society. One person is "talented" and one is not. A 
more productive job is available to the talented individual, paying £10 per hour, 
while the less productive job pays £5 per hour. The £5 difference is pure 
productivity incentive. The talented person can (and Pogge takes this to be her 
duty according to Cohen) take the more productive job and give £5 to be 
distributed evenly between them, leaving both with £7.50 each (per hour). 
Alternatively, the more talented individual could take labouring work at the rate 
o f £5 per hour. She would, in fact, prefer to do this (Pogge has her say) because 
she is attracted to managerial work only at a wage multiple greater than 1. (If she
37 Because the economic rent a person receives is the difference between her actual wage 
and her “reservation wage”, the minimum she is prepared to work for, the more reluctant 
a person is (or the higher her reservation wage) the lower is her economic rent.
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goes into more productive employment and transfers income to achieve equality 
the wage multiple is 7.5/7.5 = 1 removing the incentive for her to take up the 
managerial post, given her respio (I note what Pogge means by “respio” at n.24, 
above). If she works as a labourer, however, incomes are only £5 each. Letting 
(£7.50, £7.50) = D1 and (£5, £5) = D2, D2 is less preferred to D1 by the 
difference principle. So long as an individual has a respio above 1 it will be 
rational for her to work as a labourer. Working in more productive employment 
and transferring income until the wage ratio is 1:1 takes the wage multiple below 
that which she requires as incentive.
Unless, then, Cohen requires individuals to take up more productive posts 
then, says Pogge, all with respio above 1 will retreat, as this individual did, to less 
productive work, producing outcomes that are ranked lower by the difference 
principle than those that would otherwise obtain. Pogge goes on:
Cohen in fact holds that a true commitment to the difference principle does not permit (a) 
retreat to labouring. This is expressed in all three of Cohen's essays, most clearly in (the 
Pareto Argument for Inequality), where he argues that the same enlarged social product 
Rawls wants to see produced thanks to the incentives that an unequal distribution (D2) 
provides should instead be produced by citizens personally committed to justice and 
distributed equally (D3). Clearly the social product would not be the same if (individuals) 
followed (their) preference for laboring work under D3. (Pogge, 2000, 150).38
38 Assumed here is that a person will not look to the absolute level of reward available 
from being a manager once the rewards are distributed (i.e.,£7.50), but to the reward 
relative to that available as a labourer. Given that the respio indicates a peson’s reluctance 
to do one job rather than another it seems a reasonable assumption. It should be noted 
also that Pogge (again, reasonably) assumes that pay differentials that reflect the 
reluctance that the respio represents are, for Cohen, permissible.
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And this suggests to Pogge a fourth reading o f Cohen's intention:
Here is then the fourth interpretation of the moral duty Cohen seeks to add: The talented 
ought to contribute as they would in the society Rawls envisions even while receiving 
merely an equal share of the social product, (ibid.).
Cohen is, I suggest, on the reasons-based reading, unmoved by this complaint. 
The individual does enough to satisfy Cohen if  she acts for reasons consonant 
with consistent commitments. Not acting in order to acquire additional material 
reward is sufficient to make her market-oriented practical reasoning consistent 
with a commitment to the difference principle. If the market institutions are such 
that higher reward (as pure incentive) is forthcoming, is attached to the sort o f job 
her talents qualify her for, then she can, if  she wishes, distribute it among her 
neighbours or make a special payment to the tax authorities. This latter largesse is 
not, however, required by Cohen on the restricted reading I am recommending.
Similarly, a Rawlsian who has addressed his commitments and is now disposed 
to have his convictions inform actual choices does not have to register a 
substantive requirement in his deliberation to choose one line o f work over 
another. Cohen says, according to Pogge's paraphrase (quoted above), that the 
"same enlarged social product Rawls wants to see produced thanks to the 
incentives that an unequal distribution (D2) provides should instead be produced 
by citizens personally committed to justice and distributed equally." This does not 
have to mean that the same enlarged product must be forthcoming in this way, so 
entailing a requirement on the individuals to produce it. It can mean that any 
enlarged product that may or does occur ought not to be the outcome o f incentive
86
seeking choice behaviour. This leaves it open whether any such enlargement will, 
in fact, be forthcoming, it being left to individuals to decide what employment 
they take up (once their commitments have been laundered o f their 
inconsistency).39
I suggest, then, that Pogge's critique of Cohen assumes an outcome-oriented 
reading to be correct. On this reading Cohen requires agents look to the effects of 
their choices in order to check their consistency with the objectives o f the 
difference principle. Cohen need not, however, go so far as to require individuals 
attend to the compatibility of their actions with a commitment to the difference 
principle; they need only assess the consistency o f their beliefs and, accordingly, 
restrict the reasons they can permissibly act from in market-based choice. Once 
this is recognised Pogge's criticisms miss their intended target. Redirection o f a 
portion of the pay packet, and widespread embezzlement do not follow from a 
requirement to flush out inconsistent beliefs and certain motives of personal 
interest. Furthermore, a requirement to take up more productive work that 
engages scarce talents is not entailed in Cohen. Were Cohen to present, in fact, a 
thesis that has the shape Pogge takes it to have then his critique would, I think, be 
a considerable blow to Cohen’s view. The same can be said o f Williams’ critique. 
What Cohen can do, I have argued, is to restrict his thesis to one that points up 
what Rawlsian agents’ must for consistency believe to be legitimate reasons in 
personal, market-based decision.
39 Similarly, the objections made in Pogge's section X depend entirely, I think, on an 
outcome-based interpretation of Cohen.
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I present in the next sections a further challenge to the monistic thesis, as it 
applies to Rawls, to which the reasons-based version o f Cohen’s thesis is, 
however, not resistant. I begin by considering a challenge to the monist based 
around the importance later Rawls attaches to the distinction between neutral and 
engaged reasoning, the type o f reasoning associated, respectively, with what 
Rawls marks out as political discussion concerning institutional choice, and 
reasoning that engages comprehensive beliefs and commitments, in everyday 
contexts.
§4. Rejecting the reasons-based version of Cohen’s view
There are two aspects to my rejection o f the reasons-based version of Cohen’s 
thesis. The first aspect is an emphasis on the importance o f neutrality in the 
derivation of institutional principles. The second aspect emphasises the social 
embeddedness o f market conduct. Taken together they help to emphasise the 
divide between the institutional and the personal context o f market choice. Market 
choice is at once influenced by institutional constraints, such as restrictions on the 
quantities of a good that can be traded, and by personal, for example religious and 
moral, concerns. This divide is important in my attempt in the next chapter to 
derive a conception of embedded critique by looking at the characteristics o f the 
market participant.
§4.1 First aspect of the argument: The neutral basis of institutional principles 
versus the doctrinal basis of personal market choice
Cohen and Murphy are brief in their remarks on the difference between Rawls' 
earlier and later work, and its implications for their theses. In "Political 
Liberalism" Rawls attaches great importance to this difference. As noted above, 
Rawls came to see that requiring people to embrace the two principles o f justice 
as a moral doctrine fails to respect the fundamental role o f their personal moral 
doctrines in shaping their personal outlooks. The Rawls of A Theory o f Justice 
took the device he used, to derive principles for just societal arrangements, to 
reflect fundamental moral convictions that all in a pluralist society could share. 
His later revision reflects his coming to see that visions o f the good life, and of 
what constitutes fair social arrangements in the personal sphere, emanate from 
fundamental moral, philosophical, and religious convictions that differentiate 
social groups. The neutrality o f the original position device denies the primacy of 
thick conceptions o f the good, and the formative role they play in shaping the 
normative appearance of the world. This emphasis on the basic place of personal 
moral, religious, and philosophical beliefs seems to provide, alone, a sound basis 
for a dualistic conception of principles of justice. If principles for personal 
conduct derive from fundamental moral convictions, then it is inappropriate to 
have the same principles inform both institutional design and personal behaviour. 
If they inform what people do in their personal lives then they are coeval with 
their fundamental convictions. To suppose them also principles for institutional 
design bases political agreement on a supposed common ground, and this 
reinstates the errors o f A Theory of Justice.
This creates problems for the reasons-based version o f Cohen. On the 
reasons-based reading the agent is required to address the consistency o f his
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beliefs and manage his practical reasons accordingly. He is to eliminate as a 
possible reason for taking a job the premium offered for effort, effort that could be 
made without additional reward. What is required, on the part o f the market 
participant, is, then, principled self-restraint. This requires that the principle be 
understood to be part of a person’s background convictions. Were we to imagine 
it as a principle that emanates from outside of an individual’s standing convictions 
we would be presenting a conception of principled self-restraint in which self- 
control is exercised, so to speak, “from behind the scenes”, from outside of the 
person's moral outlook; and that invites an obvious incoherence, one familiar from 
the neo-Hegelian objections to Rawls’ theory. We can, of course, construct such a 
picture. Kant, on a common reading, offers a conception o f practical decision in 
which moral reasons bypass natural psychology. And, this can, in familiar ways, 
be countered with a rejection of the notion of there being such a thing as practical 
reason (For example, Blackburn (2001), Korsgaard (1986)). But this debate is not 
to the point. Whatever one's view about the capacity o f reason to autonomously 
direct the will, what Rawls must avoid is not a position in this dispute. To satisfy 
the strictures of his later theory, a principle that entails self-restraint must either 
have a supporting rationale that appeals to or has its basis in standing fundamental 
convictions, or it must have a rationale that does not. If the former, it cannot be a 
principle also for institutional design as it has an improper provenance in existing 
commitments. But if  its supporting rationale does not make appeal to moral 
convictions then it cannot form part of personal reasoning about what to do in 
everyday choice scenarios.
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So Cohen, on the reasons-based reading, is faced with a dilemma. Either he 
supposes that the personal principle40 individuals must apply has a rationale that 
lies outside of their background convictions or he supposes it to emanate from 
within existing moral doctrine. If the former it cannot have purchase in everyday 
life, if  the latter it cannot be a principle also for institutional design. What makes 
this an acutely problematic dilemma for Cohen is that it cannot be overcome by 
assuming away the division between the neutral reflective stance and the 
embeddedness o f personal doctrines. If he assumes this away then he does not 
have Rawls in his sights. Unlike (what according to Rawls are) comprehensive 
liberal positions such as Kant's or Mill's it is of central theoretical importance in 
Rawls that that divide be respected.41
40 To be clear about the content of this principle: According to Cohen, for consistency, a 
Rawlsian agent must believe that it is impermissible for her to seek extra reward for 
additional effort that could anyway be offered. The personal principle that follows from 
this is, on the reasons-based reading, that a person ought not to let that part of any 
premium offered that is designed to entice extra effort influence the decision about 
whether to take a post or not. (As I have argued, the rejection or donation of extra 
productivity premia actually received is not entailed by this principle).
41 Recalling footnote 26, above, in Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas (1995) Rawls 
presents an account of his theory that suggests the divide, as I draw it, between 
comprehensive and neutral thinking does not well represent Rawls’ thinking. In his reply 
Rawls states that, “We assume that each citizen affirms both a political conception and a 
comprehensive doctrine..In this case, the citizen accepts a political conception and fills 
out its justification by embedding in it some way to the citizen’s comprehensive doctrine 
as either true or reasonable, depending on what that doctrine allows.” (Rawls, 1995, 143). 
Such a statement implies that agents in a well-ordered society are to be understood to be 
capable of grasping at once both arguments with a neutral basis, and those that are 
associated with comprehensive doctrine. In order for agents to harmonise public reasons, 
those associated with arguments for regulative principles of justice, with comprehensive
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Consider the way in which Cohen and Murphy, each in his respective way, 
dismisses the revision in Rawls' later work. It is possible to read Cohen (1997, 
17) as setting up a dilemma for Rawls. In a section (section IV) devoted to 
pointing up ambiguities in Rawls’ texts as regards the reach o f his principles of 
justice, Cohen quotes him as saying that Rawlsian citizens "strive to apply" the 
principles of justice in their daily lives because they,
have a desire to express their nature as free and equal moral persons.. .When all strive to 
comply with these principles and each succeeds, then individually and collectively their 
nature as moral persons is most fully realized, and with it their individual and collective 
good. (Rawls, 1973/1971, 528, cited in Cohen, 1997, 17).
Cohen on behalf of Rawls responds to this by pointing out that his later work, as I 
have noted, seeks to shed the idea that there is a common fundamental moral 
conception that all can appeal to in support o f their public and private practices. 
Rawls can, then, simply disavow his earlier suggestion (captured in the quote used
doctrine it must be the case that a standpoint is afforded them that allows a single 
evaluative perspective, one that dissolves the divide I have referred to in the text between 
comprehensive and neutral thinking. I think, however, that this does not save Cohen from 
the dilemma that, I have argued, he faces. The harmonisation of political principle and 
comprehensive doctrine that Rawls refers to comes after a neutral principle has been 
established. It might be that Rawlsian agents will come to see the fit between Cohen’s 
principle of self-restraint and their personal convictions. However, what (at least reasons- 
based) Cohen wants is a logical implication from a commitment to the difference 
principle to a personal commitment to self-restraint in the face of incentive payments. He 
cannot have this, I would argue, because such a logical implication crosses a divide 
between neutral and comprehensive thinking that, in the derivation of, political principles 
that, as I read Rawls, ought to be respected.
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by Cohen) that he sees principles o f justice as both shaping institutional 
arrangements and informing private deliberations. But a simple disavowal will not 
mend things, says Cohen. Denying people a common source o f inspiration for 
their everyday decisions leaves individuals, so to speak, morally stranded, the 
practices o f each distinct group being informed by their own, distinct fundamental 
normative commitments. Cohen says: "it means that the ideals of dignity, 
fraternity, and full realization of people’s moral natures can no longer be said to 
be delivered by Rawlsian justice." (Cohen, 1997, 17).
Hence, Rawls must, on Cohen's account, supply a bridge between principles 
at institutional and personal levels if  he is to secure a basis for personal conduct 
that has it cohere with the aims implicit in the specification o f institutional rules. 
So, either: (1) he provides such a common moral basis for all, from which they 
can work up normative requirements into their everyday lives; or (2) he does 
away with this common basis and so (because he prevents their being a common 
moral culture) isolates social groups from one another. Option 1 has Rawls yield 
to Cohen, while option 2 makes a general social ethos impossible - so preventing 
Rawls from forging the stability he sees as so essential to his theory. So Rawls 
cannot, Cohen thinks, escape his monist critique by privileging comprehensive 
doctrines. Doing so begs the question of what the basis for communal, society- 
wide mores is. Cohen, as far I am aware, doesn’t pursue this line o f thought.
However, he is too brief on this aspect o f Rawls' work. Once we emphasise, 
with Rawls, the importance of accommodating disparate comprehensive doctrines 
in a single polity, we see that we need to confront rather than dismiss this feature 
o f Rawls' position. Once we do that the conflict between principles that do and do
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not emanate from comprehensive doctrines, and, respectively, can and cannot be 
taken to inform personal deliberation, comes into view. And with it an argument 
against Cohen, even, as I have suggested, on the reasons-based reading.
In section 4.2 I draw on Liam Murphy’s criticism of Rawls in order to 
emphasise the social embeddedness of market conduct, and so complete the 
second aspect o f my argument against reasons-based Cohen. It is worth noting 
first that Murphy too pays insufficient attention to the divide most emphasised in 
Rawls’ later work between neutral and doctrinal principles.
Murphy is similarly brief in his consideration o f Rawls' adjustments to his 
project. He notes (1998, 255) that Rawls defines the political conception of justice 
in Political Liberalism along dualistic lines: "..it is a moral conception worked out 
for a specific kind of subject, namely for political, social and economic 
institutions" (Rawls, 1993, 11). And also notes that "The language o f dualism also 
figures in the account of a political conception o f justice as one that stands free of, 
and is compatible with, a range o f “comprehensive views”" (Murphy refers us to 
Rawls, 1993, 12-15). Murphy goes on to say, however (Murphy, 1998, 255), that,
this central issue for Political Liberalism of how a conception of justice can be justified 
and stable in a society made up of people with a range of different moral, philosophical, 
and religious views in fact seems to be neutral between dualism and monism.
He refers us to pages 223-27 of Political Liberalism , and finds here evidence for 
his opinion that individual groups can, consistently with Rawls’ theory, argue 
successfully for principles to shape the political arena that shape also their 
personal lives. Given this it might possibly be the case that an "overlapping 
consensus" is established whose elements cross political and personal boundaries
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for some or, indeed, all groups within the Rawlsian society. There is evidence for 
Murphy’s point here. The search for substantive political principles requires there 
to be a public understanding of what constitutes acceptable modes of 
argumentation. Not only must we (presumably us and Rawls qua theoreticians) 
seek common principles, but must do so in a way that appeals to a universally 
acceptable conception o f criticality ("..each o f us must have, and be ready to 
explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines we think other 
citizens...may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us..." (Rawls, 1993, 
226)). Thus, in arriving at a consensus some political conceptions will (no doubt) 
fail to get a hearing due to their being unsupported by reasonable criteria. Those 
that are successful may, it seems safe to conclude with Murphy, consist of 
monistic and dualistic elements. So Murphy dispels the idea that Rawls' concern 
to secure stability in the face of radical moral and philosophical difference is 
relevant to his (Murphy’s) thesis.
Murphy appears to think that Rawls makes room for consensus, while 
assuming self-contained doctrinal positions, by differentiating between two types 
o f substantive commitment: commitments that reflect established theories of the 
good; and those that reflect a neutral commitment to democratic mechanisms. One 
plausible way to combine the existence o f substantive political commitments with 
a belief in the soundness of mastergoal monism (taking that to be Murphy's 
favoured position) is to take as mastergoal just the political aspect of fundamental 
convictions. The distributional aspect o f the mastergoal, embodying the 
overriding aims o f a society's institutions, on this account is part o f the substantive 
commitments individuals have for their society irrespective o f their own distinct
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creeds. Monism, in this picture, does not exclude the politically inspired (non- 
doctrinal) mastergoal from entailing requirements on everyday life. This 
combination leaves individuals free to have their contending moral, philosophical, 
and religious visions of the good inform their personal lives, while political 
principles inform not only aspects of the personal sphere but also a person's vision 
o f the good society, as democratic and egalitarian, along Rawlsian lines. For 
example, it is possible to imagine an individual whose market behaviour is 
influenced by a desire to be consistent in his acceptance and application o f the 
difference principle (this reflecting a commitment to the mastergoal); and who 
buys only products not proscribed by his religion (this reflecting his 
comprehensive moral vision). This leaves his comprehensive doctrine intact, and 
has it inform his life appropriately, while political principle infiltrates his life to an 
extent that does not have it challenge moral, philosophical, and religious 
convictions. Pogge takes Murphy to task on this. For him, Murphy misreads 
Rawls because mastergoals are a function of comprehensive doctrines, and 
political institutions are acceptable only insofar as they further them, and their 
distinct aims. There is no political or other mastergoal standing over and above 
those of disparate social groups.
Devotees of diverse mastergoals may be able to agree on the same public criterion of 
justice, accepting from their separate standpoints that it advances well enough what they 
believe ultimately matters.. .To facilitate such a consensus, Rawls himself does not..take a 
stand on whether there is a mastergoal and, if so, what it is. (Pogge, 2000, 158).
And Pogge's footnote to this reads (n. 38),
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His (Rawls') abstinence here instantiates a general effort to keep his theory compatible, as 
far as possible, with a plurality of more (sic.) comprehensive doctrines by avoiding denial 
of any views they set forth as well as expressions of skepticism and indifference toward 
them.
Hence, Pogge denies (what Murphy, as mastergoal theorist, requires) that a 
Rawlsian society has a mastergoal at all. And this seems right. The presumption 
builds into Rawls' theory a dangerous understanding that there is a primary theory 
o f the good, to which other theories are underlings. It is precisely this danger that 
Rawls wants to avoid in his rejection of utilitarian and perfectionist theories o f 
justice.42
According to Pogge, then, the mastergoal monist requires a common 
understanding of what promotes the just society, mastergoals are a function of 
comprehensive doctrines, so the fact of plurality precludes their being a single 
society-wide mastergoal. There just is not then a master goal available for people 
to feed in to their personal lives. Murphy, however, need not feel thwarted by 
Pogge's remarks. He can reply that the type o f mastergoal he refers to need not be 
taken to emanate from a comprehensive doctrine. The mastergoal he requires need 
only relate to political convictions, on the understanding that democratic and 
society-wide distributional aims have a basis, not in moral, but in a political 
conception. This seems to put Pogge and Murphy in deadlock, and I’m not sure
42 It should be said that in his response to an "expensive tastes" objection to his theory 
Rawls talks about people having responsibility for their tastes. They ought, he says, to 
adjust their expectations and exercise restraint accordingly given facts about the scarcity 
of resources and others' legitimate claims. However, this type of adjustment does not 
require a change to a personal (or group-inspired) view of what constitutes the good on 
the grounds that it conflicts with a higher, substantive view of the good life.
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how to move on from this. The discussion does, however, indicate that Murphy 
may well be a little hasty in his rejection o f the importance to his argument of the 
limited place o f comprehensive doctrines in Rawls’ later work.
In the next section I present the second aspect of m y argument against the 
reasons-based version of Cohen’s argument. I draw on Liam Murphy’s defence o f 
Monism in order to emphasise the social embeddedness o f personal market 
choice.
§4.2 Second aspect o f the argument: the embeddedness of market-based decision 
In section 4.1 I argued that due attention to Rawls' aims in his later theory reveals 
a division between the personal and the political that hinges on the understanding 
that principles for personal conduct stem from fundamental convictions; and that 
this basis makes them unsuitable for institutional design. An accommodation o f 
the "fact of pluralism" and stability is not achieved by so grounding political 
principles. This creates problems for Cohen even on the reasons-based account, 
according to which he requires Rawlsian citizens to address reasons for action. 
These considerations have been expressed in a way that emphasises the neutral 
basis of institutional principles. My focus in this section is on the social 
embeddedness o f market choice, and how an emphasis on its embeddedness 
supports the view that we ought to recognise a difference between the bases and 
practical status o f institutional and personal principles. I draw again on an aspect 
o f Liam Murphy's defence o f his thesis.
In support o f his position, Murphy responds first to the argument in favour 
o f dualism that Rawls offers in lecture VII of Political Liberalism, "The Basic
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Structure as Subject." There, Rawls makes the following points. The first two are 
not considered at all by Murphy who opts to move straight to (what is here) the 
third point - that concerning "a division o f labour". The first two are, however, 
important, as will be seen. Noting that utilitarianism is a theory that applies a 
common principle in the assessment of political institutions, economic 
arrangements, and individual acts alike Rawls says that "The first principles of 
justice are plainly not suitable for a general theory," (Rawls, 1993, 261). And the 
difference is that justice as fairness is informationally sensitive to intrinsic 
differences among distinct parts o f society. Rawls says,
These principles require.. .that the basic structure establish certain equal basic liberties for 
all and make sure that social and economic inequalities work for the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged against a background of fair equality of opportunity. In many if not 
most cases these principles give unreasonable directives. (Rawls, 1993, 261).
He expands by pointing to the way in which associations -  he gives churches and 
universities as examples -  differ in terms o f their aims, and how this makes the 
application of common principles to their internal organisation inappropriate. 
While societal relations among associations are appropriately regulated by a 
single set of principles, taking these to govern their internal operations fails to 
recognise the distinct way in which their individual goals shape their objectives. 
What is to be recognised as a claim against another, for example, within an 
association will be legitimately determined by, say, what is taken to be its raison 
d'etre. But more than this "it seems natural to suppose that the distinctive 
character and autonomy of the various elements o f society requires that, within 
some sphere, they act from their own principles designed to suit their peculiar
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nature." (Rawls, 1993, 262). Hence, Rawls does not only defend the distinction 
between principles of justice and those that regulate associations on instrumental 
grounds. There is a relationship between the "character" and the "nature" of 
distinct associations and the principles that govern them. Combined with a respect 
for their "autonomy" the picture is that the restriction o f principles o f justice to the 
basic structure provides the potential for an accommodation o f associations whose 
modus operandi reflect (often) deeply rooted convictions about their purpose, 
significance and role.
The next reason Rawls gives for the distinction o f principles is the 
following (Rawls, 1993, 266). Considered just as such, a set of transactions or, 
more generally, individual actions may be, taken singly, just according to a 
particular criterion. This does not prevent the outcome generated by the actions in 
combination producing an unjust circumstance. Declining relative income for one 
concentrated group of workers -  unacceptable according to a general principle -  
may well be consistent with each individual action, in the series o f actions leading 
to the decline, being permissible by some principle whose application is to 
individual choice. Given this possibility it is necessary that we have principles not 
only for individual behaviour but principles that will enable us to comment 
simultaneously on what is happening globally and relatively. This prepares the 
way for, but is distinct from, the third defence - that associated with what Murphy 
calls the "division of labour". Rawls says, "That there are no feasible rules that it 
is practicable to require economic agents to follow in their day-to-day transactions 
that can prevent.. .undesirable consequences. These consequences are often so far 
in the future, or so indirect, that the attempt to forestall them by restrictive rules
100
that apply to individuals would be an excessive if  not an impossible burden." 
(Rawls, 1993, 266). Hence, the fact that local interactions are not transparent in 
their consequences makes it unfeasible to require individuals to seek out the 
information necessary to make a global assessment o f their action. The application 
o f general principle to activity at the individual level would require such 
information seeking and so would be impossibly burdensome. But this is, I 
suggest, a secondary consideration. That what happens at individual or local 
levels, and their aggregated consequences may come apart in terms o f their 
justness is the primary concern. That a division o f labour is appropriate is a 
consequence o f this prior fact. That individual transactions could lead to unjust 
global outcomes is, o f course, insufficient grounds to worry about global 
consequences. But coupled with the view that unregulated interaction will, 
however, lead to "oligopolistic configuration o f accumulations that succeeds in 
maintaining unjustified inequalities", we not only have an argument for general 
principles to regulate background conditions, but, prior to that, a justification for 
justice-preserving background institutions, to which principles o f justice can be 
applied. "(W)e require special institutions to preserve background justice, and a 
special conception o f justice to define how these institutions are to be set up." 
(Rawls, 1993, 267).
Murphy, emphasising the division o f labour aspect o f Rawls' discussion 
here, (Murphy, 1998, 259), is unconvinced that what Rawls has to say helps to 
address the monist-dualist dispute: "But none o f this supports the idea that 
different normative principles apply to institutional design on the one hand and 
personal conduct on the other." In support o f his view Murphy discusses a
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"conception o f justice that rejects dualism, but embraces the ideal o f the division 
of labour." (p. 262). Murphy employs a principle o f “weighted beneficence” a 
principle that attaches more weight to the worse o ff in comparisons o f 
distributions. The principle is utilitarian in that according to it it ought to be the 
case that weighted aggregate well-being be promoted, and it is monistic because 
this weighted aggregation procedure (by assumption) is applied to both 
institutions and to individual choices. Nonetheless, says Murphy, it will "make 
eminent sense" (p. 263) to concentrate responsibility for achieving desired 
outcomes at an administrative level - responsible for setting taxes and co­
ordinating transfers - while relieving individuals o f much o f the burden of steering 
the economy towards just allocations. And this seems correct. We cannot argue 
for a separation of principles, between institutions and every day choices, on the 
grounds that it is more efficient to free up individuals from the burdensome task 
o f active moral stewardship. But this, while no doubt a knock-down argument for 
some variants o f dualism, does not respond to aspects o f Rawls' opinion (as 
expressed in "The Basic Structure as Subject") that are important for his theory. 
Rawls does present instrumental arguments for a separation o f principles, in a 
division of labour argument that Murphy here convincingly overturns. But, as 
noted, Rawls does not rely on the division o f labour point, it is, rather, merely an 
upshot of his more basic points.
Note that part o f Lecture VII (Rawls, 1996, 262-265) is a response to the 
libertarian rejection o f systematic co-ordination of economic activity at the 
institutional level for the purposes o f distributive justice, and the notion that 
"special first principles are required for the basic structure." (p. 262). The
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libertarian argument, as Rawls presents it , has, as a primitive feature, the 
assumption that a single set of rules can be applied to all transactions in order to 
assess whether the outcomes they generate are just. A basic datum in the theory is 
a conception of transactions as a single type of item to which, as such, a single set 
o f rules can be applied. For Rawls this is an inappropriate starting place. Basic to 
his theory are not transactions as such, but transactions embedded in rule-laden 
contexts. On page 267 of Political Liberalism Rawls says that,
..fair background conditions may exist at one time and be gradually undermined even 
though no one acts unfairly when their conduct is judged by the rules that apply to 
transactions within the appropriately circumscribed local situation.
This can be interpreted as a reference to local circumstances given a background 
assumption that general rules at an institutional level already exist. But this is not 
Rawls' intention. Consider the rest of the paragraph - interspersed with my 
comments:
The fact that everyone with reason believes that they are acting fairly and scrupulously 
honouring the norms governing agreements is not sufficient to preserve background 
justice, (ibid.).
This directly contradicts what the libertarian would say, with "fairly" given a 
Nozickian gloss. And if  this is a challenge to the libertarian, on his terms, then it 
would be appropriate for us to understand these local transactions as taking place 
independently o f any administrative hierarchy. Rawls goes on,
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This is an important though obvious point: when our social world is pervaded by 
duplicity and deceit we are tempted to think that law and government are necessary only 
because of the propensity of individuals to act unfairly. But to the contrary, the tendency 
is rather for background justice to be eroded even when individuals act fairly: the overall 
result of separate and independent transactions is away from and not toward background 
justice.. .Therefore, we require special institutions to preserve background justice, and a 
special conception of justice to define how these institutions are to be set up.' (ibid.).
This recommends a reading that sees the local transactions referred to as taking 
place prior to the setting up of a general institutional framework. The rules applied 
"to transactions within the...local situation", "the norms governing (local) 
agreements", are, then, to be taken to be, in this quote, prior to more general rules 
that apply across local contexts. The point is, and this is the basis o f Rawls' 
offensive here against the libertarian, that economic interactions considered fair 
from the perspective of the locale are not guaranteed to promote fair outcomes at a 
general level. This is, empirically, because general structural facts such as 
inequalities of bargaining power, can (or, we can say, with some conviction, will) 
create unfair outcomes in the aggregate. For example, someone's job acceptance 
can, taken by itself, appear to be just, whereas once we take account of the 
pressures on the individual to accept the work, pressures originating from outside 
the local context (such as a decline in demand for the output in her region of the 
industry in which she currently works, due to monopolisation in another region) 
the transaction may not appear so fair (Rawls gives an alternative labour market 
example on page 267). But, importantly, this result does not depend on empirical 
assumptions alone. It is basic to the argument that transactions with distinct 
locations - where what defines a location are the norms under which transactions 
occur - cannot be taken to satisfy a higher-level norm, one that breaks down the
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distinction between different contexts. Were this to be possible then the libertarian 
would be let back in. He could say that he recognises local norms but what takes 
precedence, for theory, are the transactional principles that secure justice at the 
general level.
It is essential, then, if  his response to the libertarian is to work, that Rawls 
accommodate, rather than override, local principles in his argument for principles 
o f justice. It is, at the same time, imperative that such institutional principles be 
established because (something the libertarian does not allow within his 
argument) fair principles o f cooperation that seem to operate well locally do not 
offer protection from injustices that come from background events. The latter is 
also an important point from the perspective of a discussion about monism and 
dualism. It might be suggested that once the need for institutional principles is 
recognised, the local norms can be overridden, supplying a monism that Rawls 
need not object to once he has convinced us of the need for institutional concern 
for distributive justice. To see why this is not the case let us consider the 
following distinctions - distinctions that are not, I think, made explicit in Murphy, 
nor indeed in Cohen.
The rules that constitute the market as an institution detail the permissions 
and contractual and other obligations o f market participants as they engage in 
production and exchange. These rules govern everyday individual conduct in the 
market context. All trades, for example, must be voluntary. These rules are, in 
turn, influenced by the principles for institutional design ground out by the 
original position device, and are thus rules all can accept as legitimate restraints 
on what they can permissibly do. Restrictions on monopoly power, for example,
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intended to avoid unequal democratic representation entail restrictions on the 
conduct o f firms they will accept if  they accept the underlying rationale. 
Individuals not directly involved in production will nonetheless be aware o f and, 
similarly, accept the restrictions as legitimate, given a commitment to their 
underlying rationale. This sort of influence on conduct is general to all market 
participants, in that all who engage in exchange or production must abide by 
them. There are other influences, however, that do not apply to all market 
participants. What I have in mind are influences associated with comprehensive 
doctrines (in Rawls’ sense of the term). For example, choices associated with 
veganism, religious codes, environmentalism, fashion, and culture are all 
informed by ethical outlooks. The point is not to contrast the compulsory nature of 
rules of market exchange with the discretion that applies to personal 
commitments, and tastes. The distinction is, moreover, crucial if  Rawls is to 
preserve a division between restrictions on personal behaviour that emanate from 
neutral reasoning (behind-the-veil), and moral restraints whose support is 
embedded in comprehensive doctrines.
The market context is an instance o f Rawls' concern to take as datum 
doctrinal distinctions across different groups. If he helps himself to the view that 
general restrictions associated with principles for institutional choice can 
influence personal behaviour as part o f  the comprehensive doctrine o f all 
individuals then he fails to secure a distinction between restrictions associated 
with neutral reasoning, and restrictions associated with comprehensive doctrine. 
That is, general restrictions, such as a requirement to abide by personal tax codes, 
inform personal choice, but the reason for this cannot be that their rationale is
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integrated with the other constitutive elements o f a comprehensive doctrine. This 
would assume the compatibility o f the support for the details of institutional 
design and fundamental moral conviction, precisely what Rawls cannot assume if  
he is to move away from the instability in his original account. Hence, central to 
my argument is that normative considerations that feature in ground level market 
activity are wedded to comprehensive moral outlooks, and that the emphasis 
Rawls places on accommodating standing comprehensive doctrines carries over to 
the domain o f market choice. This being so there is a divide between what can be 
acknowledged as a restriction on market outcomes, engineered parametrically, 
through institutional adjustment, and the pressures that bear on individual 
behaviour, and have a basis in the fabric o f personal moral commitments. 
Preserving this divide, as Rawls must, imposes dualism as a requirement in his 
theory, rather than an option he favours. It also delinks his dualism from 
arguments against it that point to ambiguities in the specified reach o f the basic 
structure.
§5. A “Delimitative” Response
The picture that emerges is of a market participant who is constrained in two 
ways. First, she is constrained to comply with restrictions on her conduct 
associated with the specific details of her society’s institutional architecture. She 
must comply with tax regulations, company law, contractual obligations, and the 
details of the rules that ensure that market exchange is voluntary, and that
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property rights are respected. Rawls presumes a market economy43 and so it is 
reasonable to suppose that an understanding of and respect for the general 
restrictions associated with market participation are embedded in the outlooks of 
Rawlsian citizens. This does not mean that the restrictions associated with policy, 
the details o f which are inspired by the principles o f justice, have a rationale that 
is similarly embedded in comprehensive outlooks. Indeed, it is this latter type o f 
restriction the rationale for which cannot be assumed to be integrated with 
comprehensive doctrine. To assume so fails to ensure a necessary divide between 
rationales of neutral standing and those emanating from a comprehensive view. In 
order to accommodate this contrast, a contrast I am suggesting Rawls must 
acknowledge, it is essential that there is a related distinction between two types of 
normative requirement. I will call these “delimitative” and “personal” normative 
requirements. A delimitative normative requirement need not feature in, or play a 
role in the formation o f personal choice in everyday situations, situations in which
43 Rawls sees his theory as applying in principle to both socialist and capitalist systems, 
differentiated by the extent of private ownership, hence the market he presumes (at 
Rawls, 1972/1971, 7) is a system of exchange and production with the degree of private 
ownership unspecified. Luck egalitarian readings of Rawls, for example Scheffler (2003), 
tend to identify his use of the market, however, with a response to Conservative thinkers 
who doubt the ability of egalitarians to adequately respect the personal responsibility the 
market system, with its devolved responsibility for the management of personal economic 
affairs, engenders. On this reading the market, in Rawls, rather than being indifferently 
located within socialist and capitalist polities is understood to be the market as it exists in 
modem liberal democracies. What I have to say is insensitive, I think, to these two 
readings of Rawls’ intentions. It is relevant to note here Rawls’ view that it is only by 
supposing a market system “..that the problem of distribution can be handled as a case of 
pure procedural justice. Further, we only gain the advantages of efficiency and protect the
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a choice or decision is to be made from a first-personal perspective. An example 
o f a delimitative normative requirement is, relevantly for the discussion, a 
requirement to respect the negative rights (rights to non-interference) of others, 
with respect to their personal property. While (widespread) obedience to such a 
requirement is necessary to the long-term stability o f a system of market 
exchange, it is not a requirement that a person need ever bring into play in his or 
her actual market choices. The requirement sets parameters to what can 
permissibly be done, restricts the sort of choices that can, permissibly, be made, 
but it need not feature in a choice, or a piece of practical reasoning in the market 
context, that is itself consistent with the parametric constraints the delimitative 
requirement sets. Requirements associated with the policies, laws, and regulations 
that are intended to give material shape to Rawls' two principles o f justice are 
delimitative in this sense.
The distinguishing feature o f a personal normative requirement, as I intend 
it, is that it features in, plays a performative role in, personal, practical reasoning. 
Rather than placing limits on what might be permissibly chosen, a personal 
requirement shapes, or contributes to the process o f actual evaluation, at point-of- 
choice, as a constitutive aspect of the process o f deliberation itself. These 
distinctions are helpful in characterising the form a person's practical reasoning 
should have if it is to satisfy, for the market context, the requirement that there be 
a distinction between requirements that have their basis in comprehensive vision, 
and those that find their support in neutral, behind-the-veil, argumentation.
important liberty of free choice of occupation.” (1972/1971, 274). None of these 
properties rely, in principle, on private ownership of productive means.
109
Personal requirements will include those associated with moral principles and 
commitments that inform what a person buys, where she is prepared to invest, and 
so on. These sorts of requirements associated with comprehensive doctrine can 
then have a different pedigree to those, delimitative, requirements that, in the 
economist's parlance, restrict her feasible set. This sort o f distinction is a must, I 
would argue, if  Rawls is to ensure that comprehensive doctrines do not infiltrate 
the original position, and principles so derived do not automatically harmonise 
with comprehensive doctrines.
I want to consider now the implications o f the distinction between 
delimitative and personal normative principles for the reasons-based version of 
Cohen's position44. Is Cohen to say that the moral requirements he thinks ought to 
be in play in the market place are "personal" requirements, in the sense in play 
here? It seems that he must do so if they are to be thought o f as pressing for 
market actors in the personal domain, in their everyday lives. If he does say this, 
however, he is characterising these requirements as emanating from a person's 
comprehensive doctrine. If he denies this then the principle must emanate, rather, 
from the reasoning associated with the neutral vantage point of the original 
position, and if  he claims this then he threatens to break down the distinction, so 
crucial in Rawls, between the normative outlook connected with a person's 
comprehensive outlook and principles whose origin is neutral, from outside of that 
outlook.
44 The argument of this section (§5) relates to reasons-based version of Cohen’s view, so 
that references to Cohen are to reasons-based Cohen.
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Cohen might want to claim that the personal moral requirement he supports 
is delimitative, and that because o f this the argument here doesn't touch him. He 
might offer the seemingly plausible argument that a requirement to forego 
payments made purely for extra effort need not feature in personal choice. The 
associated principle could be one that rules out - on a reasons-based reading of his 
view -  certain reasons for choice. However, characterising the personal 
requirements he defends as delimitative will not help his case. What he needs to 
be convincing against Rawls is a requirement that features in the personal sphere, 
in the everyday orientation of Rawlsian market agents. A delimitative requirement 
does not do this. It is, indeed, on all fours with requirements associated with the 
policies, laws etc., that are not personal but institutional.
§6. Conclusion
Cohen’s general claim is that if  a person defends principles o f justice for 
institutions then they must also recognise implicit principles for personal conduct. 
The way he argues for this in relation to Rawls is to point out an inconsistency 
between a commitment to the difference principle and conduct that generates 
unnecessary inequalities. In particular, market participants ought to be prepared to 
forego material rewards for effort that could be made in their absence. Prominent 
defences o f Rawls on this score, associated with Thomas Pogge and Andrew 
Williams, rely, I have argued, on non-compulsory readings of Cohen’s view. 
Cohen can, I think, side-step their remarks. He can place a reasons-for-action 
emphasis on his claims. On this reading the Rawlsian market agent ought to 
modify her beliefs about what constitutes acceptable reasons for action, and then
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outlaw those reasons as a basis for market exchange. This sort o f exercise in self- 
restraint does not require agents to make counterfactual judgements about the 
possible consequences of their actions, as in the Pogge-Williams view. Indeed, a 
world in which pure incentive payments are routinely paid and routinely accepted 
can be one from which the offending reasons have been expunged.
This would seem, at first pass, to leave Cohen’s position poorly defended. If 
the existence of inequalities that he thinks ought to be outlawed by the difference 
principle is consistent with universal acceptance by market participants o f his 
restriction on reasons, then his ambition o f making Rawls more egalitarian is not, 
it would seem, achieved. But it is perfectly compatible with Cohen’s monist thesis 
for him to see the removal of such inequalities, those associated with pure 
incentive payments, as an institutional task, rather than a task for the individual. 
There is, however, an alternative way to criticise Cohen, one not so easily side­
stepped by a reasons-based reading. The embeddedness of market-based decision 
is important for Rawls, I have argued, not only because, being everyday action, it 
is informed by agents’ comprehensive doctrines. If Rawls is to avoid dissolving 
the divide between principles supportable from the neutral stance of the original 
position, and those whose support is embedded in standing, "thick" doctrine, he 
must distinguish between those principles in terms o f their support. In order to 
avoid dissolving this distinction, I have argued, Rawls must have in place a 
further distinction between what I have called delimitative and personal normative 
requirements. The problem this causes for Cohen even on a reasons-based reading 
can be stated as follows: Either: (1) he sees the personal principle he wants to 
defend as based in comprehensive doctrine and so of a different pedigree to the
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(institutional) difference principle; or (2) he sees the personal principle as having 
the same pedigree as the difference principle and so imposing a requirement 
without purchase in the everyday life o f the market actor. This, however, can be 
circumvented, or so Cohen might argue. A delimitative moral restraint places out 
o f bounds prohibited considerations prior to actual deliberation taking place. 
Cohen could argue that market agents can, whatever their cultural background, 
place such prior restrictions on what are permissible choice-guiding reasons. The 
question of the purchase of such restrictions need not arise, then, once market 
actors are engaged in market exchange. Enlightened Rawlsian market agents will, 
having seen the truth o f Cohen’s argument, see as off-limits the reasons he has 
convinced them ought not to be taken into consideration. But this attempted 
solution is problematic. What Cohen wants (must) argue for is personal moral 
restraint. A delimitative moral principle is not one that enters into the 
considerations o f an agent as she is engaged in (in this case market) activity. It 
sets boundaries around what is permissible anterior to deliberation towards 
choice, but is not in play in such deliberation itself. So this strategy does not 
introduce personal moral restraint into the lives o f market actors, it merely 
precludes the possibility of the offending reasons being part o f their everyday 
deliberations at all. It does not address the problem identified as it excludes from 
the personal domain the principles it seeks to argue ought to be felt there.
What this discussion of Cohen serves to emphasise is the importance in 
Rawls of the distinction between the institutional context o f market choice and the 
everyday orientation of the market actor. Choice in the latter, everyday setting is 
informed by comprehensive doctrine. Moreover, what ensures that the distinction
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matters is the discretion agents are allowed in the market context. This makes the 
market a powerful way to achieve both the preservation of a thoroughly private 
space, informed by comprehensive doctrine, and an institutional framework 
whose permissions and prohibitions rely on extra-doctrinal considerations. 
Cohen’s thesis threatens to break down this divide and so undermine what is 
paramount in Rawls, that (reasonable) comprehensive doctrine inform personal 
evaluation, in the personal sphere, while the design o f basic institutions has non- 
doctrinal foundations. Discretion in the marketplace is central to the way in which 
Rawls preserves this distinction in the market context, and such discretion is 
central to the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Market Participation and Embedded Critique in Rawls
Introduction
A stable liberal democratic society is not one from which the potential for dissent 
has been expelled. Those who reluctantly accept the institutional status quo do not 
exorcise the concerns that motivate their disapproval, they, rather, exercise 
restraint, they moderate the practical force of the concerns that would otherwise 
inform their conduct. However, Rawls' conception o f the impartial standpoint a 
person must adopt in order to engage in public debate fails to accommodate the 
practical status o f the concerns that motivate dissent. Imaginatively shorn o f the 
distinctive outlook that forms the basis of those concerns the person, in 
deliberative mode, sets their practical significance aside. Those concerns cannot 
be addressed, then, from within the outlook that supports them, but must, if  they 
are to be overridden, be worked on from outside of the person's outlook. 
Suppression is the only option for one who accepts that those concerns ought not 
to be allowed unhindered practical force in everyday conduct, and this removes 
what ought to be present in the ongoing stance of persons in a stable liberal 
democratic society: the potential for dissent.
In this chapter I examine the extent to which this weakness, in Rawls' 
representation of the problem of stability, can be overcome by appealing to the
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properties of a market system, and the associated characteristics o f a market actor. 
In section one I consider the place o f the market in Rawls, emphasising the role 
the market plays in securing a personal domain in which choice is informed by 
conceptions o f the good. My intention here is not merely to repeat, with further 
textual evidence, the point that market choice is informed by conceptions o f the 
good. What I want to emphasise is the necessity to Rawls o f the market, that it is 
not something that can be easily removed from his thesis without doing some 
structural damage. This helps to show the worth of pursuing a conception of 
embedded critique that focuses on the market. Section two establishes the 
character of what I call reason-based autonomy in the context of the market, and 
works out its implications for a conception of reflective critique. An aspect of 
Ronald Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism is drawn on here in order to bring out 
the meaning of reason-based autonomy. In section three the argument draws on a 
“metapreference” approach to preference formation. In section four I attempt to 
generalise to other, non-market, contexts of choice, the conception o f embedded 
critique I defend for the market setting, while section five considers how the 
argument against Cohen, presented in chapter three, might seem to need 
adjustment in the light of what is said in this chapter. Section six concludes.
§1. The Market in Rawls
A central aspect o f Rawls’ constructivist method45, and what helps to distinguish 
his approach, quite clearly, from Immanuel Kant’s (Cf. Rawls 1989), is the
45 His constructivism is laid out most explicitly, perhaps, in Rawls (1980, 1989). The 
general character of Rawls’ constmctivism is outlined in an illuminating way in Cohen 
(2003, §c).
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inclusion at a fundamental level in his theory of presumed facts about the society 
to which the principles of justice are intended to apply. One such presumed fact is 
that economic activity is organised through competitive markets. Indeed, Rawls 
confirms early in a Theory o f Justice that he sees a system o f competitive markets 
as an example o f a major social institution (1972/1972, 7):
By major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principle economic 
and social arrangements. Thus...competitive markets, private property in the means of 
production, and the monogamous family are examples of major social institutions.
Later he tells us why he includes a market system among the basic institutions to 
which his principles are to apply. It is only by supposing a market system, he says,
that the problem of distribution can be handled as a case of pure procedural justice. 
Further, we...gain the advantages of efficiency and protect the important liberty of free 
choice of occupation. (1972/1971, 274).
So, rather than simply acknowledging competitive markets as a datum he is forced 
to take as empirical input, Rawls opts to include the market as a major social 
institution because o f what he sees as its desirable properties. First, a system of 
voluntary exchange that permits ground level transactions to be based on personal 
preferences affords a distinction between aggregate outcomes, background, 
market-oriented policies, and personal decisions. So long as the way in which 
personal decisions generate aggregate outcomes is consistent with background 
rules that are considered just, then the outcomes themselves will be just. This, the 
procedural character o f the market, is not, however, only reflected in the 
distinction between uncoordinated choice at ground level and justice preserving
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background rules. I will return to this point shortly. Second, according to the 
above quote, Rawls views efficiency as a “fundamental social problem” 
(1972/1971, 6) that a realistic set o f principles must seek to accommodate, and he 
accepts, it seems, the mainstream economic results that competitive markets 
secure efficient allocations of goods and productive inputs.46 Regarding Rawls’ 
third point, in the above quotation, that markets “protect the important liberty of 
free choice of occupation”, I note only that this view is much debated for 
capitalist economic systems.47
Returning to the first point, that the market lends itself to a procedural 
interpretation of what social and economic justice requires, there is an alternative
46 That he accepts arguments for market efficiency is suggested by the view he expresses 
in the quote in the text (1971/1972, 274). He also says, however, that, “..if the received 
doctrine is..mistaken..I hope that for the purposes of the theory of justice no harm is 
done.” (p. 234) We can, I think, reconcile these two remarks by viewing Rawls’ 
acceptance of economic theory as tentative; or, perhaps better, as tentatively held by “the 
citizen who is trying to organize his judgements concerning the justice of economic 
instituions.” (ibid.). The relevant area of economic theory is available in most 
microeconomic principles texts. Eg. Cowell (2006, 238, Theorem 9.4)) and Varian (1992, 
Ch. 17), incorporates the classic results in Debreu (1972/1959) and ensuing 
modifications. Cowell’s theorem 9.4 states the case for efficiency in a way that makes 
explicit the need to exclude “externalities” (third-party effects of economic activity) and 
“non-private goods”.
47 Reiman (1987) is a good source for the thoughts of Roemer and Cohen on this issue. I 
note also that Rawls intends his theory to apply indifferently to polities with regard to the 
extent of state ownership of the means of production. The contrast he draws in the 
introduction to the revised edition of "A Theory of Justice" (1999) is between a socialist 
liberal society (state-centric ownership) and a property owning democracy (dispersed 
onwnership).
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way of making the point. In a way commented on by David Miller (1990, chapter 
3), a significant feature of a system of competitive markets is that it is neutral as 
to which conceptions o f the good individuals apply in their market decisions48. 
This facilitates a division between market-oriented public rules designed to secure 
just outcomes and action inspired by comprehensive doctrines at ground level, and 
this, I would argue, is an under-emphasised way in which the market is helpful to 
Rawls. The nature of the contrast can be explored by way o f comment on what 
Kymlicka (1990) sees as Rawls’ incipient luck egalitarianism. According to 
Kymlicka, Rawls is motivated to present a theory of justice that is sensitive to 
personal voluntary choices, while being blind to differences in unchosen (personal 
and social) circumstances. As Scheffler puts it,
Will Kymlicka offers a clear description of this putative progression of (luck egalitarian) 
ideas. Kymlicka says that "[o]ne of Rawls's central intuitions . . . concerns the distinction 
between choices and circumstances," and that Rawls is "motivated" by the desire to 
produce a theory that is "ambition sensitive" but "endowment insensitive"— a theory that 
makes people's fortunes depend on their choices but not on their natural endowments or 
other unchosen circumstances... (Scheffler, 2003, 8. Page references to Kymlicka, in the 
original, have been omitted).
As Scheffler also notes, Kymlicka presents, in fact, two theses:
1. Rawls is an originator of a luck egalitarian approach. Strong evidence for this is 
his rejection of a system of "natural liberty" because the associated unbridled free 
markets will fail to compensate individuals for inequalities that arise as a result of
48 Miller argues that markets are not sufficient for neutrality, but I needn’t address this in
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unchosen factors that, being unchosen, place arbitrary limits on persons' 
opportunities.
2. Rawls, perhaps because he is unaware of his role as originator of a luck 
egalitarian stance, fails to adequately separate the influences o f chosen and 
unchosen factors in persons' lives. A prime example o f this is his use o f primary 
goods as an index of inequality. The allocation of primary goods is directed by the 
difference principle's concern for relative equality, without reference, for example, 
to the indolence of couch potatoes, or, say, the special needs of the disabled,49 so, 
using Dworkin’s way o f putting things (Dworkin (2000)), the option/brute luck 
divide is poorly drawn.
Scheffler goes on to doubt whether Kymlicka has got Rawls right in this regard. 
He would tend to agree, he says, with Elizabeth Anderson (1999) that luck 
egalitarianism requires a higher-order moral perspective that embraces the 
distinction between choice and luck. An approach that takes the latter distinction 
as a primary building block for egalitarian theory cannot take into account the 
relevance o f the specific context in which a choice/luck distinction might be in 
play -  and this, inter alia, points up the need for the luck egalitarian to provide a 
prior moral basis for a focus on choice. Scheffler is convincing here50 and I think
order to make my points.
49 This line of criticism, as is well known, is pursued by Sen (most recently in Sen 
(2000)).
50 A central quote is, Scheffler (2003, 33): “The intuitive view, I believe, is that the 
fairness or unfairness of differences in advantage resulting from, on the one hand, factors
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that we should see that in Rawls the choice/circumstance distinction is very much 
contextualised; and what provides that context, I would argue, is both his concern 
to divide neutral and non-neutral orientations in personal choice, and the way the 
market helps him to secure that distinction in everyday life. Important, if  this 
point of view is to be seen as in any way correct, is the idea that when a person is 
engaged in personal choice in the marketplace, what informs her choice is her 
personal outlook. I would argue that this is the case, in Rawls, for two reasons:
1. If conceptions o f the good are to have the protected status they are supposed to 
have in Rawls then it seems inappropriate to see neutral considerations as 
invading the personal sphere when it comes to market deliberation. One way to 
incorporate reasons-for-choice that have a neutral basis in market choice is to 
integrate them somehow with reasons that emanate from comprehensive doctrine. 
This, however, would threaten to break down the divide that ensures 
comprehensive doctrines do not seep into the foundations o f the neutral outlook;
beyond people's control and, on the other hand, people's voluntary choices, is highly 
dependent on the prevailing social context and institutional setting. For example...most 
(would not) think it unfair if a naturally gifted professional athlete were offered a more 
lucrative contract than his less talented teammate. On the other hand, most people would 
consider it outrageous if an emergency room doctor left an injured patient untreated 
simply because the patient's injury resulted from a foolish but voluntary decision. And 
few would think it acceptable to deny legal counsel to an indigent defendant on the 
ground that her inability to pay for an attorney was the result of poor financial decision 
making on her part. If this is correct, then the intuitive credentials of luck egalitarianism 
cannot be taken for granted, and it is all the more important for luck egalitarians to 
explain how exactly their position is supposed to follow from a conception of persons as 
having equal moral worth."
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2. I argued in chapter three that one, important, way in which Rawls argues 
against a Nozickian position is his presumption that market transactions are 
culturally embedded. This stymies libertarian attempts to construct a principle of 
justice that applies to a theoretically primitive conception o f transactions just as 
such.
Hence, the usefulness o f the market, for Rawls, is, arguably, that it helps preserve 
a personal domain in which any ethical considerations that are in play emanate 
from standing comprehensive doctrine. Neutral ethical evaluation applies not to 
personal choices but to overall outcomes. Further, where overall outcomes are 
deemed unacceptable from the point of view of justice any adjustments that are to 
be made must be to the background “rules of the game”51 and not at the level of 
personal choice. This requirement is reinforced by a conception o f a system o f 
market exchange and production that emphasises the privileged status of personal 
values, and personal beliefs at ground level.
The central thing to retain, from these brief remarks about the role of the 
market in Rawls, that will be useful as we proceed, is the way in which personal 
market choice is informed by comprehensive doctrine. The agent is non-neutral
51 The term “rules of the game” to describe the basic conditions for market interaction is 
commonly used, for example Friedman 1970: “there is only one social responsibility of 
business -  to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition without deception or fraud.”
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when engaged in market-based practical deliberation (the thought is expressed 
less starkly later).
§2. Limited and Unlimited Reason-Based Autonomy 
in the Context of Market Exchange
I want to begin now to attempt to address the issue o f the neutralisation o f the 
motive status o f doctrinally based claims, in the context o f a Rawlsian society, by 
presenting a particular characterisation o f the market participant. It will be 
helpful, first, to describe what I take to be the relationship between, what I call, 
limited and unlimited reason-based discretion in the market setting. Note, first, the 
place o f a person's reasons fo r  making a choice (what might be called "the 
because" o f her choice)52 in the process of preference formation.
§2.1 Reasons, Evaluative Criteria, and Preference 
When a person makes a choice in a market context evaluative criteria are brought 
into play. In a decision about which of two houses to buy, for example, the houses 
may be compared according to the number o f rooms, proximity to transport links, 
and so on. Each possible comparator is an evaluative criterion that, generally, 
informs the way a person compares two objects. There is a relationship between 
the evaluative criteria a person brings to bear on a choice and the reason(s) she 
has for making the choice. A person about to start a family will have more
52 Someone might say, "I am choosing a new car because my old one no longer works". 
That their old car no longer works is here the reason for the choice. Alternatively a person 
might say, "I am choosing a new car because I have money to bum". Theirs would be an 
alternative reason for making the choice.
123
concern, perhaps, for the safety o f a neighbourhood, or the size of the rooms, 
when choosing a new place to live than someone looking to rent a house out to 
students. The formation of a preference in the marketplace, where by preference I 
understand an ordering o f possible options (an ordering that will, or would, inform 
actual choice, were the occasion to arise), is informed by these evaluative criteria. 
In turn, which personal evaluative criteria that are in play in the process of 
preference formation is influenced by the reason(s) the person has for making the 
choice (the reason she has for ranking those possible options rather than focusing 
her attention, at that time, on other objects o f choice). In any given choice 
scenario, then, a person arrives at a preference, a ranking o f available options, by 
bringing into play evaluative criteria that reflect her underlying reasons for 
orienting herself in that way. This in no way attempts to elide the complexity, 
often noted, of the way that evaluative criteria are brought to bear in a choice 
situation. Nor does it have to avoid the issue o f incommensurability (dealt with in 
an interesting way in Raz (1999, Ch. 3)). All that is needed here is to think of 
what a person would aver are the evaluative criteria she is applying. How they 
operate in the act o f  comparison is not a relevant issue.
Having located the place of reasons-for-choice in the process of preference 
formation, I want in the next two sections, to draw out the relationship between, 
what I call, limited and unlimited reason-based discretion in the context of market 
exchange. As a first step, we can get a good idea o f what is meant by reason-based 
discretion by looking at how it features in Ronald Dworkin’s version of resource 
egalitarianism.
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§2.2 Reason-Based Discretion in Dworkin's Resource Egalitarianism 
An important ingredient in Dworkin's project is his attempt to show how, through 
a characterisation of the properties o f a market system, a normative political 
theory can be defended that accommodates, in a non-antagonistic way, both 
liberty and equality. A way to see how Dworkin achieves this is through an 
interpretation o f his thoughts on expensive tastes. Under conditions o f scarcity a 
person who cultivates expensive tastes will make a greater call on resources than 
others whose desires are more easily satisfied. If we imagine that a stock o f all­
purpose resources are centrally held for distribution according to the principles a 
society accepts, then the decision will be, in a simple welfare-egalitarianism, that 
some centrally held resources ought to be released for the person with the 
expensive tastes, in order to maintain equality o f welfare. This, given scarcity, 
makes those resources unavailable to others, thereby imposing a cost on them. A 
pertinent question to ask is how it is decided how much additional resources the 
person with expensive tastes ought to receive. If it is to be based on the person's 
subjective assessment, o f the shortfall between the resources needed to bring him 
up to a welfare level equal to others and the resources he has, then there is no limit 
in principle to the resource transfer, and associated cost that others must bear. 
Moreover, a welfare egalitarianism that attempts to fix this by introducing an 
objective assessment, based on, say, a theory about the relationship between 
higher gustatory tastes and personal welfare, will not bring into play, in the 
calculation, the preferences of other people. In this way, equal concern (the 
"sovereign virtue") is not shown to all. The desires of the generality are muted in 
the determination o f the resource needs of the bon vivant.
125
Contrast the way the market makes this kind of decision. Here expensive 
tastes are registered in the marketplace as claims on resources, where the intensity 
o f desire for a particular good is reflected in a preparedness to forego other 
desired goods, including leisure. Similarly, the desires, for other purposes, o f 
other individuals for the resources required to satisfy expensive tastes, will be 
registered by claims made upon those resources. Who gets what is decided via 
competition in which the person with expensive tastes will be able to attract only 
those resources he is prepared to outbid others for, perhaps taking less leisure in 
the process in order to bolster his claims. The corollary o f a higher price paid by 
the bon vivant for the resources he needs is the amount o f other resources he must 
forego, these being released for general use (added to the extra output he, 
presumably, generates due to reduced leisure). In this way he pays the aggregate 
opportunity cost to all others of the resources he acquires. As Dworkin puts it,
Under equality of welfare, people are meant to decide what sorts of lives they want 
independently of information relevant to determining how much their choices will reduce 
or enhance the ability of others to have what they want. That sort of information only 
becomes relevant at a second, political level at which administrators then gather all the 
choices made at the first level to see what distribution will give these choices equal 
success...Under equality of resources, however, people decide what sorts of lives to 
pursue against a background of information about the actual cost their choices impose on 
other people and hence on the total stock of resources that may fairly be used by 
them...(T)he contingent facts of raw material and the distribution of tastes 
are.. .background facts about what equality of resources, in these circumstances is...The 
market character of the auction... is an institutionalised form of the process of discovery 
and adaptation that is at the centre of the ethics of that ideal... (T)he true measure of the
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social resources devoted to the life of one person is fixed by asking how important, in 
fact, that resource is for others." (Dworkin, 2000, 69-70. Cf. 84-85 & 122).53
It is "sovereign" he says (p. 72) in the argument that "people enter the market on 
equal terms" (ibid.). Were there to be unequal initial claims, or the amassed 
wealth of a few gave them greater command over resources ab initio then equal 
voice would not be given to the preferences o f market participants. Their desires 
would have unequal weight in the calculation o f social cost, and so the criticism 
of the welfarist response to expensive tastes, considered above, would apply here 
also.
It is essential then to Dworkin's argument that conditions be such as to 
secure participants’ preferences not be muted in the market process. One essential 
condition (that holds only for an ideal market) is that initial claims be equal and 
the process not reflect growth, over time, in, for example, asymmetric bargaining 
strengths. In addition, the market shows equal concern for all participants if  it is 
maximally sensitive to people's preferences. Maximal sensitivity to preference 
helps to determine, Dworkin says, the "true opportunity costs" (p. 150) o f people's 
holdings. And this brings us closer to the place o f reason-based discretion in 
Dworkin’s work.
53 On page 72 Dworkin appears to suggest that the use of a central allocation used to 
mimic the market process, rather than the market process itself, would suffice to deliver 
equality of resources. This seems to undermine the reading that has him say the market 
process must be gone through for equality of reources to be achieved. I think, however, 
that he is considering here what the practical political implications of his insight might be, 
and countenancing a real-world modification that does not challenge his theoretical view 
that the process is a sine qua non of justice in resource allocation -  but see p. 112, 
paragraph 3.
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He asks us to imagine a group going to buy land on which to build a 
football stadium (p. 150). The price paid for sufficient land would likely be less 
were the land sold as a single lot than were the lot to be divided into smaller 
portions. This is because the smaller lots will be capable o f being put to a larger 
number of competing uses than the single football stadium sized plot. The sale of 
smaller lots also seems to serve better the objective o f achieving equality of 
resources because "an auction is fairer...when it offers more discriminating 
choices and is thus more sensitive to the discrete plans and preferences people in 
fact have." (pp. 150-151).
The lack o f discrimination in the object for sale makes redundant 
preferences that exist and would, were they to be brought into play, effect a better 
estimate of the opportunity costs o f the resulting resource holdings. Not only 
ought goods to be identified in ways that makes them maximally divisible but also 
the uses goods can be put to ought to be as wide as possible. A restriction on what 
can be done with a good makes redundant a type o f preference a person might 
bring into play in deciding whether to purchase it. If we picture market-based 
choice as a comparison o f options in which the chooser bases a comparison on 
evaluative criteria, as in the threefold distinction made in section 2.1, above, it 
seems straightforward that Dworkin would see the unhindered application of self- 
selected evaluative criteria, on the part o f market participants, as a beneficial 
feature of a market system. It serves the dual purpose o f showing equal concern - 
types o f criteria are not, from the outset, excluded - and helps to determine true 
opportunity costs (thereby achieving an appropriate combination o f equality and 
"liberty/constraint base" (Chapter 3, passim)).
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Moreover, if  we describe the relationship between personal reason(s)-for- 
choice and evaluative criteria in the way I did in the previous section then it is a 
short walk to the view that reason-based discretion is a desirable property of a 
market system for Dworkin. Allowing reason-based discretion maximises the type 
o f evaluative criteria that can possibly be brought into play in market choice.
This, while it begins to give us an insight into what reason-based discretion 
is in a market context, does not, however, tell us how reason-based discretion 
might be legitimately restricted. It is unlikely to be compatible with Dworkin’s 
thesis that reasons associated with persons’ race or religion, for example, are 
always a legitimate basis for reasons-for-choice in the marketplace. So, while it is 
beneficial for reason-based discretion to be unlimited, it intensifies social 
competition for scarce resources, it should also be recognised that some limitation 
is necessary if  the market system is to avoid being sullied by unwanted biases and 
crooked tastes. This does not help, o f course, to determine where the line should 
be drawn, between acceptable and unacceptable preferences, but it does help to 
draw the relevant distinction between limited and unlimited reason-based 
discretion. The distinction is an important one for what I want to say about the 
reflective capacities o f the market participant, and the next section attempts to 
specify it further.
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§2.3 Reason-Based Discretion in Markets and Hierarchies 
A recurrent debate in the field of what is often called "transaction cost 
economics"54 concerns what distinguishes, in a precise way, market-based 
methods of organising production from production conducted via hierarchical 
organisations. An obvious distinguishing feature is the extent to which immediate 
managerial control is maintained within a hierarchy, in which managers have the 
power to directly command subordinates, and the extent to which managerial 
control is diluted in a market-based relationship.
Alchian and Demsetz (1996) claim to have identified a weakness in the 
view, commonly accepted among transaction cost theorists, that the long-term 
labour contract is employed by firms because o f the managerial command it 
affords. The ability of a worker to leave the firm or, alternatively, be sacked for 
non-compliance with demands made, makes the employer-employee relationship 
more of a market-type relationship than the common view allows. The degree of 
command is equivalent, say Alchian and Demsetz, to that associated with arm’s 
length, or market-based, transactions. It is not important to become embroiled in 
the details of that debate, but there is something pertinent to my argument to be
54 Coase (1937) is commonly recognised as the groundbreaking paper in this area. The 
transaction cost approach to the study of industrial organisation was developed later, 
prominently, by Oliver Williamson (1975, 1998, 2000, 2002), and is often placed under 
the banner of "new institutional economics". Good summaries of Williamson's influential 
approach are Williamson (1994, 1996). Essentially, in his 1937 paper Coase set himself 
the task of explaining the existence of firms. He concluded that the hierarchical control 
they afford removes the costs of market transacting that would be incurred were all 
employer-employee relations to be conducted on a market, or "arms-length", basis. 
Williamson extends the theory in a number of directions including a consideration of the 
impact of the degree of "asset specificity" on the firm-supplier relationship.
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had from considering a possible location o f the divide between market and 
hierarchical methods of organising production.
Consider the expert employee, an employee in a firm who has the 
recognised expertise to make independent decisions concerning, let us say, choice 
of supplier, for an important material input. Responsibility for the choice, let us 
imagine, has been devolved to this individual because of his expertise. It is natural 
to suppose that there is an implicit understanding that the reason the expert has for 
selecting suppliers and the reason the firm has for asking him to make the 
selection are compatible. The reasons o f the expert employee and the employer 
need not be identical, however. What is often placed under the rubric of the 
“principal-agent problem” is the insight that employer-employee motivations 
might not coincide. What is important for the employer is that whatever reason the 
employee has for making the choice should further his (the employer’s) aims. 
That is, the employee’s preference ordering should be one that could have been 
informed by the employer’s reasons for making the choice among potential 
suppliers. This gives the impression that complete reason-based discretion can be 
granted to the employee, but this is not the case. It is, o f course, possible that the 
employee might choose for a reason that is not compatible with that of the 
employer, its incompatibility lying in the fact that the preference ordering is not 
one that could have flowed from the employer’s own reason for making the 
choice. The employee might be inspired by arguments in support o f fair trade, for 
example, to opt for a higher cost supplier, arguments that do not, let us assume, 
similarly inspire his employer. The drawback for the employer, then, o f complete 
reason-based discretion is that reason compatibility might be lost. Moreover, if
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reason-based discretion is complete there will be no mechanism by which the 
employer can get the expert employee back on track. The loss o f hierarchical 
control, which complete reason-based discretion implies, will result in a loss of 
control over the preference ordering o f the employee. Recalling the description of 
the components o f preference formation (section 2.1, above), we can say that the 
expert employee can be permitted complete evaluative discretion, complete 
discretion over what evaluative criteria to apply -  therein lies the importance to 
his employer o f his expertise -  but, in order to preempt the possibility o f loss of 
control over final preference, reason-based discretion cannot be unlimited. That 
is, the expert employee can be granted evaluative discretion, indeed can be 
granted complete evaluative discretion, but he can only be granted this given a 
prior limitation on the reasons he can apply in making the relevant type o f choice. 
Hierarchical organisation is incompatible with unlimited reason-based autonomy, 
on the part o f the employee. Full autonomy can extend to choice of evaluative 
criteria but only on condition that the reasons a person applies fall within a 
permissible range.
In contrast, a market system is compatible with unlimited reason-based 
discretion. The compatibility of the reasons a person has for choosing as she does 
and the reasons o f a higher authority need not be an issue.55 While the “because”
551 should say that I don’t think I have answered Alchian and Demsetz (1996) in what I 
say here. The ability to sack an employee (or adjust her contract (Williamson 2002, 185)) 
is one way to exert control on what she does. The effort at control is, in the terms I have 
used in the text, an effort to control the reasons she regularly applies. Were the 
relationship a contractual market one then other mechanisms would be employed, 
including possible termination of the contract, to exert control. What is different in the 
two types of relationship (market and non-market) is the way control is exercised. In this
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of personal choice (Cf. §2.1) is necessarily limited in a hierarchy, it need not be in 
a market, quite simply because what characterises personal choice in the latter is 
an absence of formal managerial superintendence (of course, there might actually 
be superintendence in unequal relationships, for example). Hence, what in 
Dworkin is viewed as a valuable property o f a market is, further, a distinguishing 
feature of a market, in that it is compatible with market organisation but not with 
organisation that has a hierarchical structure.
However, it is not necessary for market participants to have unlimited 
reason-based discretion in order for the system o f exchange they are involved in 
to qualify as a market. While Dworkin would argue, I think, were he to present 
things in these terms, for reason-based discretion, he would acknowledge the need 
for limitations on such discretion in order to root out, for example, crooked tastes. 
And he would not consider that the existence of such limitations is incompatible 
with market-based exchange - limited discretion over personal reasons-for-choice 
is compatible with market participation. For example, legislation designed to 
combat discrimination in the selection o f job candidates aims, in part, to outlaw 
types of reason for choice. A person who takes this on board in her recruitment of 
personnel is not thereby disqualified as a market participant. Indeed, while I have 
argued that Cohen's preferred restriction on market conduct does not follow from 
Rawls’ principles o f justice, a person may well apply such a restriction on his or 
her reasons as a matter o f personal, moral choice. This self-imposed limitation of 
reason autonomy would not interfere with her status as a market participant. This
way we can see that Alchian and Demsetz have in their sights two types of relationship -  
one hierarchcial and one market-based. What I consider in the text is a contrast between 
two types of organisation per se -  one hierarchical and one not.
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may seem to make the notion of unlimited reason-based autonomy redundant, or 
relevant only for a hypothetical market system in which only basic market rules of 
exchange are in force, those preserving property rights and preventing fraud. But, 
as we will see, the distinction between unlimited and limited reason-based 
autonomy, far from entailing the redundancy o f the former notion, is a helpful 
one.
To see this, note that we can distinguish between a market understood as a 
system of voluntary exchange, shorn o f any but minimal institutional restrictions, 
designed to make stable exchange possible, and a market understood as subject 
also to a range of market-oriented policies -  designed to regulate competition, 
proscribe harmful goods, and so on. This sort o f distinction is in, for example, 
Lindblom (2002):
Although not all societies embrace or contain a market system, all existing societies make 
use of markets...Whenever people frequently pay other people to do something -  sing a 
song or dig coal -  those interchanges constitute markets. Yet despite the commonalty of 
such interchanges in Maoist China or the Soviet Union, these societies were not called 
market systems, because a market system exists only when markets proliferate and link 
with each other in a particular way...specifically to organize or coordinate many of the 
activities of a society. (Lindblom, 2004, 4).
Similarly, we find such a distinction in Max Weber’s Economy and Society'.
A market may be said to exist wherever there is competition...for opportunities of 
exchange among a plurality of potential parties. Their physical assemblage in one place,
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as in the market square,... only constitutes the most consistent kind of market formation, 
(cited in Swedberg, 1994, 265).
This, in addition to W eber’s later contrast (noted in Swedberg, 1994, 266) 
between a market and the regulatory framework that conditions personal action 
brings out the type o f contrast I have in mind.
Let us call a market understood as being constituted by voluntary 
exchanges, along with the enforced restrictions that facilitate such exchanges, a 
market per se. Were a person to be involved (hypothetically) in such a basic 
market set-up, she would have unlimited reason-based discretion. There are, in 
such a set-up, no institutional restrictions on the reasons people might bring to 
bear in their personal choices. So we can distinguish between the market a person 
is actually engaged in and the market per se, the market set-up in which she 
might, counterfactually, be engaged, a market in which limitations on reason- 
based discretion are (counterfactually) silenced.56 A market participant can, then, 
distinguish between the market she is involved in, replete with higher-order57 
constraints, and the market per se, the market shorn of its higher-order,
56 It might help to note that two market systems can be identical, understood as markets 
per se - in both there may be rule-governed, voluntary exchange -  while being very 
different in their less basic institutional characteristics. In one market system there might 
be a relaxed, “Austrian” approach to monopoly power, while in the other institutional 
rules condemn any form of market domination.
57 It is useful to introduce, at this point, the term “higher-order” to describe the 
restrictions and permissions associated with market-oriented policies. What is “lower- 
order” are the more basic provisions, that make trade possible. I will also draw on the 
contrast between the contngency of higher-order rules and the necessity of lower-order 
provisions.
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institutional properties. An immediate corollary o f this is that higher-order market 
rules are contingent and, being so, are characteristically open to critical review - 
being contingent their practical efficacy is conditional on their being warranted.
Now, recall that in Rawls' theory, as he presents it (Cf. §1) everyday market 
activity is informed by comprehensive doctrine, while the institutional backdrop, 
that determines, inter alia, the nature o f competition, redistributive mechanisms, 
and, which goods are deemed tradeable, is informed by neutral, behind-the-veil 
reasoning. On one side, everyday market activity is informed by comprehensive 
doctrine. Attitudes to consumerism, reluctance to eat dead animals and to 
purchase sweatshop goods, and so on are influenced by religious and group 
affiliations, and what persons see as personal crusades. On the other side are 
commitments to policies, and their associated implications for personal conduct, 
that are supported by a mode of reasoning that does not engage the concerns that 
emanate from comprehensive doctrine. To make the next step in my argument I 
want to notice that this seemingly happy schism is hard to maintain in the face of 
policies that have implications for practical reasoning in the personal domain. A 
policy intended to root out unwarranted discrimination in recruitment, for 
example, could be interpreted as requiring, on the part of the market participant, 
the adoption of a rule designed to disallow, prior to actual deliberation, certain 
reasons for choice. However, when it actually comes to selecting among job 
candidates the application of the rule will not alone serve to moderate the criteria 
the participant applies, in the act o f  selection. A person, for example, whose 
choice is influenced by the ageist norms that prevail in her society will have to 
tussle with the criteria she would readily apply were there no policy intended to
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root out ageism. Similarly, a policy designed to break prejudice in consumption 
patterns will have to work in part on attitudes if  the policy is to have practical 
effect at ground level. Hence, it is implausible to presume a happy separation 
(contra Rawls) o f commitments between those in support o f basic institutions and 
those that directly influence personal choice. So, institutional rules will, in many 
(important) instances, influence the application o f evaluative criteria in personal, 
market-based choice. (Relevant discussion is in Nancy Fraser (1999). See 
addendum I).
Now, recall that everyday, market-oriented choice is informed by 
comprehensive doctrine (in Rawls), and add to that the fact, just observed, that 
higher-order market rules have (in many cases) implications for actual market- 
based personal deliberation. This entails that a person's deliberation as to whether 
they should accept, as a factor in their personal choice, the evaluative criteria 
associated with an institutional rule, must be informed by their comprehensive 
doctrine. This is because the practical implications o f the institutional rule are 
considered at ground level, from the perspective associated with the everyday 
stance of the market participant, and that stance is informed (in Rawls' well- 
ordered society) not by neutral reasoning but by comprehensive doctrine (the 
central point of §1). In order to bring out what is potentially achieved here, I note 
a seeming difficulty. If the justness o f the implications for personal choice o f an 
institutional rule is assessed from within comprehensive doctrine then its 
justification will, according to the objection, be assessed from an inappropriate 
point o f view. While the critique proceeds in a way that engages personal outlooks 
and the concerns that emanate from them, this is bought at the cost o f removing a
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point of view that transcends comprehensive views. Without such a transcendent 
viewpoint, social agreement as to the content o f public rules, and their underlying 
principles, will only be achievable if  all can agree from within their 
comprehensive doctrines, and this will lead us, surely, into the type of 
“comprehensive liberalism” Rawls is concerned to avoid.58 I have to argue, then, 
if  the conception I am defending is to be friendly to Rawls, that presenting the 
possibility of dissent in this way does not necessitate partial, substantive 
agreement among otherwise competing conceptions o f the good. I can, I think, 
argue this, and the form the argument takes delivers the picture o f critique that, I 
think, secures a better (more realistic) representation o f the problem of social 
stability.
58 He says (Rawls, 1999, 360): "one deep divide between conceptions of justice is 
whether they allow for a plurality of different and opposing, and even incommensurable, 
conceptions of the good which is to be recognized by all persons, so far as they are 
rational...Plato and Aristotle, and the Christian tradition as represented by Aquinas and 
Augustine, fall on the side of the one (rational) good...The presupposition of 
liberalism...as represented by Locke, Kant and J. S. Mill, is that there are many 
conflicting and incommensuarble conceptions of the good, each compatible with the full 
autonomy and rationality of human persons." Hence, the liberal inclination is to avoid an 
appeal to a single conception of the good, but it is, says Rawls, the mistake of 
“comprehensive liberalism” to suppose that, among competing conceptions of the good, 
there is a common baseline from which to work towards political, if not doctrinal, 
harmony. He accuses Kant and John Stuart Mill, and his younger self, of comprehensive 
liberalism.
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§3 The Argument Adopting a “Metapreference” Approach
A good way to present the argument is to adopt, for purposes o f exposition, what 
has been called a "metapreference" conception o f the process of choice. (See 
addendum II).59 Consider a person's choice set, C{x, y}, being the list o f (here 
two) objects that the person can form a preference over, and select. They might be 
candidates for a job, or two potential housebuyers, recalling the earlier examples. 
PI and P2 are two preferences over x and y that the person may hold, xP ly  and 
yP2x. There is, further, an institutional rule whose effective implementation 
requires that people moderate the evaluative criteria they would otherwise readily 
apply in market choice. An appropriate moderation o f evaluative criteria (from the 
point of view of policy) is reflected in P I, while P2 is the ranking that reflects the 
unmoderated application of the personal evaluative criteria o f the market 
participant. We have, then, if  a person chooses in accordance with P I, C{x, y} = 
x, and if P2 then C{x, y} = y.
Let E denote the evaluative criteria that support PI. According to the 
metapreference interpretation o f choice, that PI holds sway can be represented as 
(P1)P(P2), that is, preference ordering one is preferred to preference ordering two. 
So, if  E is accepted by the market participant then (P1)P(P2) which entails C{x, 
y} = x. Letting E' denote the personal evaluative criteria o f the market participant 
we have if E' then (P2)P(P1) and C{x, y} = y.
If we omit the intermediate preference rankings we have, more simply,
if E then C{x, y} = x and if  E' then C{x, y} = y
59 The way things are laid out here is influenced, most directly, by Sen (1997).
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Now, this metapreference construction stops at the level o f evaluative criteria. 
However, each criterion has an associated justification. A justification for E 
would be defended by the authorities who would like to see E reflected in 
personal choice. The justification for E1 (personal evaluative criteria) is grounded 
in the comprehensive doctrine o f the agent. So, let J denote the justification for E 
and J' the justification for E'. Note that each justification can be embedded in a 
"because.." clause, o f the form, "evaluative criteria E (or E') ought to be applied 
because.. Note also that, in order to represent the reason-based autonomy that, I 
have argued, ought to be ascribed to the market agent, we can represent a higher 
level still at which the because clauses, rather than the evaluative criteria they 
support, can be compared. Indeed, that it facilitates a representation o f reason- 
based autonomy is the chief virtue o f using a metapreference approach in this 
argument. Now, one way to express the implications of the distinctions I have 
identified in connection with market participation is to say that counterfactual 
autonomy with respect to "the because o f choice" is what is secured for the market 
participant, by virtue o f his participation in a market (non-hierarchical) system. 
This makes live in the comparison o f justifications the possibility that it is the 
justification that reflects personal concern that will inform choice. At the same 
time we avoid the objection that this is achieved at the cost of presenting the 
adjudication from the perspective of comprehensive doctrine. That the objection is 
avoided can be seen from the way in which in the metapreference structure the 
two justifications are brought into view. They are compared from a higher vantage 
'point that need not be seen as itself informed by comprehensive doctrine. Neither
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need it be characterised as neutral. I am, in fact, suggesting that counterfactual 
autonomy with respect to the because of choice equips the person with a criticality 
that transcends the neutral/non-neutral divide, such as that presented by Rawls.60 
Persons are capable of a critical appreciation of competing justifications, and their 
grounds, that does not presuppose a particular normative stance, a criticality that 
does not require us to see persons' thinking as falling on one or the other side o f a 
divide between neutral and non-neutral modes o f evaluation. Moreover, 
competing justifications (personal and institutional) are in view and vie with each 
other in an assessment o f the merit o f existing policy. This conception keeps in 
view the personal concern that motivates dissent because it does not require the 
agent to transcend her everyday outlook in order to assess institutional rules.
§4. Implications for Cohen’s Argument?
At the end of chapter three I rejected a response Cohen might make to the 
accusation that he fails to pay proper respect to the division between neutral and 
non-neutral standpoints in Rawls. I said that Cohen might argue that the principle 
restricting a certain type o f personal reward is delimitative, in that it rules out, 
prior to actual choice, a consideration o f effort-reward combinations where 
rewards are pure incentive payments. Being delimitative, Cohen might argue, they 
do not invade the personal domain whose practical concerns are shaped by 
comprehensive doctrine. This, I argued, will not work, as what Cohen wanted to 
show was that a personal principle is entailed by a commitment to the difference
60 The seeds of this type of view are in Sen whose metapreference model of moral choice 
has the agent opting for a particular mode of moral thinking from a perspective that lies 
outside of that mode.
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principle, i. e., a principle that informs choice, as it were on location, in the 
marketplace. A delimitative normative principle is not personal in that sense. This 
way of rejecting an appeal to a delimitative-personal distinction is, perhaps, 
brought into question by the discussion o f this chapter. A delimitative normative 
principle is a person-level analogue o f an institutional rule. That is, the person is 
viewed as having, so to speak, a personal constitution61 that rules out anterior to 
any actual choice taking place a consideration o f (staying with the Cohenist case) 
the pure incentive structure o f a possible reward package. The constitutional 
character of a delimitative principle contrasts well with, what I am calling in this 
context, a personal principle, because the latter can be pictured as emanating from 
comprehensive doctrine, while the former is supported by neutral thinking. This 
preserves well, in a schematic way, the compartmentalisation that appears to 
follow from Rawls’ distinctions, and serves, it seems, to rebut Cohen. However, 
the discussion o f this chapter appears to break down this seemingly neat division 
between delimitative/neutral principles on the one hand and personal/non-neutral 
principles on the other. I have argued for a conception o f reflective critique that 
takes in in a single sweep justifications for institutional rules, not tied to 
comprehensive doctrine, and justifications for personal evaluative criteria that are 
so tied. My defence o f Rawls against Cohen relied on the notion that everyday, 
market-oriented choice is informed by comprehensive doctrine, and that imposing 
moral requirements (derived from institution-level principles) in this sphere was 
an indefensible intrusion. If agents are able to take in, in one mental sweep, 
justifications for both institution-level principles and justifications associated with
61 A similar notion is in Vanberg (1994, 21).
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comprehensive doctrine, then why can’t they appreciate and accept the entailment 
Cohen defends, without this being seen as an invasion of a privileged, personal 
space? In answer to this, I suggest that the fact that a person has reason-based 
autonomy as a market participant prevents a moral principle (derived from 
reasoning offered in support o f institution-level principles) overriding a market 
participant’s capacity to reflect on and apply self-chosen evaluative criteria in the 
marketplace.
§5. Conclusion
The central claim o f this chapter has been that an adequate conception of 
embedded critique -  adequate because it can help secure a realistic representation 
o f a stable society -  can be derived from a characterisation of the market 
participant. According to this characterisation a distinguishing feature o f a 
competitive market is the reason-based autonomy afforded its participants. That 
is, the reasons for which agents choose is a matter o f personal discretion. It 
follows from this characteristic o f market participation that it is inappropriate to 
represent the agent as someone for whom reasons for choice (in the market 
context) are imposed in a way that overrides that discretion. If that discretion is 
overridden then what we have in view is not a market but, as I have argued in the 
chapter, a hierarchical system. It must be the case, then, in order to preserve that 
discretion, the discretion associated with reason-based autonomy, that a person 
who acts in accordance with an institutional requirement intended to restrain 
market conduct (for example a piece of legislation intended to root out 
discrimination in the marketplace) must be understood to do so in a way that
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preserves that discretion. That is only possible if  the reason associated with the 
institutional rule is brought into view as a reason that might not be applied, that 
might not, if  the market agent so decides, be the reason that informs his choice. 
For the compliant dissenter, someone who reluctantly chooses in accordance with 
the reason associated with an institutional requirement, for the relevant type of 
discretion to be preserved in her market-oriented choice it must be the case that 
the reason associated with the (reluctantly accepted) institutional requirement is 
brought into open conflict with the reason associated with personal concern (the 
concern that motivates the dissent). This must be the case if  it is to be a live 
possibility that the agent might act from personal concern, and so shun the 
institutional requirement. For this vying o f competing reasons to take place in the 
practical reasoning of the market participant it must be the case that there is a 
vantage point from which both types o f reason, and their rational support can be 
brought into view. The vantage point both transcends the points o f view 
associated with neutral and doctrinal perspectives and keeps in play, in 
deliberation, the motivating concern that fires the dissent. The market participant, 
then, ought, if  the discretion associated with reason-based autonomy is to be 
preserved, be pictured as capable o f a mode o f thinking that is both critical, 
because it brings into view competing reasons or choice, and embedded in that it 
keeps in play the socio-cultural bases o f personal concern.
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Addenda
I
Here I offer further support for the view that policies associated with basic institutions 
ought to be viewed as having, in some important ways, implications for personal choice 
in the marketplace. I draw on the work of Nancy Fraser who defends what she sees as an 
alternative paradigm to the type of approach she associates with Rawls.
In her "Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics" (1999) Nancy Fraser 
distinguishes between a concern for economic and social justice that focuses on the 
distribution of resources, or a derivative metric such as welfare, and an approach that 
emphasises the role of "recognitional" imbalances in generating and supporting 
inequalities. A just society is, on a recognitional account, one that recognises, and 
accommodates differences among personal identities: differences of ethnicity, sex, race, 
and gender. I take this to be for two reasons. Recognising differences associated with, for 
example, physical characteristics, can provide reasons for special treatment (for example, 
adjusting public spaces to enable access to people with disabilities can make their 
preferences "authentic" (Macleod, 1998, 38)). The explicit recognition of difference can, 
on the other hand, provide a basis from which to argue for equal treatment, for those 
differences not to be taken into account inappropriately. Apposite are employee selection 
procedures (referred to in the text) that are indifferent to class or sex. Talk of claims 
based on personal identity are, in large part, orthogonal to a discussion of resource or 
welfare inequality. It is possible to examine the way social roles track gender, for 
example, quite independently of how the social division of tasks shows up in material 
holdings or, say, personal expectations.
However, Fraser has something interesting to say about the seeming disparity of the 
two approaches. First, it is important to her that a recognitional approach is not limited to 
"identity politics", to the "affirmation of difference" (Fraser, 1999, 27) -  taking this to be 
related to the realm of understandings, or "significations", as Fraser puts it - but includes 
"currents dedicated to righting gender-specific, 'race'-specific, and sex-specific forms of 
economic injustice." (ibid. My emphasis.). Hence, an emphasis on recognition brings to 
the fore causes of inequality related to, for example, racial or sexual prejudice. And, 
importantly, recommends cures that call for cultural change rather than material 
redistribution. As Fraser puts it:
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The redistribution paradigm focuses on injustices it defines as socio-economic and presumes to be 
rooted in the political economy.. .The recognition paradigm, in contrast, targets injustices it 
presumes to be rooted in social patterns o f representation, interpretation and communication. 
Examples include cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect...In the redistribution 
paradigm, the remedy for injustice is political-economic restructuring. This might involve 
redistributing income...In the paradigm o f recognition, in contrast, the remedy for injustice is 
cultural or symbolic change. This could involve upwardly revaluing disrespected identities.." 
(Fraser, 1999, 27).
Fraser's comments are of particular interest here because of what they imply for the 
relationship between policy and personal choice. It must be the case that recognitional 
concerns are intended to feed into personal market conduct in Fraser's thesis. Were 
exchange to be infected with the sort of recognitional imbalances she mentions then it 
would be appropriate, indeed, surely necessary to have that conduct change -  through 
attitudinal change, or through compliance. And for this, it is necessary, if the change is to 
be policy-based, to presume policy to effect a shift in personal modes of reasoning.
Supporting this view, Fraser (p.31) identifies a type of inequality whose origin is 
both economic and cultural, circumstances in which "groups..suffer both maldistribution 
and misrecognition in forms where neither o f these injustices is an indirect effect o f the 
other, but where both are primary and co -orig ina lnoting that in order to address the 
inequality both redistributive and recognitional remedies will be required. For example, 
giving resources to a minority in order to increase their average income level, even if the 
resources are targeted for the acquisition of marketable skills, will not improve their lot if 
they are routinely turned down for jobs on the basis of their identity (Cf. Fraser, p.32). 
Similarly, access to schools with sound academic reputations is commonly based on an 
ability to buy, consequently expensive, local houses, but such clusters often mirror 
concentrations categorised according to ethnicity. Hence, on Fraser's account, sensitivity 
to recognitional issues is not a side concern, but ought, rather, to permeate the market 
participant's thinking in a market context. Policy ought, on her view, to influence 
attitudes, and so practical reasoning at a personal level, and involve a commitment to 
institution-level rules. Helpfully in the present context, Fraser would argue that she is not 
alone in supposing these two types of concern at play in egalitarian thinking. She states 
that, while their approaches are "unsatisfactory" (p.36), Rawls, Dworkin, and Sen have 
recognitional concerns:
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John Rawls..at times conceives 'primary goods' such as income and jobs as 'social bases of self- 
respect', while also speaking o f self-respect itself as an especially important primary good whose 
distribution is a matter o f justice. Ronald Dworkin, likewise, defends the idea of 'equality of 
resources' as the distributive expression o f the 'equal moral worth o f persons'. Amartya Sen, 
finally, considers both a 'sense o f self and the capacity 'to appear in public without shame' as 
relevant to the 'capability to function'.. (1999, 49, n.7, referenced at p.36).
I appeal to common sense in the text for the view that institution-level policy will, at 
least on occasion, influence personal choice. The type of theory defended by Fraser offers 
more theoretical support.
II
A metapreference account of moral, more generally reflective critical, reasoning with a 
view to personal choice, attributes to the agent a preference hierarchy. On this model the 
agent is presumed to have a range of preferences, some of which may present competing 
rankings of choice objects. Practical decision then involves a “second-order” decision 
regarding which of the “first-order” preferences to have determine choice. The 
metapreference conception appears in a number of largely unconnected literatures, in 
different forms. Seminal papers are those of Sen (1974) and Frankfurt (1971) in which 
lower-order preferences are quite explicitly up for examination; but an earlier, more 
implicit, version of the account can be found in John Stuart Mill (1972/1863). Richard 
Hare notes his debt to the way in which the vagaries of character and its rational control 
feature in Aristotle and Plato, and his own moral theory (esp. 1981) itself yields to a 
metapreference reading. Hirschman (1985) considers the application of hierarchy in 
choice to economics in a number of ways, including worker motivation. The central idea 
is to introduce an element of reasoned control into the economist's picture of individual 
choice, so moving away from the 'black box' passivity ordinarily associated with agents' 
behaviour. In the work of Elster (1985a) and Schelling (1984) (see also Thaler and 
Shefffin (1981)) akrasia is given a treatment that uses higher order preferences to 
differentiate between what the individual would do were she to successfully restrain 
herself and how she orders things according to her more pressing desires. George (1993) 
considers the implications of the model for economic policy, and (George (1998)) 
contrasts metapreference and multiple-self approaches to modelling irrationality. A 
review of some of the specifically economic aspects of the metapreference approach is 
Drakopoulos (1994).
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It will be helpful to be clear about what I understand by a metapreference model of 
reflective evaluation, or, at least, what interpretation of it is in play in the text. And for 
this I begin by responding to comments that Timothy Brennan makes (Brennan, 1989, 
1993) about the character of the metapreference approach, and its theoretical worth. 
Brennan, whose focus is the conception’s would-be role in economics, sees it as a 
wasteful extension to the orthodox, single-layered notion of preference. Brennan refers to 
Amartya Sen’s (1982a, 1982c -  see also 1982b) “model of morality” (Sen, 1982b: 75) as 
one according to which
higher-order preferences.. .ought to be followed in situations where actions based directly 
on satisfying interests would make everyone worse off. (Brennan, 1989, p ...).
Brennan says also of Harry Frankfurt’s classic Freedom o f the Will and the Concept o f a 
Person that, according to that paper, hierarchies of preference “reflect different levels of 
moral importance” (Brennan, 1989: 192); and that,
Using Frankfurt’s framework, stealing would be unethical because the preference not to 
take something belonging to another is a higher-order preference arrived at through moral 
reflection.” (ibid.).
This is, I think, a mistaken interpretation of those accounts.62 A consideration of where 
Brennan goes wrong helps to bring out what I take to be the more instructive account of a 
metapreference conception I draw on in the text.
What Brennan is associating with Sen and Frankfurt, it seems, is a preference 
structure in which preferences are categorised as higher or lower order according to their 
type. In the case of Frankfurt, for example, moral preferences are higher-order because 
they are subject to reflective endorsement. This way of seeing what is involved in 
metapreference is suitable to aspects of John Stuart Mill’s moral philosophy, and Brennan 
applies it to Mill. But even in this case Brennan’s reading is, arguably, less instructive 
than the alternative I take to be the correct rendition. It is helpful to look at what he says 
about Mill. On Brennan’s interpretation, the aspect of Mill’s moral philosophy that can be 
given a metapreference reading is his distinction of pleasures, and associated preferences, 
as more or less sophisticated:
62 Mark Lutz (1993) also thinks Brennan's account mistaken.
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Mill argued that the pleasures must be judged not just on “quantity” but on “quality”. The 
pleasures that engage the “higher faculties”, such as intelligence or education, are the 
more valuable. (Brennan, 1989: 191).
As is well known, contra the views of his father, James Mill, and the position defended 
by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill saw importance in a distinction of merit between 
the higher pursuits of, say, opera, and more base pursuits, such as, for example, watching 
mud wrestling. Acknowledging the distinction in earlier writers sympathetic to his 
position Mill points out,
however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over 
bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the
former rather than their intrinsic nature.(..)..It is quite compatible with the principle
of utility to recognise the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more 
valuable than others. (Mill, 1863: 8).
And the corresponding distinction in terms of preferences is between those of, say, the 
savant and those of the couch potato. The temptation here, in reading a metapreference 
model into Mill’s work, is that we focus exclusively (as Brennan does) on the quality of 
the preferences themselves, viewing the preference-hierarchy as importantly one of kind, 
when what is correctly viewed as higher-order here is a preference understood as a 
reflective ranking of possible preferences; a ranking that brings into view the evaluative 
criteria supporting the preferences, or (as in Mill) what they mean for one’s character, and 
so on. When Mill goes on to describe the competent judge, one who is qualified to offer a 
“decided preference” (ibid: 8) between two pleasures, he has him bring possible 
pleasures, (and associated preferences, I should add) into view. Thus, preferences of 
supposed greater sophistication and those more base are equally lower-order. What is 
higher-order is a considered assessment of their merits.
As I understand it, then, a metapreference account of evaluative deliberation, as 
witnessed in Mill, sees choice as taking into account possible preferences, these latter 
being equally lower-order. And the higher-order preference reflects a comprehensive 
evaluation that takes into account the reasoning in support of the lower-order preferences, 
such as their perceived personal or social consequences. That this is the proper place of 
metapreference in Mill’s moral theory is supported by McPherson (1982). According to 
the latter one way in which Mill argues for the superiority of the higher pleasures is that,
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those who are genuinely free to choose their plan of life...display a strong tendency to 
choose a life of higher pleasures...In the language of modem preference theory, such 
propensity would be characterised as a “metapreference”: a preference concerning the 
type of preference structure one wants to have. (McPherson, 1982: 11).
The view also finds support in Martin Hollis’ emphasis (Hollis, 1994) that the political 
value of individual liberty, for Mill, resides in the room it makes for self-direction, both 
in given choice-scenarios and in willing adjustments to character and capacities over 
time. This is a well documented aspect of Mill’s work and will include, I think we can 
take it, instances in which what are up for adjustment are the untutored preferences a 
person actually has. Giving Hollis’ emphasis on self-direction a metapreference 
interpretation we would distinguish possible preference-types as lower-order and the 
decided preference for, say, those associated with a more sophisticated personality, as 
higher-order.63
What is “higher-order”, then, in a hierarchical conception of evaluative-practical 
thinking is a decision concerning which possible lower-order preference ranking to have 
inform actual choice, and not, as Brennan would have it, preference types of greater
63 Making a related though different point, Hare (1981:25), whose own moral theory 
displays a metapreference structure, refers to Mill as exemplar of the type of approach 
that sees the source of our moral being as grounded in a capacity to exert intellectual 
control over the type of emotional response we share with other animals. Mill himself 
says (1863:54), "It is common enough certainly, though the reverse of commendable, to 
feel resentment merely because we have suffered pain; but a person whose resentment is 
really a moral feeling, that is, considers whether an act is blamable before he allows 
himself to resent it - such a person, though he may not say expressly to himself that he is 
standing up for the interest of society, certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule which 
is for the benefit of others as well as for his own." We can see in this quote that the moral 
individual is one able to recognise two possible preference orderings: one associated with 
unmitigated emotional response and one with rational control. The two orderings need not 
conflict in terms of the action they recommend but it is possible they will. The quote has 
Mill observing not simply a ranking of preference types but considering the role they play 
in a reflective consideration of what one ought to do. This, again, tells against Brennan's 
version of the model.
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sophistication. While a metapreference reading of Mill is available that ranks preferences 
according to qualitative criteria, I take the interpretation outlined here to better capture 
Mill’s intention. It is this form of metapreference model that I intend in the text. There is, 
however, more to be said on this that is useful in motivating the use of metapreference in 
the text. What is brought into view in a metapreference account need not be limited to 
evaluative criteria, but the modes of reasoning that support them as well, as the following 
points out.
We find in Sen an explicit intention to present a conception of metapreference that 
models moral deliberation. Its structure is, perhaps, most clearly expressed in the 
following:
Let X be the set of all possible outcomes and n be the set of all possible orderings of 
elements of X. A moral view can be defined as a quasi-ordering Q of the elements of 
7i.. .What does a moral quasi-ordering Q stand for? Various interpretations are possible. It 
might take the form of a moral desire to have one preference pattern over outcomes rather 
than another...Or else Q may correspond to one’s ranking in terms of 
praiseworthiness...(Sen, 1982b: 80).64
This set-theoretic formalisation, whilst rudimentary, seems, on the face of it 
straightforward enough as a possible, if stylistic, description of moral choice. Frankfurt, 
unlike Sen, talks not in terms of orders of preferences but of desires. Peculiar to the
64 A quasi-ordering is, following Sen's usage here, a ranking that is reflexive and 
transitive but may not be complete. One way to contrast rankings is in Sen (1970) chapter 
1 * but definitions vary across authors. I note also that, in later work, Sen (1995, 1997) has 
discussed the importance of context in personal choice. While economists make much of 
the internal consistency of choice, consistency among choices made, and, implicitly, the 
preferences underlying them, it is commonly the case that the context of choice will 
influence the choice made. The presence of a child might lead a chocolate-loving adult to 
choose the apple over the last piece of cake, a choice that may well be reversed were the 
child not present. There is a strong connection between this type of observation and Sen's 
earlier work on metapreference. The underlying preference (for cake over fruit) has not 
changed. What is responsive to context is the adult's higher-order ranking.
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human will, he says, is an ability "to form....‘second-order desires’ or ‘desires of the 
second order’." (Frankfurt, 1971: 6). However, he goes on to say,
Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to 
have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be 
different in their preferences and purposes from what they are..(.. .)..No animal other than 
man..appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the 
formation of second-order desires, (ibid: 7).
Hence, there is a distinction between second-order desires, as such, and the process by 
which they are established, what is primitive in this process being a "wanting to be 
different" (ibid.). A second-order desire concerns first-order preferences, and reflects 
what a person’s higher-order wants are concerning not the objects of the preferences 
themselves but the relationship between the preferences and her character, her longer- 
term goals, her religious beliefs, commitments and so on.
In a footnote, Frankfurt notes the following:
In speaking of the evaluation of his own desires and motives as being characteristic of a 
person, I do not mean to suggest that a person’s second-order volitions necessarily 
manifest a moral stance on his part toward his first-order desires. It may not be from the 
point of view of morality that the person evaluates his first-order desires.... Second-order 
volitions express evaluations only in the sense that they are preferences. There is no 
essential restriction on the kind of basis, if any, upon which they are formed.’ (Frankfurt, 
1971: 13).
The pursuit of the rules-of-thumb, say, embodied in a society’s moral code may even 
conflict for an individual with the pursuit of personal gain without us as yet invoking 
Frankfurt’s second-order considerations. What takes us onto the higher level is the 
individual’s reflective evaluation of the desires he has. It is consistent with Frankfurt’s 
model to be in moral turmoil without thereby being understood to be bringing into 
question the desires one in fact has. What is distinctively human is the capacity to bring 
moral thinking itself into view, in order, in this case, to evaluate one’s commitments. In 
the text a metapreference is used to achieve just that. A representation of normative
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thinking that involves a higher-order comparison of possible evaluative criteria, a 
comparison, indeed, that does not invoke, or privilege a particular mode of evaluation.
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Chapter 4 
McDowell, Rawls, and the Market
Introduction
The source o f the deficiency in Rawls' representation o f a stable society is, I have 
argued (Ch. 1, §4), following Mark Granovetter, the "undersocialised" character 
o f his conception o f reflective critique. A conception of reflective criticism that 
has the person dissociate herself from her everyday modes of evaluation has her 
adopt a perspective that extinguishes the concerns that motivate her dissent. 
Where she accepts that her point o f view is faulty, or a minority view, and so a 
view that ought not to inform her conduct, she has no practical standpoint from 
within her everyday ways of thinking from which to engage with the motive force 
o f her personal concerns. All that is open to her is a root and branch removal of 
her motivating concern, and this, again recalling Granovetter, leads to her 
"oversocialisation". Rather than accommodating the tension that exists in an 
ongoing democratic society between commitment to existing institutions and a 
desire to see them changed, Rawls’ oversocialised conception, pictures agents as 
unquestioningly obedient to prevailing policies, practices, and regulations. What 
is required, in order to remove this deficiency, is a tenable conception o f reflective 
critique that has the agent capable o f taking into account both neutral and non­
neutral considerations simultaneously. This would enable the comparison of 
neutral and non-neutral considerations to proceed without the detachment that, I
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have argued, sets aside the motive force o f personal concerns. Such a conception 
is, as I tried to show in chapter three, can be derived from a particular 
characterisation o f market participation, a characterisation that emphasises market 
agents’ reasons-based autonomy. On this view, in order to accommodate the role 
o f both comprehensive doctrine and institutional requirement in everyday market 
choice we must conceptualise market agents as capable o f higher-order thinking 
that embraces both neutral and non-neutral reasons for personal, market-based 
choice. Being a critical perspective that embraces both neutral and non-neutral 
points of view, this conception keeps alive the motive force o f personal concerns 
even while they are being subject to critique that engages neutral considerations.
This approach has the important advantage, I think, o f supporting a 
conception o f embedded critique that draws on resources from within Rawls’ own 
theory. No metaphysical contentions are imported from outside of Rawls’ 
account, avoiding difficult-to-settle disputes about the character o f reflective 
thinking, and respecting Rawls’ belief that political philosophy ought not to rely 
on metaphysical presuppositions. However, the argument would be only partially 
successful were it to end here. There are two reasons for this. First, while market 
choice is an important aspect o f everyday life in a market economy it is not, o f 
course, the only, nor the most significant, context o f personal choice. And so, in 
order to claim to have a conception of critical reflection that applies to the 
Rawlsian citizen as such, something must be said about the implications o f my 
view for the conception o f reflective capacities in family, professional, and other 
social settings. Second, the argument of chapter three draws on an abstract 
characterisation o f agents, qua market participants. Because it relies on abstract
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considerations the argument suggests little about how flesh and blood agents in 
the real world are to come to be equipped with such reflective capacities, and the 
implications o f the conception I have offered for how we conceive their moral 
thinking more widely.
It is important to extend my thesis in these two ways because the 
conception o f critical reflection I have argued for must be married to a conception 
o f the well-ordered society as an ongoing, organic enterprise in which the 
commitment to basic institutions people have (and thereby social stability) is 
engendered, in part, in persons’ moral upbringing. This reflects Rawls’ approach 
in A Theory o f  Justice in which (in Part III) he presents a picture o f developmental 
moral psychology intended to complement the abstract discussion o f Part I. In part 
III Rawls’ intention is to show how a society whose regulative principles are 
justified as in Part I can be a stable society - the argument being that a 
commitment to original position thinking is consistent with a theoretically sound 
conception o f moral development that recognises a universal interest in a stable 
society and sees moral growth as constituted by gradual enhancements o f the 
capacity for rational reflection. This combination, for reasons I have suggested in 
chapter one, will not work. The detachment goes too far and, in neutralising the 
pull o f the motive power o f personal concern, fails to adequately represent a stable 
society. What I attempt to do in this chapter, then, is to defend a general 
conception o f moral thinking that is (1) compatible with the conception I argued 
for in chapter three, and (2) is adequately developmental to be compatible with a 
conception of the well-ordered society as an ongoing, organic enterprise.
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In order to be successful, the general conception o f moral thinking I defend 
must satisfy certain desiderata. It must allow critical reflection on doctrinal 
commitments that does not neutralise the fundamental convictions, attachments, 
and beliefs that inform and support those commitments. Neutral reflection should 
not be characterised in such a way that detachment requires a person to stand 
outside o f his or her comprehensive outlook. At the same time neutrality should 
be attainable in such a way that agents can be characterised as, in Rawls’ sense, 
reasonable. That is, an evaluative stance that does not draw on the resources of 
comprehensive doctrine must be possible. I argue in this chapter that a strong 
candidate for a conception o f moral thinking that satisfies these desiderata is that 
found in John McDowell’s moral philosophy.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section one I begin to prepare the way 
for McDowell’s thesis by describing the tension between social embeddedness 
and the capacity for social critique in a way that views Rawlsian and 
Communitarian conceptions o f reflective criticism as polar and equally untenable. 
This way o f setting things up views a conception o f reflection that accommodates 
both embeddedness and the possibility o f critique as a desirable via media 
between Rawls and Communitarian positions. In section two, to further prepare 
the way, I consider the way in which embedded critique might be thought to be 
achieved in the work o f Bernard Williams and Charles Taylor. What are, 
arguably, weaknesses in their cognate approaches serve to emphasise the 
strengths, and the salient aspects o f McDowell’s approach. I consider John 
McDowell’s thesis directly in section three. McDowell, I suggest, offers a way to 
characterise reflective critique that combines the ongoing vitality o f personal
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concerns with a capacity to criticise that does not presuppose the regulative role 
o f comprehensive doctrine. In order to understand McDowell’s ethics it is 
necessary to see it in relation to his epistemology. A sub-section brings this out. In 
section four I draw on Rawls’ own words to support a reading of him that is 
amenable to this McDowellian view. While recognising that Rawls’ methodology 
eschews metaphysics I argue that there is evidence in Rawls for a conception of 
moral thinking that has, at least, the structure o f McDowell’s conception. This 
section is intended to buttress the view that a McDowellian conception of moral 
thinking can be drawn on to complement the picture derived, in chapter three, 
from market participation. In section five I return to the issue o f market 
participation and how it might relate to the McDowellian view and its analogue in 
Rawls’ own work, drawing on the contrast between basic and non-basic 
institutions. Here I argue that the conception o f reflective critique I have offered 
for the market participant can be extended to the Rawlsian agent as such. The 
argument here recalls the metapreference framework I drew on in chapter three. 
Section six relates the argument o f this chapter to the problem of stability, and 
section seven concludes.
§1. Embedded Critique as a Via Media Between Rawls 
and the Communitarians
In this section I argue that Rawls’ conception o f reflective critique (as the 
Communitarian views it) and the Communitarian alternative, on a defensible 
reading o f prominent Communitarian positions, can be seen as polar and equally 
untenable alternatives. This serves to underline the desirability o f a conception of
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reflective critique that accommodates social embeddedness without submitting 
agents to a type o f social determinism that precludes radical critique. I begin with 
comments on Communitarianism offered by Mark Bevir and David O ’Brien in a 
recent paper.
Bevir and O ’Brien (2003) see the Communitarianism associated with 
Sandel as part o f a “social humanist” tradition they trace back to the British 
idealists, such as Edward Caird and T. H. Green (Bevir and O ’Brien (2003, 306)). 
Their main concern is to argue, indeed, that the Scottish philosopher John 
Macmurray acted as an important bridge between British idealist and later 
Communitarian thought. Macmurray, they say (ibid., 312), “defended an analysis 
o f the self as embedded in personal relations.” For him, thinking is embedded 
activity in the sense that it falls under the more general concept of action and 
ought, as such, to have the personal executive involvement in it emphasised. The 
unattached, disembodied thinking associated classically with Descartes’ cogito is 
thus seen as a misapprehension o f the nature o f thought and thinking. The essence 
o f one’s pure, unmediated being as traceable to the activity o f thinking, the basis 
o f Cartesian dualism, is replaced, in Macmurray, with the notion of thinking as 
something a person does, and this makes “the person” a more primitive concept 
than mere thinking as such. But what, it is helpful to ask, is the relationship 
between the priority o f the person and his or her social embeddedness? D. D. 
Raphael in his review o f Macmurray’s The S e lf as Agent says, “Just as the 
thinking subject o f Cartesian philosophy is an abstraction from the practical agent, 
so the agent considered alone is an abstraction from the person, who is in 
community with other personal agents.” (Raphael, 1959, 268). And avoiding this
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second type o f abstraction is, Raphael contends, what prevents Macmurray from 
being a Pragmatist:
Pragmatism, of course, allows for the fact that men live in societies, co-operating and 
competing with each other. But Professor Macmurray would say that the life of 
community, of love and friendship, is what makes men persons, (ibid. My emphasis).
Hence, what does the thinking is not to be purified o f social connections and 
environmental context but is to be understood as constituted by those types of 
relations. There is no agent as such that is, or comes to be, clothed in social garbs 
and so made a communal animal. What is primitive is just the person understood 
as constitutively social. This is instructive for an attempt to describe McDowell's 
thesis as a middle way between transcendent and embedded evaluative thinking. I 
consider the following.
Andrew Cohen (1999, 121) observes that a “social constitution thesis” (his 
term) is shared by Sandel, MacIntyre, and Taylor (p. 122); being, he says a core 
aspect o f communitarian thinking. And Macmurray’s priority-of-the-person 
response to Cartesianism would seem to fit Cohen’s bill. Cohen offers three 
pieces of evidence for a “social constitution” thesis in Sandel, MacIntyre, and 
Taylor. The following are the quotes Cohen uses (p. 122):
Community describes not just what they have as fellow citizens but also what they are, 
not a relationship they choose.. .but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute 
but a constituent part of their identity. (Sandel, 1982, 150).
Separated from the Polis, what could have been a human being becomes instead a wild 
animal. (Macintyre, 1988, 98).
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One is a self only among other selves. A self can never be described without reference to 
those who surround it. (Taylor, 1989, 35).
Cohen’s judgement is that a common idea here is that “an individual being on her 
own cannot be a person, a human being, a self.” (ibid.). But an individual’s being 
“on her own” seems not to take us to the heart o f what is being said in these 
quotes. First, let us take an individual’s being “on her own” as implying physical 
distance, in maturity, between the individual and her community. None o f these 
quotes can be taken to suggest that physical proximity, in maturity, to community 
is a condition for personality. While physical proximity is, arguably, necessary for 
there to be transmission o f tradition, it is not the case that being geographically 
outside o f a community later in life (necessarily) undoes the constructive work of 
culture. Hausheer (1996, 56) notes that for Herder “Germans only remain truly 
creative among Germans..Icelanders who go to Denmark perish. Europeans in 
America lose their creative energy..”. But while it might be an implication of the 
“social constitution” o f personality that being alienated from her own tradition 
damages a person somehow, by reducing her creative talents, for example, such 
distance does not, thereby, challenge the constitutively social character of 
personality as such. Indeed, it is precisely because o f the constitutive character for 
personality o f social setting that distance can be diminishing.
Let’s suppose then that “on her own” means something like “just as such”, a 
meaning that doesn’t imply physical dislocation, but the agent considered as an 
isolated item. The communitarian views expressed in these quotes seem to deny 
there can be a “just as such”. In Sandel community is a constituent part o f
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identity, while in Taylor a description o f a self is not possible without reference to 
those who surround it. And this is Macmurray’s position too, as Raphael 
emphasises. It is the constituted person that is primitive in his theory, not the 
agent as such. This is, Raphael notes, what serves to distinguish his position from 
a pragmatic account (such as that at a later date expressed by Richard Rorty in 
Philosophy and the Mirror o f  Nature (1980)65) that denies a primitive place to 
thinking as pure, isolable activity. In his paper, Cohen “begin(s) by noticing that 
when we say a person is socially constituted we imply that her society (or 
community) contributes to her constitution.” (Cohen, 1999, 123). But the second 
point, that there cannot be a “just as such”, helps us to question the suitability o f 
Cohen’s account o f social constitution for the communitarian enterprise he wants 
to talk about. The rejection o f the “just as such” indicates that it is not part of the 
communitarian view that society contributes to constitution. That way of 
understanding things would have two items in place: the unmoulded agent -  a 
primitive unshaped item that is not yet a person -  and a later moulded version, 
being the person proper.66 The quotes Cohen cites seem to reflect, then, what
65 Notable in Rorty is his analysis of the “ocular” prejudice in epistemology that supports 
the Cartesian view (Rorty, 1979, passim). Rorty recommends a displacement of this view 
in favour of one that does not presume opposition between mind and world -  a view that 
would be favoured also, I think, by Macmurray (and one that is embraced, though not 
without important reservation by McDowell (1996, 85-86)).
66 That Cohen has in mind a two-item conception of individual development in a social 
setting is evidenced by what he says about Locke. The latter can, Cohen, says 
accommodate a Communitarian point of view because the infant who begins life tabula 
rasa must have some input so as to develop into a human adult. There is an obvious 
dichotomy here of infantile tabula rasa and later formed personality.
162
Bevir and O ’Brien (2003) see as the communitarians’ heritage in Macmurray: 
what we can call an “immanentist” thesis concerning social constitution that sees 
situatedness and personality as coeval.
Cohen goes on to offer four possible interpretations of the social 
constitution thesis. These are, translated into matrix form, as follows:
General Particular 
Genetic A B
Sustaining C D
On interpretation A (the Genetic General interpretation) the social constitution 
thesis is a claim that the community contributes to the development o f the person, 
qua person. Interpretation B (Genetic Particular) has it that the claim is similarly 
developmental concerning the particular type o f person produced. The view 
associated with C is that community is necessary to sustain or maintain the person 
qua person, and D denotes the thesis that society is necessary to sustain the person 
qua particular type. As we have noted that geographical dislocation has no 
implication for the socialised character o f personhood we can dispense, I think, 
with both C and D. The genetic thesis can also, I think, be dispensed with insofar 
as it relies on a dichotomy o f shapeless and shaped entities that has no place, if  I 
am right, in the communitarian view o f things. A rejection o f these four possible 
readings o f Communitarianism invokes, Cohen says, an “atomism” in which the
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agent floats free o f any grounding or ongoing contextual influence. Making his 
point in terms o f “independence” he says:
The first form of independence -  call it ‘ontological independence’ -  is independence 
such that none of the social constitution theses is true.. .This independence is atomistic in 
that it requires the individual be seen as an atom, capable of coming into existence, 
continuing to exist, and acting, without any social support or input. (Cohen, 1999, 127).
However, the immanentist understanding o f social constitution that I am 
recommending (as a reading o f dominant Communitarian positions), that sees the 
person as inherently social, calls for a rejection o f all four o f Cohen’s readings 
that not only does not invoke atomistic independence but is more faithful to 
Communitarian intentions. These considerations help us to characterise, helpfully, 
the search for a conception o f embedded critique as the search for a middle way 
between a Communitarian approach that emphasises embeddedness at the expense 
o f a capacity for critique, and a Rawlsian approach that captures critique but 
envisions it as disengaged.
At the heart of the weakness in the representation o f social stability in 
Rawls is a problematic conception o f the person. A defence centred around its 
artificiality will not serve to insulate Rawls from criticism in this regard because it 
is not the conception as such that is at issue, it is its implications for, and the role 
it plays in, his unrealistic account o f the bases o f social stability. This appears to 
give the Communitarian position some appeal as an alternative source o f a 
conception o f reflective critique. However, given that (if I am right) dominant 
Communitarians are immanentist, the Communitarian conception merely begs the 
question how transcendence is possible when persons are fully embedded in their
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socio-cultural milieux. Hence, a via media, a way to conceptualise critical 
reflection that represents it as embedded critique will not come from the 
Communitarian side o f the debate. An author whose work is suggestive o f a way 
to effect a middle way between transcendent detachment and socially immersed 
thought is John McDowell. I discuss his position in section three. First, I consider 
two authors whose work also suggests a middle way between Communitarian and 
Rawlsian accounts o f  reflective critique: Bernard Williams and Charles Taylor. 
What is arguably weak in their work serves to highlight the strengths o f the 
McDowellian version.
§2. Williams and Taylor
§2.1 Williams
Bernard Williams emphasises what can be called the “dispositional” character of 
moral thinking. Foundational is his conception o f the “subjective motivational 
set” (Williams (1981b: 102)). This he presents as a more delicate interpretation 
than that standardly made o f David Hume’s theory o f practical deliberation 
(1985/1739-1740, 1998/1751). Contents of the motivational set are not only 
desires or sympathies understood as purely irrational items, but also,
dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various 
projects., (ibid: 105).
We can, Williams thinks, on this sophisticated reading o f Hume, understand the 
desiderative aspects o f deliberation as bearing an intrinsic relation to reason,
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without thereby challenging their motivational primacy. What is important to 
note, however, is not only the character o f the contents but also the dynamic 
process by which they are formed, transformed, and extinguished. Indeed, it is 
with reference to the dynamic character o f practical reason that we can see how 
Williams combines the conceptual nature o f motivational factors with their active 
capacity to motivate. Williams says, “(w)e should not think o f (the motivational 
set)..as statically given.” (Williams, (1981c: 105)). Maturation, learning, 
reflection will promote the genesis o f new wants and attachments and adjustment 
to existing dispositions. The sophistication required to enjoy, say, conceptual art 
or modal jazz can be hard won. Williams makes room, also, for alterations to 
sympathies, etc., that are the involuntary results of experiences, as well as those 
that are the outcome o f reflective thinking. This non-rational aspect o f the shaping 
o f dispositions plays a role in W illiams’ rejection o f models that characterise 
practical deliberation as explicable, and, indeed, available to self-awareness as an 
application o f principles. As John McDowell approvingly notes (McDowell 
(1995)), for Williams, deliberation typically brings into play informal heuristics; 
and this because o f the opacity o f the operations o f dispositional attributes in 
reasoning what to do. Williams says, “ ..ethical thought will never entirely appear 
as what it is, and can never fully manifest the fact that it rests in human 
dispositions” (Williams (1985: 199-200), and in his reference to the marks o f an 
“individual meaningful life” (ibid: 201) he talks about “its opacities and disorder 
as well as ..its reasoned intentions” (ibid: 202). Hence, sympathies, attachments, 
desires are available in reflection, as Williams sees it, but to suppose that they are, 
as such, what drives practical thinking, as a common rendition o f Hume has it, is
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crude. These items, as they appear in a piece o f practical-evaluative reasoning, 
possess a practical meaning that makes them inherently sensitive to rational 
assessment. Moreover, whilst we can articulate what it is that we take to be a 
reason for us in deliberating towards choice, these articulations do not uncover the 
factors at play in shaping the practical significance things have for us. What the 
individual cannot do is adopt a stance that brings into view the factors that possess 
motive power. Williams, indeed, rejects,
any model of personal practical thought according to which all my projects, purposes and 
needs should be made, discursively and at once, considerations for me. I must deliberate 
from what I am. (ibid: 200).67
Hence, practical deliberation is taken to be informed, shaped by a complex of 
inarticulable motivational factors that constitute the dispositional backdrop to 
practical thinking, and whose dynamic development the individual is in the grip 
of, but aspects o f which he can make available to himself in articulate reflection.
Here, then, is an author for whom critical reflection is ineluctably 
embedded in the everyday stance o f the individual. While reasons can be 
articulated and endorsed, and desires can be actively suppressed, the dispositional 
backdrop that constitutes the character of the individual and informs his 
unreflective and deliberate actions is opaque and cannot itself be self-consciously 
dismantled. It appears that we have a conception o f reflective critique here that 
offers to keep personal concerns as a live issue for the person while they are
67 This echoes Blackburn’s point (Blackburn (1998)) that the fatal error of Kantian 
accounts is making desire a content of deliberation rather than an informant
167
subject to critical review. Indeed, Rawls (as we will see, in section four) endorses 
Williams’ view. The difficulty is that, while W illiams’ conception is arguably 
successful in embedding critique, and so keeping in view the practical salience of 
personal concerns, unless his view is extended, it is silent on the relationship 
between the neutrality required for institutional assessment and the partiality 
associated with everyday commitments. Moreover, we cannot readily adjust 
Williams’ model to accommodate the distinction. What is opaque, and so 
inscrutible, is the dispositional backdrop that envelopes the individual’s thinking, 
making neutrality, in the sense o f a purposefully adopted neutral stance, not an 
option. Williams provides the means to conceive reflection in such a way that 
personal concerns retain their vital presence, but he does so in a way that makes it 
difficult to see how agent neutrality, in the way that Rawls requires it, might be 
effected. Williams could, o f course, argue that neutrality is an option in a society 
o f agents as he describes them. However, what we desire, if  we are to stay within 
a Rawlsian frame, is to accommodate radical difference among comprehensive 
doctrines, and in a way that does not presuppose substantive agreement among 
alternative outlooks. Without a capacity to grasp what constitutes the backdrop we 
are unable to set up discussion among consulting agents in a way that eliminates 
fundamental commitments.
Hence, Williams offers a promising thesis for present purposes. His 
conception o f reflective critique is potentially very helpful in that the vital 
significance o f existing affections, desires, and concerns is retained in critical 
review o f their practical standing. However, while Rawls applauds W illiams’ 
approach, what he fails to realise, it seems, is that Williams conception does not
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offer a standpoint, indeed, precludes a standpoint from which existing 
commitments can be neutrally assessed - where neutrality requires, as it does in 
Rawls, a point o f view that is free o f the influence of comprehensive doctrine. Of 
course, Rawls distinguishes between the artificial conception associated with 
neutral discussion, and the representational conception he can say he is 
associating with Williams, and applauding him for. However, if  I am correct, what 
Rawls needs is a conception, o f reflective critique, that accommodates both 
neutrality, in his desired sense, and the living significance o f personal concerns. 
Williams will offer the second half o f this, but his conception o f the inscrutability 
o f the “motivational set”, precludes a reflective detachment that can self­
consciously neutralise the practical role o f background dispositions, guiding 
convictions, and so on. Does Charles Taylor’s cognate work in this area offer a 
more suitable model?
§2.2 Taylor
We can begin with Taylor’s distinction, in What is Human Agency (1985a), 
between "two broad kinds o f evaluation o f desire" (ibid: 16). On the one hand we 
can evaluate a desire in respect o f its instrumental efficacy, in that furthering it a 
person understands herself to be improving her own welfare. A contrast between 
desires in this respect requires that we take notice only o f their relative ability to 
offer personal satisfaction. The contrast is with evaluation that acknowledges that 
a wide range o f desires typically reflect the characteristics or dispositions o f the 
person whose desires they are. Thus, as with Williams, there is an emphasis on the 
background conditions that are operative in the genesis o f desire. The associated
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type o f critique o f desire will take into account whether the desire reflects envy, 
say, or malice, or benevolence, the desire’s worth being tied to an opinion about 
the underlying motivations, character traits, and so on, it reflects. This latter form 
of evaluation, then, permits discussion not only o f the strength o f a desire, or, say, 
external constraints concerning the likelihood o f its satisfaction, but also its worth. 
It’s the significance o f this contrast that I want to try to bring out in what follows.
The relevant distinctions are actually three-fold. Instrumental assessment of 
desire Taylor refers to as "weak evaluation" (1985a: 16)). This, as has been noted, 
contrasts desires in terms of, for example, the costs entailed in pursuing them. 
This evaluation involves a comparison o f desires in terms o f their objects’ 
"desirability characteristics" (1985a: 17), here their relative costs, and, in the 
above example, their potential to further personal welfare. Taylor notes that 
somebody who engages in this type o f assessment is
a simple weigher...reflective in a minimal sense, in that he evaluates courses of action, 
and sometimes is capable of acting out of that evaluation as against under the impress of 
immediate desire. And this is a necessary feature of what we call a self or a person. 
(1985a: 23).
It seems, then, that Taylor wants us to distinguish between desire as it features in 
reflection and what he calls "the impress o f immediate desire". This suggests a 
contrast not only between, on the one hand, weak evaluation and, on the other, 
evaluation that considers a desire’s worthiness (this being what he calls "strong 
evaluation"), but also a contrast between weak evaluation and a form of 
assessment that is weaker still -  that associated with the "impress o f desire". But 
what is the significance, for us, o f this three-fold division?
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In his later Sources o f  the S e lf {1989) Taylor draws similar distinctions. 
Here we find him distinguishing between "brute reaction" (ibid: 6), a "response 
that relates to a proper object" (ibid), and, last, a "de facto reaction" (ibid: 7). If I 
read him correctly, a response to a proper object is an evaluation which involves 
an articulation o f the desire under consideration through a specification of its 
object. It is a further aspect o f Taylor’s thesis that desires are accessible only 
through language and that a division between how one feels and how one 
articulates that is artificial. In Wittgensteinian vein Taylor breaks down the 
division between internal response, understood simply as such, and that which is 
responded to. His classification, "response to a proper object" seems to be 
intended to convey the ineluctably phenomenal character o f emotional response. 
Indeed, for Taylor, our emotional life is constituted by the verbal account we can 
give o f it. He says,
.. .it is not as though we started off with a raw material of repulsions and attractions, elans 
and uneases...On the contrary, human life is never without interpreted feeling; the 
interpretation is constitutive of the feeling. (1985b: 63. My italics.).
Going back to Taylor’s notion o f strong evaluation, we can now see that an 
examination o f the worth o f desire is on all fours with the conception o f the desire 
itself. That is, we are not to suppose there is desire, as such, reducible to, say, its 
psychological aspect, and then, on top, as it were, a value assessment o f it. Its 
worth is intrinsic to its character, an examination o f its worthiness, being partly 
constitutive o f it. We can see from this that whilst Taylor castigates the utilitarian,
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and, indeed, the Kantian, for their exclusive treatment of desires as reducible to 
their instrumentality, there is, nonetheless, a place for weak evaluation in Taylor’s 
own thesis. It seems consistent with what he says, to note that some desires, in 
some contexts, are appropriately contrasted in cost-benefit terms, without recourse 
to notions o f worth. However, even this type o f desire evaluation is inherently 
phenomenal in Taylor. Note that he says, in his description o f weak evaluation 
that it involves an assessment o f a desire’s object in terms o f its "desirability 
characteristics". In this way, weak evaluation can be seen to be a special case of 
desire articulation that is wholly consistent with his view that articulation is 
constitutive o f desire. The third distinction, as it is made in Sources o f  the Se lf 
concerns “de facto reactions”, identifiable, I would argue, with the “impress of 
immediate desire” in his earlier What is Human Agency. Taylor is quite clear that 
while our emotions are constituted by our articulations o f them, the 
interpretational activity through which desires are known is not to be thought o f as 
floating free o f underlying facts, involving the relationship between ourselves and 
our environment. He says,
...although they (articulations) are constitutive of our feelings, these cannot just be 
shaped at will by the account we offer of them. On the contrary, an articulation purports 
to characterise a feeling; it is meant to be faithful to what it is that moves us.” (ibid: 64, 
italics added).
What Taylor wants from his theory is a happy settlement o f two requirements on a 
satisfactory treatment o f the role o f desire in practical deliberation. He seems, on 
the one hand, to want to banish non-conceptual activity as an underpinning for 
what one might say about one’s desires, attachments, and so on, because, it seems
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to him implausible to "envisage a non-conceptual analogue for..changes in 
outlook.” (ibid: 70). On the other hand he wants to reserve a place for underlying 
non-conceptual goings on:
What we experience in the dentist’s chair is language independent: and we have no 
trouble imagining an animal having this experience (ibid: 72).
Moreover, he seems -  and this is the sense I attach to “de facto reactions” -  to 
want there to be a place in his theory for a conditioning or constraining role for 
the non-conceptual. That the phenomenal aspect o f objects that evoke moral 
response is indelible in a proper account o f moral experience is captured by 
Taylor’s notion o f "intrinsic description" (1989, 7). But, as I read him, what 
provides for Taylor the informational basis for moral experience is a direct, itself 
unreflective, contact with the exterior world -  a de facto reaction. And in this 
way, the non-conceptual threatens to intrude on what is taken, in another part o f 
Taylor’s theory, to be exclusively interpretational. And it seems that we cannot 
have things both ways. To explore this a little further, it is useful to note an 
example Taylor gives o f a brute reaction -  the example o f nausea (1989, 7). (A 
similar example Taylor gives is o f physical menace: "We can give its 
meaning...in purely medical terms" 1985b, 54). Now nausea (in a simple gastric 
sense) is amenable to a reduction that mentions only natural facts. That the 
offending bacteria were in the Roquefort need not be relevant to an account o f the 
nausea qua brute fact (though it might be to a prevention o f its recurrence). A 
contrasting "response to a proper object", for example, a father’s feelings about 
his own daughter’s forthcoming performance at the school play, is not amenable
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to such a naturalist-reductive account. A reduction that mentions, say, only desire 
as such will leave out much (or all) o f what it is about the forthcoming event that 
makes it a source o f special claims on that father’s attention; that makes it a 
source o f reasons-to-do specifically for him.
However, this latter type of response, whilst not open to a reduction that leaves 
out its phenomenal details, is nonetheless, it seems Taylor wants us to believe, 
grounded in something motivationally true about the father. As quoted already, 
Taylor says:
an articulation purports to characterise a feeling; it is meant to be faithful to what it is that 
moves us. (1985b: 64).
Further, while emotions, etc., are available only in language,
this is not to say we can change our emotions arbitrarily by applying different names to 
them.. .It is not just applying the name that counts, but coming to ‘see-feeP that this is the 
right description..(...)..(0)ur thesis here that language is constitutive of our subject- 
referring emotions says nothing about the order of causation, (ibid: 69-70).
As I read him, Taylor intends a “de facto response” to play the role o f that which 
underlies what is available only in articulation, understood as an item that, whilst 
non-conceptual, is not open to reduction. Hence, when he says that his thesis
takes intrinsic description seriously, that is descriptions of the objects of our moral 
responses whose criteria are independent of our de facto reactions (1989, 7),
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the distinction is intended to invoke a contrast between reflective understanding 
and underlying emotional activity that does not put the former on the side of the 
conceptual, and the latter on the side of the non-conceptual. In this way he seems 
to be alive to the potential for an unsatisfactory rift between reflection, on the one 
hand, and its material, on the other. This is further supported by what he says in 
his recent comments on John McDowell.
In his recent response to John McDowell’s M ind and World Taylor draws 
on the idea o f "coping” as it features in the work o f Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
Coping is, he says, the "ordinary way o f living and moving around in the world, 
and dealing with things." (Taylor, 2002: 111). It is, he continues, this "pre- 
conceptual" engagement with the world that forms the "background" (ibid: 112) 
o f our thinking: "conceptual thinking is embedded in our everyday coping" (ibid);
The mass of coping is an essential support to the episodes of conceptual focus in our 
lives..(...)..(F)undamentally, the background understanding we need to make the sense 
we do of the pieces of thinking we engage in resides in our ordinary coping, (ibid).
What Taylor wants is a middle ground between the non-conceptual basis o f what 
we take our feelings to be, and the irreducibly conceptual character o f our 
emotions as they receive attention in our reflective moments. This happy mid­
point is not strongly suggested by talk o f what we share with animals, as in the 
dentist’s chair example, as what impinges on us is here wholly non-conceptual. In 
his response to McDowell, however, it seems that in the notion o f coping Taylor 
has found what he wants. The underlying interplay o f environment and 
subjectivity, and the dynamic development o f the emotional life, something we
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saw at play in Williams, need not be taken to be non-conceptual, and therefore not 
something that intrudes from outside of our articulations o f our feelings. What 
forms the subject matter o f our comments on our feelings is not non-conceptual, 
but pre-conceptual, a notion that allows for it to be understood as material for 
conceptualisation without itself being either irreducibly conceptual or non- 
conceptual. What becomes available once we take on board Taylor’s suggestions 
here is an understanding o f the de facto as a deliverance that is engendered in a 
dynamic process in which agent and environment are involved in an ongoing 
subliminal interactive engagement. Taylor says,
When we focus on some feature of our dealing with the world and bring it to speech, it 
doesn’t come across as just like a discovery of some unsuspected fact, like for example,
the change in landscape at a turn in the road.....................When I finally allow myself to
recognise that what has been making me uncomfortable in this conversation is that I’m 
feeling jealous, I feel that in a sense I wasn’t totally ignorant of this before. I knew it 
without knowing it. It has a kind of intermediate status between known and quite 
unknown. (2002: 112).
In presenting an argument in which desires are seen as responsive to reason, 
Bernard Williams, we saw, hopes to offer an integrated conception o f moral 
deliberation that allows for reflection while keeping the ongoing dispositional 
backdrop seamlessly in the background. Taylor, like Williams, emphasises the 
need to keep the dispositional backdrop in place. He refers to the '"background 
picture' lying behind our moral and spiritual intuitions" (Taylor, 1989, 8) and says 
that "(m)oral argument and exploration go on only within a world shaped by our 
deepest moral responses." (ibid). These quotes are suggestive o f the way in which 
Taylor, like Williams, sees a morality as an inescapable underlying framework for
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deliberation. What he does, however, it seems to me, is to offer a theory o f moral 
thinking that removes from view what Williams takes to be simply opaque. In his 
earlier work Taylor leaves in the picture de facto, underlying motivational factors 
that are themselves inaccessible to reflection. In later work, however, Taylor 
(implicitly) addresses this in his adoption o f the Continental notion o f coping. On 
this account dispositional alterations, though unreflective, draw in rationality in a 
way that rubs out reason-independent, motivational factors, as such. As with 
Williams, however, Taylor fails, I would suggest, to provide a critical standpoint 
that lies outside o f a person's comprehensive doctrine. He presents a satisfying 
picture o f embedded critique that accommodates the vital force of personal 
concerns while they are under review. He also goes further than Williams towards 
accommodating the sort o f neutrality Rawls needs - in Taylor background 
conditions are not determining grounds for standing convictions in the way they 
are in Williams' account. Nonetheless, the background is all embracing in 
reflection, which fact precludes a reflective stance that has the fundamental bases 
of doctrinal opinions in view. An account o f reflective critique that is more 
helpful to Rawls is, I think, that found in the work o f John McDowell.
§3. McDowell’s Moral Philosophy
Recalling section two, the Communitarian (definitively, perhaps, Sandel 
(1998/1982, 20-21)) seems to think that the only alternative to (what he sees as) 
Rawls’ conception o f the autonomous self is a "radically situated subject" who is 
indistinguishable from his or her passions, interests, values and commitments. But 
this takes no notice o f a third option: a conception o f the person as capable of,
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what I have been calling, embedded critique, and what can be called, reflecting 
McDowell’s approach, a "Neurathian" position. On this conception a person is 
understood to be able to bring into view standing convictions, attachments, and 
modes o f evaluation, while also being situated within an evaluative framework; 
one that forms a backdrop to both unreflective thinking, and critical evaluation. 
To give a flavour o f the Neurathian notion as it appears in McDowell, consider 
the following quote:
Like any thinking, ethical thinking is under a standing obligation to reflect about and
criticize the standards by which, at any time, it takes itself to be governed Now it is a
key point that for such reflective criticism, the appropriate image is Neurath's, in which a 
sailor overhauls his ship while it is afloat. This does not mean such reflection cannot be 
radical. One can find oneself called on to jettison parts of one's inherited ways of 
thinking; and, though this is harder to place in Neurath's image, weaknesses that 
reflection discloses in inherited ways of thinking can dictate the formation of new 
concepts and conceptions. But the essential thing is that one can reflect only from the 
midst o f the way o f thinking one is reflecting about. (McDowell, 1996, 81. My 
emphasis).68
How McDowell defends such a thesis is the subject o f this section.
McDowell defends a philosophical position, in his work on moral 
philosophy, that is, in intention, a moral realism that attempts to overcome the 
traditional, problematic dualism at the heart o f much discussion in moral 
philosophy; the dualism imposed by the contrast between an evident normativity
68 The original context for the image is Neurath (1959, 201): “There is no way of taking 
conclusively established pure protocol sentences as the starting point of the sciences. No 
tabula rasa exists. We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never 
able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials.”
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and an objective, value-neutral sphere. Simon Blackburn's response to Mackie's 
classic remarks on the location o f moral value, for example, fails, in McDowell's 
opinion because it is cast in terms of a dualism that we really ought not to 
entertain (Mackie (1990/1977), Blackburn (1985), McDowell (1985)). This theme 
is expressed in his earlier work in the idea that colour experience, more generally, 
Lockean secondary “qualities”, ought to be taken to be irreducibly phenomenal. In 
his later work (McDowell 1994, 1995) the idea that we ought to escape the 
traditional value/fact dichotomy is expressed via a challenge to the modem 
conception o f nature, and that approach is my focus here. I do not attempt a 
comprehensive account o f M cDowell’s views, but in order to understand the 
relevance o f his thought to the issues here it is necessary to go some way to 
explaining his central opinions. (The interpretations and criticisms o f McDowell I 
draw on here include the collected papers in Smith (2002), and McDowell et al 
(1998)).
§3.1 The Epistemological Basis o f McDowell’s Moral Philosophy 
I begin with a helpful contrast McDowell makes in M ind and World between, 
what he calls, “bald naturalism” (eg. 1996, 57) and “rampant Platonism” (eg. 
Ibid., 77). As contrasting ways o f describing the character o f ethical reasoning the 
former, we can say, is associated with a way o f thinking that adopts a stance that 
takes itself to have modes o f normative assessment on display, as objects of 
enquiry. That is, bald naturalism takes modes o f evaluation to be open to analysis 
from a fully third-personal point o f view that does not, as a point o f view, invoke 
the modes o f normative assessment themselves as background conditions.
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Normativity can, on this sort of view, be apprehended by concepts not imbued 
themselves with normative content, and that need not be distinguished from 
concepts that take the natural world, understood as a store o f value-free facts, as 
their domain. Rampant Platonism, on the other hand, conceives normativity as sui 
generis. As such, a mode o f normative assessment is only comprehensible from a 
perspective o f active engagement. This has the basic ingredients in a mode of 
normative assessment fully in play, and so inaccessible to objective, from-outside- 
of-the-normative-outlook, scrutiny. I should note that McDowell says that 
rampant Platonism is not to be identified with Platonism, as such (though Plato's 
rhetorical style, he says, might lead one to think he ought to be), and that 
Platonism in mathematics, rather than ethics comes closer to being of the rampant 
type he describes (McDowell, 1996, 77, n.7). Even so, McDowell’s imagery here 
echoes in a helpful way the Communitarian/Rawlsian contrast I adverted to in 
section one o f this chapter.
We will, where bald naturalism and rampant Platonism are all that are on 
offer, as theoretical approaches in ethics, tend to oscillate between those two polar 
positions. One is either outside o f a way o f taking things into normative account 
(with the bald naturalist), or one is enclosed within it, and so ineluctably caught 
up in its presuppositions. If the former approach is taken then the background 
presuppositions that inform the ethical outlook that is under the spotlight are 
neutralised, indeed, unavailable; and if  the latter, Platonist, point o f view is 
adopted then those presuppositions are all embracing. What arises here is the 
question raised against both Rawlsian and Communitarian conceptions in section 
one: If the background conditions for a normative outlook are in place while
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critique is under way, then it is unclear how an out-of-outlook neutrality can be 
achieved; if, on the other hand, these presuppositions are neutralised it becomes 
difficult to envisage how we make any judgements made practically relevant for 
the fully “thick” point o f view, once the neutralised presuppositions are in place. 
McDowell attempts a via media, between, in his work, bald naturalism and 
rampant Platonism, which effort is helpful in placing in a general light the thesis I 
have defended that works up a notion o f embedded critique from a conception of 
market participation.
McDowell’s ethics is part o f a larger thesis which, at its most general, 
perhaps, concerns the relationship between reason and nature; a thesis that takes 
in also his more fully worked out views on epistemology. He makes it quite clear 
(McDowell, 1994, 89) that the difficulties he perceives to be central in 
epistemology play a central role too in any attempt to arrive at a satisfactory 
account o f evaluative-practical deliberation (see also, for example, the 
introduction to the second edition o f M ind and World, xxiii, §10, and 1994, 205). 
I present, first, an overview o f his thinking which places his ethics within this 
larger setting. I then move to a consideration o f the Neurathian aspect o f his view.
At the heart o f M cDowell’s diagnosis o f what he sees as problematic in our 
understanding o f both empirical thought and motivated action, action that 
corresponds to, perhaps after-the-fact, specifiable reasons, is his contention that 
modem philosophy (perhaps, better, modernity, in, for example, Giddens’ sense 
(Giddens, 1990)) is in the grip o f an impoverished conception o f nature. This 
conception is, he argues, a paradigmatic component o f modem (meaning post- 
Baconian) scientific method, and effects, he says, a division between mind as the
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location o f conceptual activity and a natural sphere from which thought is wholly 
excluded. Moreover, meaning and value are placed on the side o f the subject and a 
“disenchanted” meaningless realm is identified with nature. In an afterword 
(1996, pp. 181-182) McDowell acknowledges that a scientific self-understanding 
that denies meaning and value to nature was not unknown to the ancients. 
However, early Greek atomists, whose “point o f view was remarkably like that of 
modem science” (Russell, 1945, 65) did not, McDowell assures us, see it as 
compulsory, as in the modem scientific frame o f mind, to see nature as 
disenchanted. There was room in their thought for a realm o f nature as distinct 
from the subject matter o f science. Indeed, says McDowell, while Aristotle was 
aware o f the atomist perspective he “has no inkling o f a perfectly correct thought 
that we can formulate like this: i f  we identify nature as the topic o f scientific 
understanding, we must see it as disenchanted.” (McDowell, 1996, 182).69 
Further, associated with this conception o f the relationship between thought and 
world is an implicit commitment, McDowell assures us, to “empirical realism” 
(not to be confused with a common description o f one part o f Kant’s doctrine) -  a 
dualistic picture o f the relationship o f mind and nature in which contact is effected 
through, what in empiricist tradition is known commonly as, “the Given”. Ross 
(1970, 12) notes that, “The expression ‘the given’ became an accepted term of 
significance in contemporary philosophical vocabulary largely because o f its use 
by C. I. Lewis in his M ind and the World O rder” He also notes (Ch. 2, §1) three 
ways o f understanding the Given (as “qualia”, as the object, as such, and as a
69 The "image" of disenchantment is originally due to Weber (McDowell, 1996, 70). The 
early sections of MacIntyre, 1987/1981, point also to the dominance of this image.
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subliminal “blur” he attributes to Bradley (Cf. Taylor on Heidegger and Merleau 
Ponty (2002)). In McDowell himself, however, it seems that the idea o f the Given 
does not (or need not) correspond to any o f Ross’ definitions. In his 1998 lectures 
McDowell restates his debt to Wilfrid Sellers’ rejection o f the Myth of the Given 
(Sellars, 1997/1956) and (while he accuses Sellers o f not quite shaking off the 
myth) shares his specification o f it. It is expressed in M ind and World in the 
following way:
Suppose we are tracing the ground, the justification, for a belief or a judgement. The idea 
is that when we have exhausted all the available moves within the space of concepts, all 
the available moves from one conceptually organized item to another, there is still one 
more step we can take: namely, pointing to something that is simply received in 
experience. It can only be pointing, because ex hypothesi this last move in a justification 
comes after we have exhausted the possibilities of tracing grounds from one conceptually 
organized, and so articulable, item to another. (McDowell, 1996, 6).70:
Hence the Given is conceived as a non-conceptual warrant for what the thinker 
professes to be the case. Thus, in the empiricist epistemology McDowell thinks 
written into scientific methodology, what effects constraint on what is judged to 
be the case about the world is understood to be a non-conceptual deliverance, that, 
just as such, offers a ground for a claim to veridicality o f an empirical proposition.
70 Soffer (2003) states that, for Sellars, “the given is the immediate in the sense of the 
unlearned. It is the content of an awareness which does not require prior experience or 
training to be grasped but is simply "there," in the raw. It is a type of awareness which 
does not presuppose language, concepts, or inferences.” However, whilst “rawness” 
communicates its uninterpreted character, to call the Given “a type of awareness”, on 
Sellar’s account of it, presumes, I think incorrectly, that it need have, for him, more than 
subliminal status.
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The picture is that o f a space in which conceptual activity takes place bounded by
a non-conceptual sphere that is knowable via external impacts; the impacts, being
non-conceptual, serving as warrant for the truth of claims made about that non-
conceptual sphere. W hat worries McDowell about this traditional empiricist
account is that i f  we suppose there to be an occurrent connection or contact
between mind and a non-mental exterior we fail to accommodate what he calls, in
his self-conscious echoing o f Kant, spontaneity; the freedom we enjoy in
judgement, in considering the correctness o f our claims with reference not to a
binding restriction on what can be correctly thought but to the rational support
provided. On this empiricist model we are compelled to acknowledge the veracity
of judgements that follow via an inexorable deductive logic from premises whose
content is purely ostensive. We obtain an explanation o f the source of a warranted
belief that threatens to exclude willed avowal o f its content. Or that, in
McDowell’s words, “offers exculpations where we wanted justifications.” (1994,
8). On the other hand, i f  we remove the non-conceptual bridge between thought
and its subject matter and suppose the primitive ingredient in our thoughts to be a
phenomenal representation we are in danger o f losing contact with an extraneous 
1 1
sphere altogether .
71 The same worry is expressed by C. I. Lewis: "If nothing were given to the mind..then 
knowledge must be contentless and arbitrary, for there would be nothing of which it must 
be true. On the other hand, if there were no interpretation offered by the mind, then 
thought would become superfluous, the possibility of error inexplicable, and the 
distinction between tme and false almost meaningless" Lewis' solution is, contra 
McDowell, to give a foundational role to the Given: "There are in our cognitive 
experience, two elements, the immediate data such as those of sense, which are presented 
or given to the mind, and a form, construction, or interpretation, which represents the
184
Thus, we are seemingly destined to oscillate in an attempt to accommodate 
both spontaneity and constraint in our thinking, caught, that is, between an 
empiricism that fully determines warranted judgement through a ground level 
input, and a coherentism that removes all external warrant; that commits us to a 
“ffictionless spinning in a void.” (1994, 11). McDowell goes on, however, to note 
that this oscillation is inescapable only for those who feel the need to incorporate 
in their account o f experience, and o f knowledge, a bridge between what is 
conceptual and what is non-conceptual. But we need not, thinks McDowell, 
believe that the options have to be arranged around such a connection. That we 
do, in fact, feel this need is due, he says, to a fixation with the perspective, 
outlined above, that arrived with modem science. If we conceive o f the 
relationship between mind and nature as one in which a sphere o f conceptual 
activity is bounded by a realm extmded o f thought entirely then a question is, o f 
course, begged concerning how the two come into contact. The empiricist 
supplies a bridge through, in M cDowell’s assessment o f the position, a non- 
conceptual connection, while the coherentist rejects one half o f the picture making 
the conceptual “unbounded”. But we can, McDowell thinks, conceive of the 
relationship between mind and nature in a way that avoids the seeming necessity 
to accommodate a duality o f conceptual interpretation and at-point-of-entry 
uninterpreted input. His rejection o f a view expressed by Davidson is instructive 
in bringing to light M cDowell’s own, positive, thesis.
activity of thought." (C. I. Lewis (1929) "Mind and the World Order" (New York: 
Scribner), pp. 38ff, cited in J. J. Ross (1970).
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In, for example, his Empirical Content (1986), Davidson defends a view 
that, on McDowell’s reading, fails to provide a constraint on thinking from 
outside o f the conceptual. Davidson’s view is, McDowell believes, infected with 
the seeming obligatoriness o f the scientific-empiricist distinction between thought 
as realm o f conceptual activity and nature as exterior to thought. On McDowell’s 
reading o f him, Davidson recognises that a non-conceptual input cannot operate as 
ground for a justification for an empirical claim. However, he sees it as imperative 
for theory that the two realms be connected somehow. His approach is to provide 
a connecting informational bridge which is understood to have a causal but a non- 
justificatory role. That is, like McDowell, Davidson thinks that the intrusion of a 
non-conceptual input into a justification o f what is thought reduces the thinker to 
passive commentator -  reporting on what she is anyway bound to think, given the 
way rational moves in a justification link up ultimately to an in itself inarticulable 
presence. However, unlike McDowell, Davidson feels the need to accommodate 
somehow a connection that bridges, avoids a gap between, the conceptual and 
what is extra-conceptually the case. There is, however, in this account, McDowell 
argues, an unfilled gap between the non-conceptual ground that cannot, as such, 
operate as foundation in a justification and that which is understood to perform 
such a role. This unfilled lacuna leaves the thinker “spinning in a void”, justifying 
beliefs with other beliefs none o f which connect to what is exterior.
To move towards an account o f McDowell’s own thesis we can note that he 
distinguishes between two senses o f the term “content” (1994, 3-4). In one o f its 
senses, the content o f a thought is its subject matter. In this sense the content can 
be articulated, as what completes the phrase “the thought that ”. Let this be
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content(i). In a second sense content is the non-conceptual data understood as 
prior to and necessary for the formation o f thoughts. In the first sense content is 
spoken o f as “representational content” (or as propositional content). In the 
second, content is what has been referred to in empiricist tradition as “the Given” 
(call this content(g)). The latter, in the empiricist view McDowell attacks, supplies 
warrant for the veridicality o f the former. In the light o f this distinction we can see 
what is McDowell’s objection to Davidson here. In placing the Given, content(g), 
outside o f a justification, representational content, what it is that is the content(i) 
o f thought, is disconnected from an objective world which it putatively represents. 
Thus Davidson takes us into the coherentist side o f the oscillation. McDowell’s 
own approach involves rubbing out content(g) and introducing a conception o f the 
relationship between thought and nature in which we need not look for a ground 
for content(i) in the non-conceptual, as such. He rejects as unworkable the 
hypothesis that what warrants our beliefs is a non-conceptual given. The latter 
cannot, as Davidson recognises, function as both raw non-conceptual input and as 
justificatory ground. To play the latter role an interpretation is required o f the 
purely non-conceptual that makes it impossible to conceive o f it as such. And in 
an understanding o f experience that recognises the incompatibility o f the two 
roles, the Given drops out as an imaginary and otiose feature. Such a basis for a 
superior solution is, according to McDowell, obscured to Davidson because o f the 
latter’s unexposed commitment to the “primitive metaphysic” (1994, 82; 1995, 
164) implicit in modem  scientific method. As has been mentioned, an unexposed 
“scientistic realism” (1995, 157) implicit in the modem outlook that conceives o f 
an “in-itself ’ located beyond the conceptual sphere, imposes a requirement on
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accounts o f experience to supply a connection between the conceptual and non- 
conceptual.
In the view McDowell criticises, access to the non-conceptual is achieved 
through conceptual engagements at a basic level; a level o f conceptual activity to 
be contrasted with the more sophisticated, higher level operations at which, say, 
law-like behaviours are considered. On this picture, that representations 
(content(i)) faithfully report or mirror an external world is certified by the 
transmission o f uninterpreted data at the level at which non-conceptual and 
conceptual engage -  this “empirical substance” being carried through “inferential 
linkages” to the level o f higher-order concepts (1994, 6-7). McDowell’s move is 
to interpret the relationship between thought and nature in such a way that he 
avoids what he sees as the mistake o f supposing the need for the Given in an 
account o f experience. McDowell says that “experience is passive” (1994, 10). 
And it is very important to be clear in what way this is meant. As I read him, what 
McDowell intends is the thought that it is wholly beyond our will to alter the way 
in which the world appears to us. He goes on,
In experience one finds oneself saddled with content. One’s conceptual capacities have 
already been brought into play, in the content’s being available to one, before one has any 
choice in the matter. (1994, 10. The thought is repeated at p.31).
What the quote suggests is that the most primitive element in experience is to be 
understood as itself a conceptualisation. In the articulation o f what is irreducible 
in experience what is articulated must be capable o f being so. A pure sensory 
input is, as such, inarticulable and, being so, drops out o f an account of what are
188
the grounds for the content (content(i)) o f one’s thought. In this way we can trace 
a ground without thinking that that ground outstrips the conceptual. The primitive 
conceptual activity associated with the receipt o f information about the world is, it 
has been noted, passive. Thus, in the sense o f passive in play here, the will is 
excluded from the ground level conceptualisations in which how things are is 
articulably yet unavoidably so. Being articulable items the most basic 
conceptualisations are suited to be integrated into a piece o f reasoning that at a 
less basic level does involve the will. Our “engagement with” the world, one 
might say, is concept-involving but will-excluding, while, at a higher level o f 
sophistication, thought is both concept-involving and will-involving. McDowell 
says:
“Thought” can mean the act of thinking; but it can also mean the content of a piece of 
thinking: what someone thinks. Now if we are to give due acknowledgement to the 
independence of reality, what we need is a constraint from outside thinking and judging, 
our exercises of spontaneity. The constraint does not need to be from outside thinkable 
contents. (1994, 28).
The constraint comes from outside thinking, but not from outside what is thinkable. 
(ibid.)
The way that we are aware o f our environment is through unwilled (will- 
excluding) conceptualisations. Experience reduced to its primitive elements is not, 
then, according to McDowell, a series o f subliminal sensory impacts. Experience 
is, for us, o f what is expressibly the case; of, in the Wittgensteinian phrase 
McDowell is fond o f using, what is “thus-and-so” (esp. McDowell, 1994, Lecture 
II).
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§3.2 McDowell’s Ethics 
Equipped with the essentials o f McDowell’s account o f the character o f 
experience we can begin to explore how it informs his ethics. As with his 
epistemological concerns, central to McDowell’s thoughts about ethics is the role 
a tacitly accepted conception o f nature plays in existing metaethical positions. A 
leading source for this aspect o f his moral theory is his Two Sorts o f  Naturalism  
(henceforth, Two Sorts), a paper which deals quite explicitly with this theme. 
McDowell notes there (McDowell, 1995, 149) that Phillipa Foot as well as the 
“subjectivists” (recall "bald naturalists") and “supernatural rationalists” (recall 
"rampant Platonists") she makes her target are all committed to this restrictive 
conception.
In Two Sorts, McDowell offers an alternative to what he says is a common 
reading o f Aristotle’s ethics. On this reading o f Aristotle’s ethics the achievement 
o f moral education is the exercise o f restraint and willed direction o f the passions 
according to principle. The mistake lies, so says McDowell, in supposing Aristotle 
intends us to imagine reason directing a distinct and fully-formed character whose 
propensities, and attachments are ready-made. On the reading he rejects, the 
rational appeal o f ethical requirements and recommendations is grounded in 
evident facts about the relationship between humans and their environment. 
According to this account the virtuous life is the demonstrably right one to lead 
given a social-cum-natural context in which the claims o f each are pitted against 
the claims o f others under circumstances o f scarcity. Further, the standard reading, 
so McDowell claims, appeals to the necessity o f the relationship between virtue
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and nature (drawing (1995, 149) on Aristotle, Metaphysics A. 5. 1015a22-6). What 
this reading depends upon, so McDowell tells us, is an understanding o f the good 
(or Eudaimonia, usually translated as “happiness”) as specifiable independently of 
the virtues. Only then can we read Aristotle as intending that we take the good to 
be achievable through exercising the virtues. However, McDowell goes on:
Aristotle explains ‘happiness’ as ‘acting well’ with ‘well’ glossed as ‘in accordance with 
the virtues'. The good he represents as unattainable without the virtues just is virtuous 
activity.” (McDowell, 1995: 150) (McDowell refers us to Nichomachean Ethics 1.7).
In response to the question, “Why be virtuous?” the response on the rejected 
reading is “Because it is necessary to achieve the good”. However, if  the good just 
is virtuous activity the answer merely describes what will be, quite obviously, the 
state o f affairs once the virtues are exercised. What is not supplied is reason to be 
virtuous, and the good understood as virtuous activity cannot provide a basis for a 
reply to that. A further related aspect o f a common reading o f Aristotle is rejected 
by McDowell, and consideration o f this will further help us to understand his own 
position. An example o f this disfavoured reading can be found, I think, in, Gaut 
(1997) in which the latter attributes to Aristotle a “recognitional model” o f the 
role of practical reason in ethical behaviour:
This model holds that the goodness of actions and of states of affairs in general is 
constituted independently of those actions and states of affairs being the objects of 
rational choice. The role of practical reason is then to recognise the obtaining of 
goodness, and to bring it about that the agent performs good actions and brings about 
good states of affairs. What makes it rational to do such things is that they are good. 
(Gaut, 1997, 162).
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Readings such as Gaut’s present an unstable accommodation o f two features o f 
Aristotle’s ethics: a naturalism that grounds the rational appeal o f virtue in facts 
about us in relation to others and our common environment, and a characterisation 
o f what virtue requires as being available only to those adequately sensitised (they 
being the practically wise). The recognitional view divides Aristotle’s explanation 
of ethical behaviour into two parts. The first part supplies a foundation for 
virtuous behaviour in natural facts available to anyone. In Gaut’s words,
Practical wisdom for Aristotle is a rational state, which grasps what is good or bad for 
humans.. ..What is good is defined with reference to the human function, so that the good 
is constituted independently of being the object of rational choice, (ibid.).
The second part supposes that only those with the appropriate sensitivities can 
perceive what behaviour virtue requires. Gaut again:
the phronimos (the possessor of practical wisdom) has a sensibility conditioned by the 
virtues, which are exhibited in his knowledge of how to do the right things in the right 
way for the right reasons, and which require a grasp of particulars. (Gaut, 1997, 164).
On the one hand the phronimos (the possessor o f practical wisdom) is one who is 
sensitive because virtuous and on the other hand one who is virtuous because he 
has recognised the good. But how can the good be recognised by one who is not 
antecedently appropriately sensitised? To think o f the good as existing anyway, 
independently o f the perceiver’s sensitivities, is to view it from a perspective that 
is not available to the phronimos; indeed is not available to anyone not
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appropriately sensitised. The reading has us reason in a circle: what virtue 
requires is not available to one who is not antecedently sensitised, while 
sensitivity develops from an apprehension o f what virtue requires. The circle is 
analogous to the oscillation McDowell identifies in accounts o f experience. What 
is required in both areas is a constraint on thinking that operates as an appeal to 
objective fact. Here, i f  we bring sensitivities into the picture as the source of 
moral understanding we threaten to remove objective ground. Once we put 
objective ground in place, in the manner o f the recognitional model, however, we 
threaten to take moral understanding out o f the hands o f the individual. 
Accommodating both a role for sensitivity and for objective, interpersonal, ground 
is awkward for a conception o f nature that places what one is sensitive to out there 
among the non-conceptual facts. The source o f the misreading o f Aristotle 
McDowell observes is again a conception o f nature in which it is extruded of 
conceptual content. Here the crime is the ascription to Aristotle o f an 
understanding o f nature that post-dates his own time. McDowell leads us out o f 
the circle with a re-conception o f nature more akin, he thinks, to Aristotle’s own. 
And central, here, is that for McDowell’s Aristotle the value o f virtue is 
intelligible only to those who already, perhaps unreflectively, practice it. Virtuous 
behaviour, as a category o f action, is available as a category only to those for 
whom virtue is already o f value: to those who know “the that”, though not 
necessarily “the because” . (Bumyeat, 1980, 7 1)72.
72 Here Bumyeat quotes Aristotle: "...while one must begin from what is familiar this 
may be taken in two ways: some things are familiar to us, others familiar without 
qualification. Presumably, then, what we should begin from is things familiar to us. This 
is the reason why one should have been brought up in good habits if one is going to listen
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To engage in reflection about the nature o f morality (to address “the 
because”) it is necessary that the individual recognise what acts, say, are kind, 
brave, tempered and so on. Such recognitional, cognitive capacities are what 
constitute “the that” and it is their acquisition that receives inadequate explanation 
in the reading McDowell rejects. And he joins Bumyeat in attributing a 
developmental model o f morality to Aristotle. Bumyeat says that,
(Aristotle) knew intellectualism in the form of Socrates’ doctrine that virtue is 
knowledge. He reacted by emphasising the importance of beginnings and the gradual 
development of good habits of feeling, (ibid., 70).
And for what those “beginnings” are, Bumyeat again:
A wide range of desires and feelings are shaping patterns of motivation and response in a 
person well before he comes to a reasoned outlook on his life as a whole, and certainly 
before he integrates this reflective consciousness with his actual behaviour, (ibid.).
adequately to lectures about things noble and just..". Thus the appropriate student for 
Aristotle's series of lectures is one already schooled in moral requirements, and so 
suitably sensitised. A person not so equipped does not see the world in the required 
wayand so cannot bring into view moral phenomena. Bumyeat clarifies: "The contrast 
here between having only 'the that' and having both 'the that' and 'the because' as well, is a 
contrats between the knowing or believing that something is so and understanding why it 
is so". And, also Bumyeat, 1980, 71: "The man who knows for himself is someone with 
"the because" -  in Aristotle's terms he is a man of practical wisdom equipped with the 
understanding to work out for himself what to do in the varied circumstances of his life -  
while the one who takes to heart sound advice learns "the that" and becomes the sort of 
person who can profit from Aristotle's lectures."
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This view, like the rejected reading, secures a place for natural facts about 
humans, our social and environmental circumstances, in an explanation o f moral 
behaviour. Where they differ is that for Bumyeat and McDowell the way in which 
natural facts about us shape our behaviour is more subliminal than the 
recognitional model allows. That there are ethical requirements can be known 
only through a shaping o f one’s intellect and emotions in moral education. And, 
here, McDowell’s philosophy o f experience informs his ethics.
For McDowell, what action, say, is right in given circumstances is not 
something that should be understood as holding, or being the case, independently 
of the individual’s interpretation o f what is, in that situation, required. This basing 
of a correct judgement on the sensitivities and beliefs o f the individual without 
McDowell’s revised conception o f the relationship between nature and mind will 
lead some, o f course, to doubt that he has secured objectivity. This will only be 
the case, however, if  we think o f objective warrant as available in a way that 
exceeds what a mature adult can possibly come to think o f as morally required. In 
this way, as with his epistemology, an external realm outside o f how we can 
possibly conceive the world, drops out o f view. In the moral realm what is 
perceived as required is a function o f upbringing and determines in part what is 
seen as required in a given situation. If we absent from the history o f an individual 
an upbringing (or other means) in which an appropriate refinement o f the “moral 
sense” is achieved then we remove the possibility for that individual o f seeing 
things in the way a morality requires. How the world is for us is limited to what 
can possibly be the content o f a conceptualisation; and this in a way that removes 
the mistaken search for a non-conceptual source o f what is thought. This permits a
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conception o f moral perception that sees it not as a spreading o f value or emotion 
on a factual canvas but as the isolating o f what is an integral element in the 
apprehension o f a scene.
What is o f import for us is not the contribution this makes to a discussion 
about moral realism but the capacity it imbues the agent with to reason toward 
action from premises that invoke the contents o f a moral outlook. It is an 
important feature o f M cDowell’s ethics that we be conceived not simply as 
applying rules and responding to ethical signals we have leamt to identify, but that 
a moral outlook comes replete with a capacity to assess its validity. 
And this is a rational capacity in which what our desires are, facts about what is 
possible, moral principles and so on are all in view as contributing to an 
assessment o f what should be done:
Reason does not just open our eyes to our nature, as members of the animal species we 
belong to; it also enables and even obliges us to step back from it, in a way that puts its 
bearing on our practical problems into question.(McDowell, 1995: 154).
I do not mean to suggest that M cDowell’s approach solves the problem o f how to 
support a conception o f reflective thinking that combines both embeddedness and 
critique. He recognises that the Aristotelian model he draws on pays insufficient 
attention to self-examination, the shaping role o f the polis being emphasised over 
the need for watchfulness at the individual level. And McDowell’s own adoption 
o f a Neurathian conception o f reflective critique will not silence critics who, like 
Habermas, seek a source o f universal principle that transcends tradition. 
However, on an, I think, uncontroversial reading, McDowell offers a picture o f
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evaluative deliberation in which there is a place not only for rational capacities 
that enable an individual to think within a tradition, but also for neutral critical 
faculties that enable a self-awareness that sees the tradition-bound modes of 
thinking as inherently open to critique. This is not to say that the person can step 
outside o f a tradition and assess its merits wholesale. What it does point to is the 
special way in which commitments, and the like, are held. While neutral rational 
capacities may not permit extra-tradition inspection o f standing commitments, and 
the like, they do affect their status. They are, on McDowell’s model, inherently 
open to critique, a characteristic that forms the basis for a middle way between a 
(“bald naturalist”) understanding o f beliefs and so on that rubs out their vital 
background support, and a (rampant Platonist) conception that invests them with 
directive status within a living morality.
§4. A McDowellian Reading of Rawls
On McDowell’s Neurathian conception o f reflective thinking it is necessary that 
the reasons, beliefs, modes o f evaluation, and so on, that inform a moral outlook 
are held in a way that sees them as inherently sensitive to critical inspection, and, 
indeed, revisable on a piecemeal basis. Moreover, the reasons, affections and so 
on, that are viewed as so sensitive also retain, on this picture, their practical 
purchase, while they are the subject o f criticism. In McDowell one finds oneself 
landed with a living morality, equipped, nonetheless, with the means to assess its 
justificatory basis. Such a conception can, I want to show, be identified in Rawls.
In lecture II, section 7, o f Political Liberalism Rawls attempts to aid our 
understanding o f how he conceives the evaluative thinking o f his citizens, by
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characterising types o f desire they are presumed to have. Their desires can, he 
says, be categorised as object, principle, and concept dependent. First, object- 
dependent desires. These include desires for food, drink, social status, wealth, and 
desires corresponding to attachments, affections and loyalties (the last three might 
be exemplified, presumably, by a desire to see a friend, or one’s national sports 
team do well) (Rawls, 1996, 82). W hat marks out a desire as object dependent is 
that,
the object of desire, or the state of affairs that fulfills it, can be described without the use 
of any moral conceptions, or reasonable or rational principles, (ibid.).
To account for a football fan’s applause for her team it is adequate to mention her 
desire to see them do well, which desire can be accounted for by a description of 
her special attachment to that team. This pointing to a desire ought not, however, 
be taken to imply a Humean picture, for this type o f desire. On the (canonical) 
reading o f Hume desire is the primitive spur to a motivationally inert reason, and 
desire does not have this foundational role in Rawls’ theory. To see why, or in 
what way this is the case, it is helpful to consider what he says about principle- 
dependent desires. He says,
the object or aim of the (principle-dependent) desire, or the activity in which we desire to 
engage, cannot be described without using the principles, rational or reasonable as the 
case may be, that enter into specifying that activity, (ibid.).
Examples Rawls gives, o f principles that serve to make principle-dependent 
desires, and associated activities, intelligible, are the following two rational
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principles: to adopt the most efficient means to given ends, and to select the 
“more probable alternative”. Examples o f reasonable principles include those 
“associated with the moral virtues recognized by common sense such as 
truthfulness and fidelity.” (ibid., 83). Hence, if  we envisage an actual choice of 
some item o f food, say, we can, or it is explanatorily adequate to, account for the 
action by mentioning an extant desire quite simply for food, or that specific item. 
An act o f truthfulness, on the other hand, will not, in a normal case, be attended 
by a desire fully described as one to be truthful just on that particular occasion, 
but will reflect a principled commitment to honesty. And, in order to make this 
sort o f case different to the object-dependent case, the commitment itself must not 
be taken to have a desiderative ground. Were it to be so taken then the principle 
itself could be the object o f the desire, and the principle-dependency would in fact 
be mere object dependency. Thus, the object and principle dependency o f desires 
can be distinguished by pointing to the need to posit commitment to a principle in 
order to rationalise certain types o f behaviour (eg. Promise keeping) and not 
others (eg. Buying a personal stereo). But there is more to the distinction. 
Rawls intends to characterise his agents’ evaluative thinking in such a way that 
they possess “autonomy”: understood as a capacity to exercise self-command, to 
act from principle in a way that denies a heteronomous role to affection.
In a footnote, that is very significant in this context, he says:
It is important to stress that the force, or weight, o f principle-dependent desires is given 
entirely by the principle to which the desire is attached, and not by the psychological 
strength o f the desire itse lf. .A person with a good will, to use Kant’s term, is someone 
whose principle-dependent desires have strengths in complete accordance with the force,
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or priority of the principles to which they are attached, (ibid., 82-83, n. 31. My 
emphasis.).
Hence, there is an intellectual appreciation o f the rational weight of a principle, 
where the rational weight, or its intellectual appeal, itself has a motivational role, 
quite independent o f a, factually present, desire to act on that principle. Indeed, I 
think, a correct interpretation o f Rawls, here, sees the factually present desire as 
dropping out of Rawls’ account, being replaced by desire understood as that 
which accounts, as a matter o f description, for the motivational attachment to a 
principle, or, indeed, an object, but that does not do the generative role o f desire in 
a standard Humean account. In support o f this, note that Rawls applauds Bernard 
Williams’ work here, on the “motivational set”, a conception, Rawls tells us, that 
may dissolve the traditional divide between Humean and Kantian accounts of
I'Kpractical deliberation (ibid., pp. 84-85 & 85, n.33). Autonomy, non-desiderative 
self-direction, may, if  Rawls’ account is correct, be possible without the 
metaphysics of a noumenal will. Indeed, what Rawls is effecting here, he seems to 
say, is a theoretically plausible account o f practical deliberation that captures our 
intuitions about what evaluative reasoning must be like for there to be social 
agents capable o f reasoning about justice, (the model he presents draws 
importantly also on Thomas Nagel (1970)). This is not to say that an object- 
dependent desire cannot compel. It might be a fact about an agent that he simply 
cannot resist being drawn towards food. Rawls’ model is, I take it, consistent with 
akrasia as it is commonly experienced. However, for object-dependent desires to 
fit into the overall scheme that Rawls presents it cannot be the case, I suggest, that
73 See §2 above.
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object-dependent desires compel just as natural facts about a person. It must be 
the case, rather, that they are responsive to reason, and this nullifies their status 
just as natural facts, simpliciter (what Taylor would call “de facto” desires: see 
§2). To see why, we need only recall from what was said above that a principle- 
dependent desire can be characterised as merely object-dependent. A persons’ 
sustained fanaticism for a certain principle might make his attachment to it 
pathological. The object in this object-dependent desire just is the principle. 
Suppose, then, as is natural, that we want to offer an account, using Rawls’ 
scheme, for, on the one hand, a person whose formerly rational commitment has 
become pathological, and, on the other hand, the remediable nature o f his 
condition. In either case, were we to think o f his (pathological) object-dependent 
desire as a natural fact about him, simpliciter, as in a basic Humean account, then 
we would not have the means to offer a narrative that involved his desire, as in the 
second case, for example, coming to be, once more, principle-dependent. There 
would in our story be a transition between desires o f distinct status (from object- 
dependent desire to principle-dependent desire) with no intermediate status 
linking the two. The way to remedy this is to think o f his object-dependent desire 
as already, so to speak, saturated with reason, and so responsive to rational 
control, in the way that a desire, just as natural fact, is not.
But there is more to the inherent responsiveness to reason o f desire, more 
broadly, affection, simpliciter. A conception o f desire that sees it as responsive to 
rational critique need do no damage to a simultaneous understanding o f it as 
psychologically directing. While this latter aspect is not, one suspects, 
embraceable in thought, a conception o f it that preserves its directive character
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can form part o f a rational understanding o f it. The notion of conception- 
dependent desires completes the Rawlsian picture o f self-regulation. It would be 
possible to imagine a person whose commitment to principles is unreflective, the 
non-desiderative self-command he exercises being based in an unreflective 
commitment to social norms (the above pathological example is a cognate, though 
dissimilar, case). It is possible, from a third-person perspective, further, to 
imagine a person selecting in a norm governed way among competing principles. 
This would not require the person to have a reflective grasp o f the reasoning that 
supports the selection o f possible principles. But this is not what Rawls wants. 
Conception-dependency refers to the selection o f principles according to a 
rationale that reflects a knowing commitment to substantive ideals:
These desires can be described by saying that the principles we desire to act from are seen 
as belonging to, and helping to articulate, a certain rational or reasonable conception, or a 
political ideal, (ibid., 84).
Rawls doesn’t fully spell out what he intends by his use o f the term “desire” in 
this context. It is to be expected that he intends us to think there is a difference in 
type between a desire to eat fruit and a desire to apply a principle, but Rawls 
doesn’t expand. I think, however, that, insofar as what Rawls has to say bears the 
interpretation I have offered, there is, at least in one sense, parity between object, 
principle, and conception dependent desires. If  an object-dependent desire is not a 
desire simpliciter then the conception o f it will be integrated with its rationale. A 
person’s desire to picnic with friends cannot, on this understanding, be reduced to 
descriptions drawn from human physiology but must mention phenomenal aspects
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of, for example, the nature of his relationships. And in supplying this sort of 
information we are at the same time supplying a reason for his desire, in a way 
that has the desire and reason appear as a couplet. Indeed, there is no way to the 
desire apart from through its attendant rationale. Similarly, and more patently, a 
desire to see a principle inform one’s action will be inexplicable just as such, but 
must mention the associated rationale. But then what emerges is not only the 
autonomy o f evaluative reasoning from desire as such, but the independent status 
o f reasons. That is, they are responsive to critique but are also simultaneously part 
of a living morality, hence capable o f playing a shaping role in the person’s 
deliberations.
Note, with this, the following:
while a reasonable comprehensive view is not necessarily fixed and unchanging, it 
normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine. Although stable 
over time, and not subject to sudden and unexplained changes, it tends to evolve slowly 
in the light of what, from its point of view, it sees as good and sufficient reasons. (Rawls, 
1996, 59);
We have a picture o f normative thought, then, in which reasons with independent 
status, in the above sense, are informed by a tradition, that, whilst encumbering, 
does not foreclose critique. As possessors o f a comprehensive doctrine, then, 
Rawls’ agents normative outlooks bear a Neurathian interpretation. Rawls can, 
then, be read in such a way that he is not guilty o f requiring a detached 
perspective that nullifies the generative factors in a thick, ethical vision. But what 
can be said of the relationship between the citizens qua citizens, replete with 
comprehensive doctrines, and their specification in the original position? Even if
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Rawls can be said to present a conception o f the person that facilitates incremental 
change to a comprehensive doctrine, through its openness to living critique, it 
might be the case, o f course, that the original position (he invites his citizens to 
consider, as a device for the derivation o f public principles) requires they 
neutralise the bases o f their thick perspectives.
In his reply to Habermas (1996, Lecture IX) Rawls appears to close the 
option o f supposing political discussion to somehow integrate with that associated 
with a comprehensive vision: . .political liberalism moves within the category of
the political.. .It leaves untouched all kinds o f doctrine -  religious, metaphysical, 
and moral -  with their long traditions o f development and interpretation.” (ibid., 
375). However, it is, as ever, important to remember the different standpoints in 
Rawls’ theory. This statement (he calls it a “central idea” (ibid.)) is made from the 
point o f view o f the theorist and so need not be taken to imply a similar 
bifurcation in the minds o f the citizens themselves. The citizen need not adopt the 
theorist’s standpoint in assessing the rationale for the two principles o f justice and 
so a strict compartmentalisation (of political and comprehensive discourse) may 
not be expected o f him. Note first (p. 374) that for a person to be “reasonable”, 
that characteristic o f a person that enables them to compromise, they must 
possess,
a willingness to propose fair terms of social cooperation that others as free and equal also 
might endorse -  and to act on these terms, provided others do, even contrary to one’s own 
interest; and second , a recognition of the burdens of judgement and acceptance of their 
consequences for one’s attitude (including toleration) toward other comprehensive 
doctrines.
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Now, Rawls discusses the “burdens o f judgement” (Lecture II, §2) in the context 
o f explaining how “reasonable disagreement” is possible. Here he refers to the 
two moral powers and says (p. 55) that,
Given their moral powers, they share a common human reason, similar powers of thought 
and judgement: they can draw inferences, weigh evidence, and balance competing 
considerations.
So that what makes a comprehensive doctrine reasonable is the capacity on the 
part o f the individual whose doctrine it is to engage in balanced discussion with 
other doctrines. The “burdens o f judgement” are then the capacities for neutral 
(or, perhaps, inter-doctrinal) thinking that accompany a “reasonable” 
comprehensive position. An alternative way o f specifying the “burdens o f 
judgement”, one that brings out more clearly the idea o f burden, is to see 
reasonableness as imposing requirements for impartiality, and the like, on the 
individual. This bears a striking resemblance to McDowell’s thought that the 
“freedom that...is...exem plified in responsible acts o f judging, is essentially a 
matter o f being answerable to criticism in the light of reasonable considerations.” 
(McDowell, 1998c, 434). There is a difficulty here associated with the type of 
access individuals can have to other doctrinal outlooks, but Rawls need not be 
taken to be specifying an out-of-doctrine point o f view, only a degree o f  openness 
that permits cross-doctrine discussion. Indeed, Rawls is not looking for 
agreement. What he seeks is a basis for reasonable disagreement, and this does 
not require either an out-of-doctrine purview or first-personal insight into others’ 
way o f seeing. So, we begin to see the seamlessness in, what we can call, Rawls’
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conception o f “embedded critique”. Though shaped by different comprehensive 
doctrines, persons’ also possess, in common, the rational capacities to work 
towards and sustain a material, i f  not an ideological, compromise. But it might 
still be remarked that, even if  it is accepted that the citizens are represented as 
embedded in an ongoing public culture, and, further, that they are capable o f inter- 
doctrinal debate without stepping outside o f their comprehensive outlook, it is still 
the case that in the original position comprehensive doctrines are blind-sided. And 
this makes inoperative what are, in fact, directive in living deliberation -  so 
making for an unrealistic account o f the bases o f social stability. One response to 
this goes as follows. In A Theory o f Justice Rawls views his approach as a 
specific application o f the theory o f  rational choice. But later Rawls disavows this 
remark (1996, 306, n.21). He says in his later work that,
(The original position) helps us to work out what we now think, once we are able to take 
a clear and uncluttered view of what justice requires when society is conceived as a 
scheme of cooperation between free and equal citizens from one generation to the next. 
The original position serves as a mediating idea by which all our considered convictions, 
whatever their level of generality -  whether they concern fair conditions for situating the 
parties or reasonable constraints on reasons, or first principles and precepts, or 
judgements about particular institutions and actions -  can be brought to bear on one 
another. This enables us to establish greater coherence among all our judgements; and 
with this deeper self-understanding we can attain wider agreement among one another. 
(1996, 26, emphases added).
The reference to society as “a scheme of cooperation... from one generation to the 
next” in this quote is frequently made by Rawls, and allows us, quite confidently, 
to situate his citizens in society as an ongoing, organic enterprise. Stability,
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indeed, is achieved, in part, not through a periodic thought experiment in which 
the principles that would be ground out in the original position are held against 
political reality, but through the strength o f the public culture the principles 
support. It is from within an ongoing society that the citizens consider the justness 
o f their living institutions -  they do not enter into the society having first agreed 
to a way to design public rules. The rational capacities associated with 
reasonableness need not be thought o f as separate from the capacities that are 
drawn on in an evaluation that calls into play the ingredients o f a comprehensive 
doctrine. The tools o f critique necessary to material compromise, to construct a 
public space in which competing ideologies can influence the activities of 
different groups, need not be thought o f as extra to the capacities drawn on in 
carrying out those activities. We can think o f the comprehensive doctrines as 
coming replete with the means to assess them, and the means to establish what, 
given the reasonable claims o f others, it is reasonable to claim for oneself.
§5. Beyond the Market Context
Market-oriented choice, though a central aspect o f everyday life in a modem 
economy, covers only a limited domain o f personal choice. It leaves out choice, 
and, more broadly, conduct, in family and other social contexts, and so the picture 
o f embedded critique I have argued for might be thought, for that reason, to be o f 
limited interest to Rawlsian criticism. In this section I want to argue that the 
conception o f embedded critique associated with market participation has 
implications for how we view the critical faculties o f the Rawlsian citizen as such, 
and not only in his role as market participant. This can be done, I want to argue
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(in §5.1), by drawing on the notion o f metapreference I used in chapter 3 to 
formulate a conception o f embedded critique. This can be fleshed out, however, 
with reference to the picture o f ethical evaluation I have found in McDowell’s 
moral philosophy. Rawls himself, in A Theory o f  Justice i f  not in Political 
Liberalism , takes two approaches to the characterisation of his agents - 
approaches that, when combined, present, so he intends, a complete picture. In the 
third part o f the earlier work Rawls talks about the moral development o f persons, 
their upbringing under the authority o f adults responsible for their care, and so on, 
presenting an empirical, developmental account o f moral personality. This 
contrasts with the presentation in part one o f A Theory o f  Justice in which the 
analysis proceeds with reference to the rational (and reasonable) capacities of the 
individual considered quite apart from the realities and contingencies o f moral 
upbringing. I presume from this that it was part o f Rawls’ intention to provide a 
conception o f the person that accounted both for the rational capacities necessary 
to neutral, moral evaluation and for the way in which what is morally possible for 
persons is determined in large part by what can be transmitted across generations, 
and the ways in which family and community can shape moral character.
The way in which I defend an extension o f my thesis to the Rawlsian agent 
per se is intended to mirror this type o f approach. I begin with an analysis that 
refers only to evaluative criteria and their rational support, and go on, drawing on 
McDowell, to refer to the contingencies o f moral upbringing I such a way, I hope, 
that there is a neat fit between the conception o f reflective critique associated with 
the market participant and that associated with the more developmental picture I 
draw from McDowell. My intention is that the way these two fit together
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preserves the rounded conception Rawls, I have suggested, wanted for his theory 
while avoiding the criticism that his representation o f the stable society is 
unrealistic.
§5.1 Metapreference and the Basic/Non-Basic Distinction 
One, perhaps, fruitful way to argue for a more general view is to note the overlap 
between market institutions and those associated with other areas o f life. Very 
often it is the case that a restriction in the marketplace reflects discussions not 
directed in the first instance at market conduct. Prohibitions (on what can be 
traded) intended to preserve public morals, for example, though they have 
implications for market choice will commonly originate outside o f that context, 
and have implications for what counts as permissible conduct more generally. The 
institutional rules that the market participant confronts, then, will see him engaged 
in debates concerning public policy at large. Hence, the critical capacities 
associated with market participation should not be viewed as those o f an isolated 
actor, isolated in that his critical response to other types o f institutional constraints 
is very different. It is possible to view the market (as Karl Polanyi has classically 
argued (Polanyi (2001/1944)) as embedded in political and social structures. The 
market participant is, in this way o f seeing things, caught up in a nexus of 
overlapping institutions that make it difficult to see the criticality associated with 
market participation as limited to the market domain.
However, among the objections that might be raised to the view that a 
general thesis is possible, is one that observes the lack o f criticality among those 
who uncritically accept the constraints imposed by non-basic institutions, and
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whose actions in the marketplace are, for that reason, without the supposed critical 
aspect. A devout Jainist, for example, will, as part o f the vow of non-violence, be 
vegetarian, and will exhibit then, so the argument might go, uncritical choice 
behaviour in the market. He may choose, in this setting, to blind-side all possible 
evaluative criteria other than those that accord with his religious convictions. He 
may, for that matter, be inured in his Jainism so that his beliefs inform his choices 
as a matter o f blind habit. This, surely, is a market participant who lacks the 
critical capacities I have argued for in connection with the market actor.
It will be helpful, for coherence, to put this contention in a metapreference 
framework. I argued earlier that the reflective capacities o f the market agent are 
well represented by a metapreference model o f practical reasoning. Here we can 
suppose the binary choice set, C{x, y}, to contain elements, x and y, that 
correspond to items proscribed and not proscribed by a person’s religion. Element 
x might be meat, for example, while y is cereal. A person might, applying the 
metapreference model, have preferences x P ly  or yP2x, there being associated 
with each possible preference ordering an evaluative criterion that informs that 
preference. Reason-based autonomy entails that the alternative criteria be assessed 
from a point o f view that brings both criteria into play, this point o f view being 
one that cannot, then, be itself regulated, exclusively, by either evaluative 
criterion. Where E, E ’ represent alternative evaluative criteria we can (recalling 
chapter 3) adopt the following schematic representation o f choice: if  E then 
(xPly)P(yP2x) and C{x, y} = x, where the choice o f E reflects an all things 
considered assessment o f the reasons supporting E. In this way o f presenting 
things someone who objects that I cannot go from a conception o f critical
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evaluation for the marketplace to a more general account could say that for the 
person habituated in the religious convictions o f her community the choice of 
evaluative criteria will not be a matter o f reflective decision. Where evaluative 
criterion E reflects her habitual religious convictions there will be no question 
whether E informs her choice, and so an alternative criterion (E’) and, moroever, 
the reasoning that compares E and E ’ will form no part o f her reasoning towards 
choice. Where alternative criteria are those associated with the institutional 
restrictions o f a well-ordered Rawslian society, those criteria, and their supporting 
rationale, will be similarly silenced. The person whose habitual religious 
convictions inform her market choices, then, will be a market actor, will be 
someone who can make market-based choices, but she will not possess the 
reason-based autonomy on which I have based my argument for embedded 
criticality. My argument, then, it could be argued, does not generalise. Indeed it 
rests on a spurious assumption o f reason-based autonomy that it is improper to 
associate with market participants once we recognise the full extent to which 
market choices can be informed by personal convictions.
I would argue, however, that such a person has no pace in a Rawlsian 
society, and that a strong support for my argument suggests also that it would be 
untenable to suppose that my thesis cannot be generalised to cover the Rawlsian 
citizen per se. To see this, imagine an agent whose market-based choices are 
exclusively informed by his comprehensive doctrine. Any evaluative criterion E 
that informs choice is supported by reasons that have a basis in his comprehensive 
view. This means that (staying with the metapreference conception) that he is 
capable o f conditional judgements o f the form, if  Ei then xPiy, but any Ei, Ej that
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are compared will be have supporting reasons that are drawn from comprehensive 
doctrine. Letting superscript c denote that the evaluative crtieria are supported by 
reasons drawn from comprehensive doctrine, we can not that any Ei, Ej should 
properly be designated Eic, Ejc. What such a person cannot do, by assumption, is 
to bring into play in her reasoning evaluative criteria supported by reasons whose 
support is neutral with respect to comprehensive doctrines. That is judgements of 
the form Eic or Ein (where superscript n denotes neutral support) are not available. 
A Rawlsian agent, however, a citizen o f a well-ordered society, as Rawls 
describes it, regulated by the two principles o f justice, must be capable of making 
judgements o f the form Eic or Ein. Were she incapable o f such judgements then 
she would be incapable o f thinking that did not engage her comprehensive 
doctrine, and so incapable o f the type o f thinking required for neutral assessment 
o f her society’s institutions. So the person whose choices are informed exclusively 
by habitual religious beliefs cannot be a Rawlsian citizen, and so, therefore, 
cannot be a Rawlsian market participant. But this line o f argument supports the 
view that the Rawlsian agent qua market participant and  qua citizen must possess 
the same hierarchical reflective capacities, capacities that enable the reflective 
assessment o f evaluative criteria whose rational support stem from alternative 
(neutral and doctrinal) sources.
§5.2 McDowell and the Market Agent 
What McDowell offers, and what was lacking in both Williams and Taylor, is a 
way to remove the backdrop, the settled modes o f thinking, evaluative stances, 
and so on, most familiar, perhaps, from Williams’ work, that regulates what a
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person thinks about a policy, event, state o f affairs, and so on. Being unable to get 
behind that backdrop we are unable to distinguish between the mode of reasoning 
a person adopts in her everyday life, and the mode she adopts in neutral scrutiny 
o f public institutions. Rawls commends W illiams’ approach. And the latter does 
indeed offer a way to accommodate personal concern in a way that avoids 
undersocialisation. However, what Rawls requires for a realistic representation of 
social stability is not only the retention o f the practical significance o f personal 
concern in reflective deliberation. In order not to fall into comprehensive 
liberalism, a liberalism that presumes a common stock o f comprehensive 
convictions, Rawls must also incorporate in his conception a capacity for out-of- 
outlook neutrality. Williams does not, I have argued, offer a position that can 
satisfy both desiderata. He fails, I would suggest, to offer room for evaluation the 
bases o f which do not lie within comprehensive doctrine. Rawls’ thesis, however, 
can be read in such a way, or so my previous section suggests, that the higher- 
order criticality, criticality that transcends substantive modes o f thinking, I have 
associated with McDowell’s work, can be associated with Rawls’ work too. This 
is helpful for two reasons. First, the picture o f reflective criticality it recommends 
lends support to the conception supported in chapter three by discussion o f what is 
involved in market participation. Second (what I want to pursue here) it helps to 
establish further the implications for the conception o f Rawls’ agent per se, that is 
it helps us to take the argument beyond the market context.
McDowell, on the interpretation I have offered, identifies two ways o f 
approaching an assessment o f normative positions, ways that vie in moral 
philosophical tradition. We can adopt a naturalistic stance, that views normative
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concepts as adequately described by the sort o f language appropriate also to 
natural (and much social) scientific theory. To talk, for example, o f the 
evolutionary role o f moral rules or commitments, is to effect such a reduction, 
removing from view, as theoretically unimportant, the living significance of rules 
and commitments. An alternative approach emphasises the regulatory character of 
moral concepts. On this (recalling McDowell’s terminology, “Rampant Platonisf’) 
view, moral concepts and categories are what do the work in moral thinking and 
are themselves, as such, not open to reduction. What makes these options seem 
the only options available is, McDowell says, (and I am suggesting that this is a 
good account o f the way the analogy works between his epistemology and his 
moral philosophy) is a presumption that the facts (first-order) moral thinking takes 
into account must be either in themselves without evaluative significance, just raw 
facts, or must be irreducibly value-laden, and so without separable “raw” content. 
Given this understanding o f the possible ways in which fact can appear or operate 
in moral thinking, if  we want to avoid the sin o f Rampant Platonism, the sin of 
investing the world as such with moral significance, then we can run into the arms 
of the naturalist. If we do, however, we remove from view the living, normative 
significance that makes the world we inhabit a moral world at all. The way out of 
this is to reject the seeming need to respect a view o f nature that sees it as value- 
neutral. If we feel the need to respect this conception o f nature we, o f course, in 
Humean fashion, must see the source o f value as the subjective feelings, 
emotions, and so on, o f the spectator. Recalling the analogous manoeuvre in his 
epistemology, M cDowell’s step here is to reject the view (the myth o f the Given) 
that nature must operate as conceptually undilute in a piece o f (in this context)
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normative thinking. The defect o f the Rampant Platonist position is that it sits 
most happily with a view o f morality in which the latter stains the world in a way 
that reflects its background presuppositions. If we no longer acknowledge that this 
must be the way in which we see nature as coming to having normative meaning, 
then we can views things at a more general level. We can talk, in a theoretically 
respectable way, about the potential meaning that facts might have for a morality 
given its commitments, and, moreover, we can make room in an actual morality 
for the possibility that the moral significance things have reflects faulty 
commitments, or ways o f evaluation. This creates room, that is, for a conception 
o f the role o f criticality in moral thinking that does not require the living 
significance things have for its participants to be neutralised in an assessment of 
their merits. This possibility o f a Neurathian movement in moral thinking, in turn, 
requires that we do not view a morality as possessing a regulative backdrop, but, 
rather, as characterised by a higher-order criticality not itself informed by 
background presuppositions. And it is this higher-order criticality that I have 
argued ought to be associated with the market participant, in the exercise o f her 
reason-based discretion.
It is worth noting also the important contribution that is made to 
McDowell’s thesis by the notion o f Bildung. The term has a long philosophical 
history, and is associated with a rich range o f definitions, and its use in McDowell 
is intended to convey, no doubt, some o f this subtlety. However, Bildung, in a 
perhaps too prosaic usage, can be taken to refer to the moral upbringing o f a child, 
where what the use o f the term Bildung emphasises is the rational autonomy that 
is thereby acquired. On this view moral education develops a critical take on a
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morality pari passu  with knowledge and an appreciation o f its substance. Now, 
evidently, people do not arrive as fully formed adults in the marketplace, 
knowledgeable o f much o f a society’s moral culture but needing schooling in the 
ways o f market trade. Part o f our Bildung is an orientation towards the market, 
and, it is plausible to suggest, preparation for the exercise o f reason-based 
autonomy in the marketplace constitutes a significant portion of the “moral” 
upbringing o f the child in a modem market economy setting. So, there is, if  my 
reading o f Rawls in section four can be made to carry water, a rather satisfying 
connection to be had between the Neurathian conception o f the person that can be 
found there and the conception o f reflective thinking I have argued for in 
connection with the market participant.
§5.3 Beyond the Market 
What is understandably missing from M cDowell’s account o f moral education is 
the distinction, important in Rawls, between basic and non-basic institutions. 
People, o f course, in actual as well as in well-ordered societies, are raised in the 
ways of non-basic institutions as well as being exposed to institutions that are, in 
the Rawlsian sense, basic. The explicit and implicit moral codes imposed within 
families, among friends, in professional contexts, and within religious faiths, 
exemplify institutional contexts that are non-basic. The market and, more 
generally, social and legal institutions are, in one sense, basic because their rules 
and regulations play an important role in defining non-basic institutions, and 
because their provisions, in part, govern relations among non-basic institutions. In 
this way what legally constitutes a family is governed at a basic level, while, in
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some cases, what a person is permitted to do within the family (children’s bed 
times, and so on) is non-basic. The property rights o f religious communities are, 
for further example, basic, while their credos are non-basic. Now a person will, in 
his or her upbringing, be sensitized to, or be made aware o f the need to be 
sensitive to, the basic requirements o f market trade. These will include 
prohibitions whose justification, being basic,74 does not draw on the 
comprehensive doctrine o f any particular social grouping. A person will, 
typically, however, also be exposed to the prohibitions and prescriptions 
associated with the non-basic institution (indeed, institutions) she belongs to. It is 
quite possible that there will be no interference between basic and non-basic 
requirements at a personal level. While trade in dead animals is permitted at a 
basic level it might not be permitted at a non-basic level, for example. The 
individuals this affects can recognise both a basic permission and a non-basic 
obligation, and can act accordingly. Things might not be so simple for those (for 
example, fox-hunters) who want to engage in something impermissible at a basic 
level but permissible at a non-basic level. However, even here, there is no 
intellectual, or logical, difficulty involved in perceiving an obligation (a basic 
obligation) and a (non-basic) permission. Suppose, then, somebody whose 
Bildung has been comprised o f exclusive inculcation in a basic institutional 
setting, so that she is blind to obligations and permissions other than those that 
emanate from her non-basic institution. Suppose, further, that one o f her 
permissions conflicts with an obligation associated with a basic institution,
74 The sense in play of “basic” here entails, of course, that a justification is basic if it is 
associated with a basic institution (here the market).
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specifically the market. It seems straightforward that if  she (and not merely her 
teachers) is to be a market participant then she must be sensitive to normative 
considerations o f a basic type, and not merely those that are non-basic. Note 
further that she will have to be able to bring into view justifications associated 
with both basic and with non-basic normative considerations if  she is to be 
sensitive to restrictions and permissions emanating from both quarters, restrictions 
and permissions that may concern the same objects o f choice. Hence, so long as 
we cannot envision agents who are sensitive to only non-basic norms (and one 
good reason for not envisioning such people is that they will not qualify as 
reasonable in the required sense) we must have agents whose criticality embraces 
market-based norms. Once we have in place only such people then it seems 
untenable to suppose agents in family, and other non-market contexts, to possess 
the bipartite critical faculties the neo-Hegelian finds so objectionable in Rawls, 
while, qua market actor, her criticality transcends the neutral/non-neutral divide. It 
seems defensible, then, to view the critical capacities I have argued for in 
connection with market participation, as those o f the Rawlsian agent as such, and 
not only in her guise as market agent.
§6 McDowell, the Market, and Stability
I attempt in this section to pull together the threads o f the argument presented in 
this chapter, and to bring out their relationship to my overall thesis. I begin by 
recalling that Rawls devotes a substantial part o f A Theory o f  Justice to the 
problem o f stability. His intention, in Part III, appears to be to present a theory o f 
moral development that shows how affective attachment to the basic institutions
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of a well-ordered society is compatible with a belief that the behind-the-veil 
reasoning is an appropriate rendition o f the moral point o f view, for purposes of 
assessing existing (basic) institutions. The way he hopes to achieve this 
combination is by pointing to the universality o f the interest in fair and stable 
institutions while emphasising the progressively greater rational distance a person 
is able to achieve from his desires, beliefs, and attachments as he matures.75 Rawls 
comes to doubt the validity o f such a combination as relying on universal interests 
presupposes sufficient resources for political stability in the agents’ 
comprehensive doctrines. This, he comes to think, presupposes too much, and that 
the real challenge for a theory o f justice for a democratic polity is to accommodate 
agents whose comprehensive doctrines are distinct in their fundamentals, so that 
compliance, hence stability, cannot be presumed to flow from shared 
comprehensive convictions. Rawls adjusted his theory to take these considerations 
into account and presented a conception o f normative reflection for the public 
sphere (in Political Liberalism) that views agents as capable o f evaluative 
thinking, with respect to basic political, economic, and social insitutions, that does 
not bring into play their comprehensive doctrines. This bipartite construction, I 
have argued, generates an oversocialised conception o f the obedient citizen that 
leads to an unrealistic representation o f a stable society. Agents are construed as 
acting on themselves from outside o f their comprehensive doctrines in order to 
override their personal motivations. They ought to be represented as vanquishing, 
or moderating the motive power o f their personal concerns. Rawls’ representation
75 Feminist critics of Rawls would say that I am right to say “he” here, as Rawls’ 
(Kohlbergian) account emphasises the development of what are predominantly male 
characterisitics.
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has them bypass their motivations and so fails to represent the tension that ought 
to be represented in a stable, democratic society between willed compliance and 
the vital, though restrained, sources o f dissent.
The problem, then, o f how to accommodate the commitment required for 
social stability and the rational detachment required for neutral thinking does not 
go away for Rawls with the adjustments he makes in Political Liberalism. The 
problem can be seen, not too stylistically, as how to accommodate in one 
theoretical framework an embedded commitment to basic institutions, embedded 
in the sense that the commitment emanates from agents’ comprehensive doctrines, 
and a supporting rationale for those institutions that appeals to a moral point of 
view that is neutral with respect to comprehensive, doctrinal positions. Seen in 
this light, what Rawls requires is a conception o f embedded critique, a conception 
that accounts for the commitment that flows from comprehensive doctrine and 
that allows sufficient reflective distance to allow neutral, non-doctrinal, discussion 
of shared, basic institutions. One way to construct such a conception is, I have 
argued, to draw on a characterisation o f market participation, and such was the 
argument o f chapter three. This allows room for commitment that emanates from 
comprehensive doctrine to be combined with rational reflection that subjects such 
commitments to rational critique. What is not supplied thereby is a 
complementary picture o f moral thinking and its development that indicates how 
flesh and blood citizens in a well-ordered society can, in a way that is compatible 
with this (market-derived) conception, become thoroughly committed to, though 
potentially critical o f their society’s institutions. The moral philosophy o f John 
McDowell was brought on board to provide that second part o f the conception,
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achieving, it is intended, the combination o f commitment and stability, on the one 
hand, and moral neutrality, on the other, that I have argued is missing in both 
Rawls’ earlier and later work.
§7. Conclusion
Rawls presents a positive view o f theories o f reflective critique that emphasise the 
embeddedness o f personal criticism. He thinks that Bernard Williams, for 
example, has valuable things to say about the inability o f the person to escape into 
rational detachment when assessing her moral and political worlds. However, 
thinks Rawls, this ought not to prevent us from describing an artificial conception 
o f reflective criticism that has the agent capable o f radical detachment. I would 
suggest that this combination o f views is not open to Rawls because he must offer 
a conception of reflective criticism, in a well-ordered society, that not only 
maintains the vitality o f personal concerns, something W illiams’ type o f approach 
can secure, but also the type o f neutrality that must be in place if  his agents are to 
be capable of agreement that does not presuppose shared background convictions. 
I have argued that Williams, and the cognate account o f Charles Taylor, cannot be 
drawn on to secure such an account. Neither successfully eliminates prevailing 
background convictions, those that are, in Rawls, associated with comprehensive 
doctrine, as the source o f what a person thinks even in deepest personal reflection. 
Their approaches contrast with those o f John McDowell who views, if  I read him 
correctly, normative thinking as characterised by a higher-level criticality that 
does not privilege the presuppositions o f a particular morality. This degree of 
criticality is analogous to that which I have argued ought to be associated with the
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market participant. Indeed, in conjunction with his thesis on the role of moral 
education in promoting a neutral take on existing norms, we can present a 
McDowellian account o f the moral education o f the young in a market economy. 
This permits a combination o f thoroughgoing commitment to existing institutions, 
commitment that emanates from comprehensive doctrine, and so engenders 
stability, while allowing neutral critique in the assessment o f political, economic 
and social institutions.
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Conclusion
The neo-Hegelian criticism o f Rawls, to the extent that it applies to his conception 
o f the person has been, arguably, refuted by Rawls’ reinterpretation of his theory 
o f justice. By saying that his conception o f the person is meant to model but not to 
represent actual evaluative capacities, Rawls effectively side-steps the neo- 
Hegelian remark. However, the way Rawls constructs impartial assessment has 
implications for his conception o f stability in a well-ordered society. Those who 
object to existing economic or social policy will, where the dispute cannot be 
settled with reference to existing interpretations o f principles o f justice, appeal to 
the argument made in support o f the principles o f justice themselves. Because 
entering into this form o f argument requires an imaginative loss o f a person’s 
existing identity and circumstances, because the reasoning is “behind the veil”, 
the concerns that motivate the claim must be bracketed, and their occurrent, 
practical significance removed. Where, then, a person accepts that her concern 
ought not to be acted upon, where a person accepts that the reasoning that 
supports the principles o f justice will not also support her claim, she must, in 
order to suppress the practical significance o f her concerns, mute, or control the 
strength of, their normative pull. In order to do this, however, on the conception of 
reflective criticism Rawls gives us, she must act on herself from outside o f her 
everyday way o f thinking, what in Rawls is her comprehensive outlook. In 
Bernard W illiams’ well known terminology, she must act on herself in a way that
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draws on resources that are outside of her “motivational set” . And because the 
personal adjustment the person must make does not engage with the bases of her 
everyday practical orientation, she must root out, or extirpate, those personal 
concerns that would otherwise inform her action. More generally, a well-ordered 
society regulated by Rawlsian principles, principles supported in the way he 
would have us support them, will be characterised by uncritical obedience to 
existing policies. Stability, in a liberal democratic society whose institutions are 
sensitive to criticism ought, rather, to be characterised as one in which the 
potential for dissent is ever-present. There should be, in the way stability is 
conceptualised, an ongoing tension between persons’ commitment to existing 
institutions and the desire to see some policies revised or replaced. Rawls fails to 
capture this tension because, as the neo-Hegelian would agree, his conception of 
reflective critique requires a detachment that annuls the normative purchase of 
personal concerns. Unlike the neo-Hegelian criticism, however, this objection 
cannot be easily rebuffed by Rawls’ appeal to the artificiality o f his conception of 
reflective critique. Rawls wants his picture o f stability to be realistic. While the 
well-ordered society merely models actual democratic societies it, nonetheless, is 
intended to represent a political settlement that is achievable, "taking men as they 
are”, in the Rousseauian phrase. That is, the institutions in the well-ordered 
society, though established by ideal theory, ought to be supportable in a way that 
takes account o f the way real world agents (the way “we”) are likely to respond to 
institutional restraints. It is not realistic, I suggest, to expect, or, moreover, to 
entertain the possibility that, actual people will root out concerns that would 
otherwise lead them to dissent. We, rather, temper, through an effort o f will, the
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practical pull o f personal concerns that, though tempered, retain their status as live 
concerns.
It is possible to argue, o f course, for a conception o f the person that 
accommodates ongoing critical acceptance o f institutional rules and policy 
decisions. Such a conception is available, for example, in the theories of Williams 
and Taylor, theories that I have considered in the text. However, what Rawls 
requires, if  he is to answer the charge that he misrepresents the problem o f social 
stability, is a conception that allows for a neutrality that does not privilege any 
particular comprehensive point o f view. He must have this if  he is to avoid the 
sort o f comprehensive liberalism that he presented in his early work, and a 
Williams-Taylor type o f approach cannot, I have argued, offer this. Drawing on 
the work o f John McDowell, it is possible, however, to work up a reading of 
Rawls that achieves these two desiderata: a critical capacity that does not privilege 
comprehensive doctrine; and that retains the vital practical significance of 
personal concern. This is an appropriate model to associate with the market 
participant who, I have argued, if  he is to be soundly characterised as a market 
agent, must possess higher-order critical faculties that transcend the divide 
between neutral and non-neutral, doctrinal thinking. One advantage o f such an 
approach is that it works from within Rawls’ own theory. Rather than importing a 
thesis concerning a conception o f critical reflection from outside o f his own 
approach, my method has been to draw on Rawls’ presumption o f discretionary, 
market-based exchange. It is possible in this way to leave intact all o f Rawls’ 
contentions, and his way o f defending them, changing only our interpretation of 
the reflective capacities o f his agents and, relatedly, the nature o f the original
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position. Rather than taking the latter to be a free-standing model of reflective 
critique, a reading that links it naturally to the faulty, bipartite conception, we 
should see the original position as something that is embraced by Rawlsian agents 
from a point o f view that encapsulates both neutral and non-neutral standpoints. If 
criticality can, as I have argued, be viewed as fundamentally presuppositionless 
then it would be wrong to suppose that agents must cleanse themselves o f their 
comprehensive doctrines in order to see things impartially. That is not to say that 
they ought not to imaginatively remove from view their talents, existing status and 
so on, but this need not lead us to think that they must, thereby, blind themselves 
to the motive force o f their ongoing concerns. This accommodation (of the 
imaginative adoption o f the impartial point o f view and the living practical 
significance o f personal concerns) offers, I suggest, a combination o f reflective 
critique and personal embeddedness that promises to mend what is wrong with the 
representation o f social stability in Rawls.
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